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Privatization of Security in Colombia:  
Expanding the Concept of Militarization 
 
 
 
Andrés Macías 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This dissertation examines the role of the privatization of security in the 
militarization process that took place in Colombia between 1990 and 2010. It also 
analyzes the impact of that particular militarization process on indicators of 
democracy and economic growth. The main purpose of the study is to asses an 
intellectually puzzling situation regarding the existing theory on militarization and 
the evidence provided by the case study: while the current literature concludes that 
militarization is negatively associated with development, the militarization process 
in Colombia has had a positive effect on both democracy and economic growth. 
 
The context of the period in which the research is focused on is 
characterized by a protracted internal armed conflict, the production and trafficking 
of illegal drugs, the demobilization and reintegration of illegal paramilitary groups, a 
strong influence of United States’ foreign policy, unceasing counterinsurgent and 
counternarcotic operations, and an emerging private security industry. The unique 
combination of these characteristics makes the evaluation of the case study 
academically interesting. Likewise, the parallel manifestation of the processes of 
militarization and privatization of security in the same space and time enables the 
possibility of broadening the theoretical approach towards the controversial 
concept of militarization. 
 
In order to analyze the theoretically puzzling situation present in Colombia, 
the dissertation aims to answer the following research questions: first, despite that 
PMSCs emerged in the context of demilitarization after the end of the Cold War, 
why has the domestic private security industry developed in an environment 
marked by greater militarization in Colombia during the last two decades?; and 
second, while existing literature on militarization concludes that large militaries and 
high defense budgets are negatively associated with development (in terms of 
levels of democracy and economic growth) in Latin America, why does the 
militarization process in Colombia seem to have had a positive effect on 
democracy and economic growth? 
 
The study tests four hypotheses to answer the previously stated questions: 
first, the rise of the domestic private security industry in Colombia is not triggered 
by the country’s militarization or demilitarization context; other factors motivate its 
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growth; second, the domestic private security industry and the national armed 
forces provide complementary services to fulfill the increasing demand for security 
in a country affected by a protracted internal armed conflict; third, the presence of a 
domestic private security industry mitigates the negative effects of militarization on 
democracy and economic growth; and fourth, the domestic private security industry 
fulfills security demands that promote a stable political and economic environment. 
The first two hypotheses address the first research question and the last two 
address the second research question.   
 
This dissertation is a policy-oriented study. The type of research design is a 
case study research of Colombia: it is a single-case study that entails diachronic 
and synchronic analysis. In other words, militarization and privatization of security 
are analyzed combining temporal and spatial components. 
 
The first chapter of the study introduces the concept of privatization of 
security and describes the relevant background of the case study. The second 
chapter presents the literature review on the existing research regarding 
militarization in Latin America and its impact on democracy and economic growth. 
It also describes the global industry of Private Military and Security Companies and 
presents the findings of the scarce research on the presence of these companies 
in Colombia. The third chapter explains in detail the methodology of the research. It 
reveals the main hypotheses of the study and identifies the independent and 
dependent variables that will be used to analyze the hypotheses. 
 
The fourth chapter analyzes in depth the processes of militarization and 
privatization of security that took place in Colombia between 1990 and 2010. This 
chapter examines the increasing militarization and the rise of the private security 
industry in the country and highlights the importance of the protracted internal 
armed conflict in each process. This is a fundamental chapter to understand the 
impact that the private security sector has had on the militarization of Colombia. A 
quantitative analysis of the relation between militarization (in terms of MPR) and 
privatization of security (in terms of PrivateMPR) shows that there is a strong and 
significant correlation between the two variables.  
 
In chapter five the quantitative and qualitative evidence provided along the 
study confirms that the militarization process in Colombia had a positive impact on 
democracy and economic growth, and that role played by the private security 
industry in Colombia was vital for that impact to occur. The qualitative analysis 
shows that the insertion of the privatization of security variable in the analysis of 
the impact of militarization on democracy and economic growth provides four 
reasons capable of explaining why militarization does not exert a negative effect on 
democratization and economic development in the country. First of all, the service 
provided by private security agents complemented the service that had been 
traditionally provided by national security forces. Second, private security providers 
helped reduce the risks posed by the urbanization of the conflict in Colombia 
during the 1990s, a situation that otherwise would have created more political and 
social instability. Third, the private security industry enabled national and foreign 
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companies to continue performing and expand their commercial activities 
throughout the country, increasing their sense of security in the middle of the 
internal conflict. Finally, the privatization of security created a significant number of 
quality jobs that had a positive impact on the nation’s unemployment rate. Likewise, 
the quantitative analysis proved that there is a indeed a strong, positive, and 
significant effect of MPR on democracy and economic growth, and due to the 
strong correlation between MPR and Private MPR, it may be affirmed that the 
privatization of security does have a positive effect on democracy and economic 
growth. 
 
These findings offer new alternatives for other countries affected by armed 
conflicts: while it is important to evaluate the inherent risks of using private 
providers of military and security services, these private companies might be 
helpful to overcome political instability and economic crisis.  Finally, the study 
encourages the need to broaden the current concept of militarization in order to 
refer not only to military and police institutions, but also to the various expressions 
and mechanisms of legal coercive means and organized violence. This wider 
notion of militarization should definitely include the private security sector.  
 
This dissertation provides various relevant elements that may stimulate 
further discussions in current academic debates. For instance, is the use of PMSC 
part of the evolution of the modern state? Is this new modern state handing over 
the monopoly of the use of force back to the private sector? Is privatization of 
security essential for a successful security sector reform? Does private security 
promote social inequality? 
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1. Introduction 
 
The control and use of violence and coercive means in modern times has been 
commonly attributed to states. The legitimate power to use force was gradually taken 
away from pirates, corsairs, and mercenaries, and was given to armed bodies such as 
military and police forces. However, in recent years, private providers of military and 
security services have appeared in the global arena and have challenged the 
conventional notion and political claim of the state’s monopoly of the use of violence 
within a given territory. Private military and security companies (PMSC) have acquired a 
high level of expertise, proficiency, and skills that have enabled them to be active in 
over 100 countries around the world (Verkuil, 2007, p. 26), working side by side with 
national armed forces and, in some cases, even in the absence of such forces. 
 
PMSC have become a resounding topic of study and research especially due to 
their presence in Iraq and Afghanistan. Most reports regarding the use of PMSC include 
concerns over their lack of accountability, criticism towards episodes of violations of 
human rights, and accusations of killings of innocent civilians. While the majority of 
these alarms have focused mainly on international PMSC, it is also important to 
recognize that the spectrum of the private security industry also embraces domestic 
security companies. Domestic industries of private security may not be the center of 
attention of media spotlight or academic debate, but nevertheless, their emergence and 
evolution require a more profound analysis and examination. For instance, a study 
conducted by Small Arms Survey in 2011 established that out of the 17 Latin American 
2 
 
countries included in the study, in 11 the number of private security personnel was 
higher than the number police officers (Florquin, 2011, pp. 104-106). These findings 
show the significant role played by domestic PMSC in the provision of security in those 
countries and encourage further research regarding the assimilation process of the 
privatization of security phenomenon in the security sector.  
 
Along that context, this dissertation examines the impact of the privatization of 
security in Colombia. More specifically, it focuses on analyzing the relationship between 
militarization and privatization of security, and the effect that both processes had on 
democracy and economic growth between 1990 and 2010. During this period, the size 
and the budget of the Colombian armed forces increased as a consequence of the 
intensification of violent attacks on civilians, state officials, and state institutions within 
the country’s protracted armed conflict. Likewise, PMSC have begun to play an 
important role both in the fight against insurgent groups and drug trafficking in rural 
areas and in the reaction to the urbanization of the conflict in major cities. At the same 
time, the latter decade witnessed a significant improvement of the country’s statistics on 
various measurements of democracy and economic growth.  
 
This description of the internal situation in Colombia – increasing militarization, 
development of private security services, and promising levels of democracy and 
economic growth - raises important questions as it differs, in a great extent, from 
regional and global tendencies. On one hand, extensive research on PMSC affirms that 
the industry of private military and security services emerged in a context of 
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demilitarization after the Cold War. On the other hand, previous studies on militarization 
in Latin America point out, among other things, that large militaries have had negative 
effects on democracy and economic growth. Therefore, it results intellectually puzzling 
that since the moment in which Colombia initiated a militarization process to counter its 
internal security challenges – insurgency and drug trafficking –,  the domestic industry 
of private security services arose, the democracy strengthened, and the economy 
revealed a continuous growing trend. 
 
In order to suggest an explanation to the above stated puzzle, this dissertation 
examines the correlation between militarization and the domestic private security 
industry in Colombia. It also analyzes the dynamics behind the evolution of the 
militarization process and the path towards the country’s privatization of security. 
Secondly, the dissertation examines two specific relationships: the effect of militarization 
and privatization of security on democracy, and the effect of militarization and 
privatization of security on economic growth. The overarching argument of the study is 
that militarization in Colombia built a symbiotic relationship with the domestic private 
security industry, and together they created a suitable environment that stimulated 
economic growth and strengthened certain aspects of democracy. 
 
The next section of this introductory chapter of the dissertation presents the 
background of the study. It elaborates on the only military government in Colombia in 
the second half of the twentieth century, on the appearance of insurgent groups in the 
country, and on the initial strategies to counter them. It also describes the rise of drug 
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trafficking, the implementation of early counternarcotic policies, and the emergence of 
self-defence private armed groups in Colombia. The following sections of the chapter 
specify the problem of the study, describe its professional significance, and give an 
overview of the methodology used which will be further developed in a succeeding 
chapter. The final section identifies the delimitations of the study and concludes by 
stating the structure of the upcoming chapters. 
 
 
1.1 Background of the study 
 
This section gives a concrete description of the conflict scenario that has been 
present in Colombia in the previous decades. The study focuses on the period in which 
the strongest counterinsurgent and counternarcotic initiatives were implemented in the 
country including the use of PMSC as part of the strategy. However, in order to 
understand the extent of the problem, it is important to know the reasons that led to the 
rise of insurgent movements, drug cartels, and self-defense forces, and the initial 
governmental operations designed to counter them.  
 
 
1.1.1 Military Government in Colombia 
 
The year 1948 stands as a breaking point in the Colombian politics of the 
twentieth century. On April 9 of that year, the murder of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, leader of 
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the liberal party with the highest probability of becoming the next elected president, 
unleashed a violent uprising in the capital city known as “El Bogotazo”. This uprising 
became the most visible social icon of rejection towards the political persecution carried 
out by the conservative president of that moment against liberal masses and liberal 
followers all around the country. Without Gaitán in the race for presidential elections, 
another conservative candidate became president and continued applying the policies 
of repression against liberal factions. This period of intense rivalry between members of 
the conservative and liberal parties received the name of “La Violencia” which was 
characterized by political armed confrontations that took the lives of hundreds of citizens. 
 
The repressive measures of the conservative government created internal 
disputes among the leadership of the party and the previously supporting elites. The 
tense environment around the government led to conspiracy initiatives that in June of 
1953 originated a military unrest supported by political and economic groups. As a 
result, the former Commander of the Colombian Military, General Gustavo Rojas, took 
over power and established the only military government in the recent history of the 
country. The new political administration had the approval of leaders from both the 
liberal and the conservative parties, and General Rojas received the tacit challenge of 
ending the political violence that had emerged years before (Pinzón & Muñoz, 1983, pp. 
114-116). 
 
The period in which General Rojas was in power was characterized by a large 
public investment in projects aiming at modernizing the country. Some of those projects 
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included a national fabric for processing iron and steel, a national network of hospitals, 
and various airports in different cities. The pacification of Colombia seemed to be going 
on the right path, at first, as the levels of violence had been reduced, and the 
implementation of governmental policies allowed the society to foresee a positive 
economic and political future. However, a new wave of violence reappeared, and 
criticism towards the measures adopted by General Rojas did not take too long.  
 
In 1954 a grave scandal began to affect in a negative way the administration of 
General Rojas. Several students were murdered, and many others resulted injured 
during a student protest near the president’s residency. The government alleged that 
among the manifestation there were individuals with communist ideals encouraging the 
protests and, as the demonstration began to heat up, soldiers opened fire against the 
students (Pinzón & Muñoz, 1983, p. 117). The excessive use of force by the 
government and the rising dissatisfaction among political leaders and wealthy elites 
towards the military government reduced the support that General Rojas once had. In 
1957, the scandals that continued to arise involving the military institution and the desire 
of General Rojas to run for the presidency in the elections of 1958 instigated another 
popular protest against the government. As a result of the protest and after heated 
discussions within the military ranks, it was agreed that General Rojas would resign as 
President of Colombia, and a provisional military junta would replace him until 
democratic elections took place (Aguilera, 1999). 
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As the social turmoil against General Rojas was taking place in Colombia, the 
leaders of the liberal and the conservative parties were already planning a strategy to 
regain power. Political leaders from both parties arranged a meeting in Benidorm, Spain, 
in July of 1956.  At this meeting, they signed the Benidorm Pact in which they agreed on 
joining forces in order to reestablish a civil government in Colombia. In 1957, after 
General Rojas resigned, a new meeting involving the same representatives of both 
political parties took place in the city of Sitges, Spain (Iriarte, 1995). During this meeting, 
it was agreed that in order to return political stability to the country and to put an end to 
“La Violencia”, the presidency of the country would be shared for equal periods between 
both parties. A representative of one political party would assume power during the 
constitutional presidential period, and once the period finished, a representative of the 
other political party would replace him. This political arrangement was called the Frente 
Nacional and lasted for 16 years. Although this agreement aimed to end the political 
conflict that existed, it was during this time that insurgent movements appeared in the 
country. 
 
 
1.1.2 Insurgency in Colombia 
 
The origins of insurgent movements in Colombia go back to the late 1950s. They 
responded to the political repression promoted by the national government with the 
conservative party in power, towards peasant protests aiming for a radical social 
change (Vargas, 2002, pp. 248-262). The revolutionary ideals that encouraged the 
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conformation of these insurgent groups were strengthened even more by the Cuban 
Revolution and by the communist principles that spread throughout the whole continent. 
The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), the main guerrilla group 
that is still active in the country, was initially a self-defense peasant group that 
established closer ties with the Colombian Communist Party and became a Marxist-
Leninist oriented armed movement. The other still active guerrilla group is the Ejército 
de Liberación Nacional (ELN), created by radical university students, that was inspired 
by Che Guevara and strongly influenced by the liberation theology promoted in Latin 
America by Christian movements reacting against social injustice (Rangel, 2001, pp. 
382-383). 
 
Insurgent groups have emerged in different periods and under relatively different 
political and social circumstances, and therefore, they have been categorized by some 
analysts as first generation and second generation movements (Vargas, 2002, pp. 249-
252). Besides the FARC and the ELN, the Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL) was 
another first generation guerrilla that shared similar roots. The second generation 
movements include the Movimiento 19 de abril (M-19), the Comandos Ernesto Rojas, 
the Corriente de Renovación Socialista (CRS), and the Movimiento Armado Quintín 
Lame. Today, most of the second generation insurgencies have disappeared either 
because they merged with another one, or because they initiated peace negotiations 
with the government. The M-19 singed a final peace agreement with the government in 
1990. In 1991, another agreement was signed with the EPL, followed by the Comandos 
Ernesto Rojas in 1992, and the CRS and the Quintin Lame in 1994.   
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During the 1960s and 1970s, the first generation of insurgent guerrillas restricted 
their presence to rural and remote areas and did not increase too much their number of 
recruits. It was only until the 1980s that these groups expanded both in human 
resources and in territory. For example, at the beginning of 1980, the FARC had around 
900 combatants and 9 fronts, but by the end of the decade of 1990, it already had 
around 15,000 combatants distributed in 60 fronts. In the same period, the ELN went 
from having 70 combatants and 3 fronts to 3,500 combatants and 30 fronts. Likewise, of 
the 1,100 municipalities that exist in Colombia, the presence of insurgent groups in 
those territories went from 175 in 1985 to 600 in 1998. It is important to highlight that 
these groups did not have a total control over all 600 municipalities: it was alleged that 
they had a high level of control in almost 200 of them (Rangel, 2001, p. 383). 
 
 
1.1.3 Drug Trafficking and Initial Counternarcotic Operations in Colombia 
 
Colombia has been known for many years as the main producer of cocaine 
around the world. However, the production and trafficking of illegal drugs did not begin 
with coca leaves. The first type of illegal drug produced in the country was marijuana.  
Its production increased during the 1960s as a result of the strong eradication initiatives 
that were taking place in Mexico where the herbicide paraquat became widely used 
(Thoumi, 2002, p. 103). In 1979, a United States Mission of the Committee on Narcotics 
Abuse and Control went to Colombia and found out that by that time there were around 
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30,000 hectares of marijuana crops and that about 65 per cent of the total marijuana 
that entered the United States came from Colombia what made it the prime exporter 
country of the illegal drug.  
 
The conversion from marijuana to cocaine took place in the mid-1970s when 
Colombia began to process coca leaves from Peru and Bolivia before sending it abroad. 
At this point, the United States and Colombia “signed an anti-drug cooperation 
agreement that allowed the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and anti-narcotic 
agents to operate” (Guaqueta, 1998, p. 14) in the Andean country. The negotiation 
included a grant of 6 million dollars to strengthen the anti-narcotic operations and the 
responsibility to create the Consejo Nacional de Estupefacientes, a national institution 
specialized in the elaboration of policies, plans, and strategies to counter the trafficking 
of illegal drugs. This institution was finally formalized through the Decree 1206 of June, 
1973, and it enabled the creation in 1974 of the first Estatuto Nacional de 
Estupefacientes, the main set of national regulations against narcotics. 
 
This cooperation agreement between the two governments produced its first 
results by the end of the 1970s when a joint action of the Colombian armed forces, 
supported by the equipment and funding from the United States, led to the 
implementation of Operación Fulminante. This military operation aimed at destroying 
over 10,000 hectares of marijuana between 1978 and 1979. The positive results of this 
initiative stimulated the creation in 1981 of the Policía Anti-narcóticos, an institution 
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within the Colombian police forces in charge of consolidating the fight against the 
production of marijuana and the processing of coca leaves (Restrepo, 1997, p. 427).  
 
The shared strategies between Colombia and the United States to control and to 
eradicate the trafficking of illegal drugs also included an extradition treaty signed in 
1979 and another agreement on mutual legal assistance signed in 1980. However, all 
these efforts were not successful enough and at the beginning of the 1980s, the 
Medellin Drug Cartel and the Cali Drug Cartel rose as the main members of the illegal 
drug industry in Colombia, an industry that by 1987 already produced almost 11 per 
cent of the world’s cocaine (Thoumi, 2002, p. 108). In order to confront this growing and 
extremely profitable illegal business, the  
Policies followed by the Colombian government at various times cover 
the full spectrum of repressive measures used against drug trafficking. 
These include the jailing and extraditing of traffickers; involuntary 
eradication of illicit crops and alternative development programs for 
affected peasants; import, production, and marketing controls of 
chemical inputs used to refine cocaine and heroin; interdiction of illicit 
drugs; anti-money-laundering measures in the financial system; and 
seizure and confiscation of assets (Thoumi, 2002, p. 113). 
 
 
 
1.1.4 Emergence of Self-defense Private Armed Groups in Colombia 
 
The Law of National Defense issued in 1968, also known as the Law 48 of that 
same year, which among other things authorized civilians to conform armed groups 
autonomous from the national armed forces, as part of its counterinsurgent strategies, 
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represented the legal basis for the emergence of self-defense organizations in the 
country. The law stated that the national government was authorized to provide privative 
property and weapons that used to belong to the regular armed forces to civilian 
establishments whenever it was considered appropriate. However, “despite the fact that 
this legislation stipulated that only the president was authorized to create such groups, 
military commanders frequently ignored civilian authorities and used Law 48 to create 
their own groups” (Tate, 2001, p. 165). 
 
During the end of the 1970s, certain regions of the country endured the absence 
of adequate state presence. This fact facilitated the increase of violent attacks from the 
FARC and other insurgent groups against civilians. Owners of large and medium sized 
farms, wealthy peasants, and individuals involved in the livestock business were the 
primary targets of extortion and kidnapping by these rebel groups. As a result of this 
situation, these civilians created their own self-defense groups and took advantage of 
the legal framework that allowed civilians to create private armed groups (Reyes, 1991, 
p. 43-45).  The first collective association of these civilian self-defense groups was 
called ACDEGAM (Asociación Campesina de Ganaderos y Agricultores del Magdalena 
Medio)1 and was located in the city of Puerto Boyacá, a region where many of those 
landowners victims of the insurgent movements resided. Many of those landowners 
were already involved in the business of drug-trafficking or soon became a part of it and 
therefore required additional private protection. 
 
                                                          
1
 ACDEGAM stands for Peasant Association of Livestock Owners and Farmers of the Magdalena Medio.  
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These private self-defense forces are also referred to as paramilitary groups2. 
They assembled themselves in a broader national organization called the Autodefensas 
Unidas de Colombia, AUC. One of the leaders of this organization never got tired of 
insisting that the AUC was a civilian counterinsurgent initiative that tried to achieve what 
the national armed forces were incapable of doing: fighting guerrilla groups. However, 
as the drug cartels expanded their business and began to require better security 
arrangements for daily activities, these private armies and the drug cartels established a 
perfectly symbiotic relationship.  
This was the beginning of the 'dirty war' in Colombia, during which 
paramilitary groups linked to drug cartels, particularly the Medellín Cartel, 
worked closely with Colombian military officers to eliminate suspected 
guerrilla sympathizers, while at the same time they attacked Colombian 
authorities investigating drug trafficking and paramilitary activity (Tate, 
2001, p. 166).  
 
This led, in 1989, to the complete abolition of the Law 48 of 1968, and the AUC 
became another illegal armed group in the Colombian conflict.   
 
Various self-defense groups arose in many weak states of Latin America during 
the last decades of the Cold War (Pizarro, 2004, p. 117), but the AUC exhibited three 
specific characteristics that differentiated them from the others and, in that sense, gave 
the Colombian conflict situation an even more unique atmosphere. The self-defense 
movements that emerged in other Latin American countries were the Patrullas Armadas 
                                                          
2
 It should be noted that in academic scholarship, there is a difference between paramilitary groups and self-
defense forces. Paramilitary groups consist of organized civilians supported by the state that use violent means to 
fight other armed groups. Self-defense forces are also organized civilians that use force to fight armed groups but 
without the support of the state (Pizarro, 2004, p. 112). In Colombia, the legal framework that existed until 1989 
authorized the existence of self-defense groups, but due to the intermittent and informal link between those 
groups and the national armed forces, the term paramilitary groups was often used to identify them. 
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Civiles (PAC) in Guatemala, the Patrullas Cantonales in El Salvador, and the Rondas 
Campesinas in Perú. The first difference between the AUC and the other groups was 
that in Colombia the legal framework and official support of the government was 
completely abolished in 1989 while in the other countries it prevailed. The second 
difference concerned the level of autonomy of each group: in Colombia. The AUC was 
completely autonomous in its decisions and activities, but in the other countries, the 
national armed forces exercised a higher level of control over them. The final difference 
consisted on the financial sustainability of the self-defense movements: in other 
countries, the state financed them directly, but in Colombia, the state did not support 
those initiatives, and the AUC relied on the profit they could gain from the drug 
trafficking business (Pizarro, 2004, pp. 118-119).  
 
 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
Insurgent movements and drug trafficking have been two of the most critical 
security challenges in recent Colombian history. Since the 1970s, the national 
government, with the permanent involvement and support of the United States, has 
implemented various tactics to counter those severe problems, but it has not been able 
to obtain successful results. In the 1990s, the strategy to overcome the nation’s security 
threats focused on strengthening the defense sector through the professionalization of 
the military, the increase in the size of the armed forces, and larger budget allocations 
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for national defense. Better prepared personnel, larger numbers in the armed forces, 
and higher levels of military spending revealed the strong emphasis posed on a 
militarization process in the country.  
 
Also during the last decade of the twentieth century, foreign PMSC became an 
additional tool in the counterinsurgent and counternarcotic operations in the country. 
Together with the appearance of PMSC, a domestic private security industry also 
emerged in Colombia. This clear tendency towards the privatization of security in the 
country is puzzling given that according to current literature on the topic, PMSC arose in 
a demilitarization context after the Cold War, while in Colombia foreign and domestic 
ones materialized in the middle of a strong militarization strategy. The case of the 
domestic PMSC is even more intriguing since their aim was not to support the activities 
of the national armed forces in the fight against rebel groups and drug traffickers, but to 
provide alternative solutions to other security needs of the society.  
 
The militarization trend after 1990 in Colombia highlights another discrepancy 
with existing theories. Various studies affirm that militarization in Latin American 
countries has had a negative impact on democracy and economic growth. Among those 
studies, a special emphasis is placed on the one conducted by Kirk Bowman. However, 
despite the clear intention to strengthen the military sector in Colombia, the country’s 
democracy scores have remained stable and economic indicators have shown a 
growing trend. These two intriguing relations – the rise of private security within a 
militarization process and the apparent positive effect of militarization on democracy 
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and economic growth – generate an intellectually puzzling situation in Colombia that 
challenge existing research and inspire the formulation of the research questions of this 
study.  
 
This dissertation examines two main research questions: on the one hand, it tries 
to answer why the domestic private security industry has developed within a 
militarization context in Colombia during the last two decades, despite that according to 
extensive scholarly work on PMSC, these companies emerged in a context of 
demilitarization after the end of the Cold War; and on the other hand, it seeks to find the 
reasons why the militarization process in Colombia seems to have had a positive effect 
on democracy and economic growth, while the existing literature on militarization 
concludes that large militaries and high defense budgets are negatively associated with 
development (in terms of levels of democracy and economic growth) in Latin America. 
In other words, evidence from the Colombian internal situation shows that the 
militarization process did not prevent the rise of the domestic industry of private security 
services, did not destabilize the democratic regime, and did not inhibit economic growth, 
and this study intends to understand why. 
 
 
 
 
 
1.3 Professional Significance of the study 
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The present study analyzes a real-life setting where PMSC have been used in 
counterinsurgent and counternarcotic operations for more than two decades in a widely 
accepted but little tested environment. Research on the effectiveness and impact of 
PMSC in the Colombian internal armed conflict is still very scarce, and any meaningful 
results produced by this dissertation are of great importance for practitioners and policy 
makers directly involved in the conflict. In this sense, the strength of the study and its 
findings relies precisely on the policy-oriented approach of the research.  
 
Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the analysis of the privatization of security also 
represents a significant added value to the security sector field and to the related 
academic literature. The exceptional features of the Colombian case study make the 
investigation very likely to advance knowledge regarding the available tools and 
instruments to fight against insurgent movements, drug trafficking, and other current 
threats to national security.  
 
Previous research on PMSC has focused primarily on two broad areas none of 
which include the subject of this dissertation. The first one  has dealt with the potential 
risks that PMSC activities pose to the protection of human rights and the controversy 
over their status under International Humanitarian Law that have led towards 
discussions regarding the need to establish legally binding norms and regulations over 
them. The second one has concentrated on case studies in African and Asian countries 
due to the widespread presence of these companies in most African conflicts and in 
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peacekeeping and peace-building operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, this 
dissertation addresses the use of PMSC in a region of the world where the topic has 
been studied very little and concentrates on examining the unattended issue of the 
emergence of this domestic private security industry in a context of increased 
militarization. 
 
Besides analyzing the relationship between militarization and privatization of 
security, this dissertation also examines the impact that this public-private militarization 
process has had on democracy and on economic growth in Colombia. The significance 
that this initiative entails may lead to the elaboration of new models or paradigms 
regarding militarization, democracy, state-building, and state-capacity in the future.  
 
1.4 Overview of the Methodology 
 
This dissertation uses both qualitative and quantitative perspectives in order to 
analyze a specific case study: militarization and privatization of security in Colombia. 
The analysis of the study was limited to the period between 1990 and 2010 with a 
stronger focus on the latter 8 years since it was during that time that the governmental 
policies intensified the militarization process. The primary sources gathered for the 
analysis included semi-structured interviews to politicians, scholars, and representatives 
of governmental institutions, general statistics from national and international 
organizations, and other official documents related to militarization, the privatization of 
security, democracy, and economic growth. The regression models used in the 
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quantitative analysis to evaluate the relationship between militarization and democracy 
and economic growth are based on the research of Kirk Bowman. A detailed description 
and explanation of the methodology used is presented in Chapter 3 of the present work. 
 
 
1.5 Delimitation and Scope of the Study 
 
The case study is limited to the period between 1990, when the tendency to use 
private providers of security arose in Colombia, and 2010, year in which the 8-year 
Democratic Security Policy of President Alvaro Uribe ended. Uribe’s Democratic 
Security Policy, among other things, achieved a peace agreement with paramilitary 
groups that led to a massive collective and individual demobilization process of illegal 
armed groups, and put together a strong military and police force with the clear intention 
of controlling the advancement of insurgent groups.  
 
This period of study – from 1990 until 2010 – differs from the one used by Kirk 
Bowman in his research. He analyzed the relationship between militarization and 
democracy and economic growth for the period 1972-1986. The different contexts in 
which both studies take place make the applicability of Bowman’s findings to analyze 
the Colombian case questionable. However, Bowman’s conclusion regarding the impact 
of militarization in the region continues to be widely accepted among scholars and as 
such, his theory may still be used as a basis to engage in further studies that try to 
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challenge, verify, or develop his findings. That is the case of this dissertation: it intends 
to expand his results by including an additional variable in the model he designed.  
 
In this sense, it should also be highlighted that in his work, Bowman argued that 
the effect of militarization on democracy and economic growth attenuated after the 
United States began to support formal democracy in Latin America during the early 
1980s (Bowman, 2002, p.63).  This shows that it is possible that shifts in the United 
State’s foreign policy affect the consequences of militarization in the region. However, 
as it will be explained in further chapters, the policy behind the foreign assistance of the 
United States to Colombia remained relatively constant throughout the second half of 
the last century, as well as, during the beginning of the current one. In Colombia there 
were no military governments after the 1970s and free elections took place periodically3. 
Therefore, it is not probable that the impact of militarization on democracy and 
economic growth in Colombia changes due to a variation in the United States’ 
assistance policy because the latter did not fluctuate considerably during the study 
period of the present work. Furthermore, the privatization of security variable addressed 
in this research to analyze militarization in Colombia embraces only the domestic 
private security industry 4  in which the United States’ foreign policy has no direct 
involvement.  
 
                                                          
3
 According to Bowman, “multiparty elections were required [by the United States] for aid and trade" (Bowman 
2002: 63). 
4
 The reasons behind differentiating the foreign PMSC from the domestic private security industry in Colombia are 
explained in the methodology chapter. 
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In Colombia, the war against drug trafficking and insurgent groups has merged 
and has transformed into a joint war against terrorism. In this context, the characteristics 
of the presence of PMSC involved in counterinsurgent and counternarcotic operations 
differ from most countries where these companies have worked: the military and police 
forces and the amount of PMSC have increased in Colombia in recent years, while in 
other countries, PMSC have increased as military and police forces have decreased, or 
vice-versa. These distinctive characteristics make the Colombian case study a unique 
one, worth of further research, but at the same time, they may make more difficult the 
generalization of the final results. 
 
Field work in Colombia is still a risky task to perform due to the ongoing armed 
conflict in the country. Most foreign PMSC are deployed in or near military bases in 
regions where counterinsurgent and counternarcotic operations take place what makes 
it difficult for researchers to gain access to them. Therefore, meeting officials from 
foreign PMSC to gather information directly was extremely restricted. Additionally, 
arranging interviews with private commercial companies that may have had any 
relationship with PMSC was nearly impossible: they were not interested in talking about 
PMSC, or if they were, they prohibited the public use of any information. This situation 
restricted the access to primary sources mainly to officials of the domestic private 
security industry, politicians, and academics. 
 
 
1.6 Structure of the Study 
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The first chapter of the study introduced the main subject of the research and 
revealed the relevant background of the case study. The second chapter presents the 
literature review of the research. It elaborates on the existing theory regarding 
militarization and its relation with democracy and economic growth, with special 
emphasis in Latin America. It also describes the industry of PMSC around the world and 
in the end focuses on their presence in Colombia. The third chapter explains in detail 
the methodology of the research. It reveals the two main hypotheses of the study and 
identifies the independent and dependent variables that will be used to analyze the 
hypothesis. 
 
The fourth chapter analyzes the processes of militarization and privatization of 
security that have taken place in Colombia between 1990 and 2010. In this chapter, the 
evolution of the internal armed conflict will be related to the increasing militarization and 
to the emergence of the private security industry in the country. This is a fundamental 
chapter to understand the impact that the private security sector had on the process of 
militarization in Colombia. In chapter five, the two main hypotheses of the study will be 
analyzed in detail and tested accordingly. The main findings of the research regarding 
the impact of the wider notion of militarization on democracy and economic growth are 
explained in this chapter. The concluding chapter gives a broad summary of the study 
and answers the previously stated research questions. Finally, the last section of the 
study lists the references that were used throughout the research. 
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2. Literature Review on Militarization and the Industry of Private Military and 
Security Services 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
This dissertation analyzes the militarization process in Colombia and the 
evolution of the country’s private security industry in the period between 1990 and 2010. 
A review of past research on both topics reveals that the convergence of militarization 
and the privatization of security in the same place and time has resulted in an 
academically intriguing situation that makes the study intellectually significant. On the 
one side, previous studies on militarization in Latin America have pointed out, among 
other things, that large military forces have negative effects on democracy and 
economic growth. On the other side, research on PMSC affirmed that the global 
industry of private military and security services emerged in a context of demilitarization 
after the Cold War. However, since the moment in which the militarization process in 
Colombia was strengthened to counter its internal security challenges, the domestic 
industry of private security services arose, the democracy has remained stable, and the 
economy has revealed a continuous growing trend. This chapter reviews the literature, 
explains the theoretical puzzle of the study, and highlights the relevance of the research. 
 
There is an extensive scholarly work on the concept of militarization and due to 
the wide array of studies that exist on the topic, it is possible to identify several points of 
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view regarding its definition and its effect on democracy and development. The present 
chapter begins by exploring the conceptualization of the term militarization and moves 
on to relate it to the claim of modern states regarding their monopoly over the legitimate 
use of force. It is vital to understand the notion of the state’s monopoly of the use of 
violence in order to assess the implications of privatizing security services in a country.  
Afterwards, the chapter focuses on the literature regarding the militarization process 
that took place in Latin America during the second half of the twentieth century and its 
impact on indicators of development.   
 
In contrast to studies on militarization, research on PMSC is not very broad, and 
most of it has focused on the evolution of the private military and security industry in 
Africa and Asia. Latin American countries have not received the same academic 
relevance as Iraq, Afghanistan, South Africa, and Sierra Leone, among others, 
regarding the impact of the privatization of security on democracy, on the monopoly of 
the use of force, and on military institutions. However, Colombia has had an active 
presence of PMSC in its territory in the last twenty years what makes it a very relevant 
case study, especially when the industry has grown in a militarization environment that 
apparently contradicts one of the main reasons that gave birth to PMSC around the 
world. 
 
This chapter is divided into three main sections: first, it reviews past literature on 
militarization; then, it examines the existing literature on the industry of private military 
and security services; and finally, it establishes the connections between the current 
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study and the reviewed literature. The first section presents different approaches to the 
analysis of militarization and elaborates on how the monopoly of the use of force is 
related to the emergence of centralized military forces. Later on, it highlights the 
uniqueness of Latin American military forces, identifies the main differences among the 
existing schools of thought on militarization, and shows the results of studies addressing 
the impact of militarization on democracy and development. The second section 
elaborates on the main reasons that led to the rise of PMSC and on the main 
challenges they pose. Afterwards, it reveals how the industry of PMSC began to 
increase its presence in Colombia, and how the industry was strongly influenced by the 
foreign policy exercised by the United States in the South American country. Finally, the 
chapter concludes with a summary of the main findings, and underlines the academic 
relevance of the present research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2. Militarization, the Monopoly of the Use of Force, and Development in Latin 
America 
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2.2.1. The Concept of Militarization 
 
Although the word militarization might seem to have a straight forward definition, 
its usage on academic literature is not standardized at all. Militarization is a process that 
involves the military forces of a state, but there are clear differences regarding its 
conceptualization that rely on the purpose, the aims, and the type of demands of those 
forces, their relationship with society, politics, and politicians, and the evolution and 
development of the process itself. Some scholars have even criticized that militarization 
has been traditionally analyzed in its most narrow sense, and they have proposed that 
the object of study should not be confined only to the military forces. One of these 
scholars, Jacklyn Cock, proposed that the doctrine behind militarization should “refer 
both to the military as a formal, state institution and to various non-state forms, 
expressions and instruments of organized violence” (2005, p. 791). 
 
Before evaluating the relevance and implications of Cock’s proposal, it is 
important to describe the main traditional approaches to militarization. In a study that 
intended to identify some of the most significant characteristics of modern militarism 
after the Second World War, Kjell Skjelsbaek affirmed that the term military may have 
different usages and different lines of reasoning. He argued that military could be 
understood in its most technical and legal form as referring to the armed forces’ 
personnel, and also, in a more sociological sense, as related to the accepted use of 
coercive means to attain common social goals (Skjelsbaek, 1979, p. 214). This 
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differentiation leads to consider that in its sociological sense, the term military might not 
always refer exclusively to the uniformed personnel at the service of the state but also 
to other organizations with the capacity of using violence to achieve social objectives.  
 
The different lines of reasoning concerning the term military that Skjelsbaek 
addressed in his work were the liberal critique and the Marxist-Leninist theory. He 
argued that the majority of western scholars such as Vagts, Radway, and Erickson and 
Mommse, agreed on the fact that militarism had an inherent idea of excess, namely but 
not limited to, excess in the use of violence by the state. On the contrary, 
Marxist-Leninist theory employs a completely different concept of 
militarism. According to this theory, each class society is by definition 
militaristic. (…) According to the Marxist school of thought, one can 
speak about militarism only when the governing, exploiting class 
consciously increases armaments, armed forces, and preparations for 
predatory wars (Skjelsbaek, 1979, p. 216).  
Although they represent opposite points of view regarding the definition of the 
concept, it results interesting that in both cases, militarism and militarization seem to 
have a negative connotation: an excessive use of violence and a means to prolong 
class domination.  
 
Another author who approached the concept of militarism from a liberal and a 
Marxist point of view is Glenn Hook. His work highlighted that “research on militarism 
has analyzed critically the military’s impact on one of the three dimensions – the 
economic and social structure of capitalist societies, the legal and political system of the 
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state, and the attitude of the citizens towards the ideology and values of the military” 
(Hook, 1995, p. 14). He argued that  the Marxist approach has focused more on the 
impact of the military on the maintenance of economic exploitation and class structure 
proper of a capitalist society, while the liberal approach has been more worried about 
the power struggle between civilians and the military, as well as, the latter’s role on 
political affairs. Skelsbaek’s analysis described the term militarization in a more 
negative and pejorative way compared to Hook’s assessment, but it is clear that both 
recognize the great impact it has on the different levels of society. 
 
The present research analyzes the militarization process in Colombia taking into 
consideration the two theoretical approaches addressed by Skjelsbaek and Hook. The 
analysis of the impact of militarization on democracy and economic growth focuses on 
all three dimensions described earlier by Hook, while the relationship between 
militarization and the private security industry follows the more liberal approach stated in 
Skjelsbaek’s work. It is in this last relationship that Jacklyn Cock’s initial proposition to 
analyze militarization in its broader sense becomes relevant.  
 
It is interesting how Cock’s proposal to expand the object of study of militarization 
complements the sociological usage of militarization put up front by Skjelsbaek. A wider 
perspective to analyze militarization which includes all organizations of organized 
violence that use coercive means to attain social objectives becomes an ideal 
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framework to address the private provision of security and military services. It also 
implies the need to understand how private providers of security services have evolved 
through time and what has been their relation with military forces and with the claim of 
the modern state over the monopoly of the use of violence.  
 
 
2.2.2. Militaries and the Monopoly of the Use of Violence 
 
Different expressions of private violence or private provision of military and 
security services have been constantly present throughout history. Some providers of 
these types of services have ceased to exist while others have transformed and 
adapted to new circumstances, allowing them to survive until now. James Cockayne 
catalogued all these historical expressions of private violence, including pirates, corsairs, 
mercenaries, and other private contractors, as military entrepreneurs, broadly defining 
them as “commercial organizers of military-scale violence” (Cockayne, 2006, p. 460). 
From the Hundred Years’ War onwards, the presence of state-authorized military 
entrepreneurs flourished especially in European territory: privateering began to be 
widely used in the thirteenth century; during the following two hundred years, private 
armies became common instruments of dominance and power; and finally, the 
eighteenth century turned out to be the golden age for mercenaries and mercantile 
companies (Thomson, 1994, p. 21). 
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The idea of individuals carrying and using weapons, and the thought of armies 
defending society exist since many centuries ago when they were encouraged to hold 
their own weapon as a sign of social wealth and personal safety. André Corvisier, a 
French scholar specialized in military history of the XVII century, gave a clear 
explanation of this social attribute: “The exercise of arms was accorded the highest 
respect among all human activities by the societies of the ancient regime. (…) it was 
also the expression of a moral setting in which violence and respect for force 
characterized relationships among individuals” (Corvisier, 1979, p. 3).  
 
During the XVIII century, when the Age of Enlightenment promoted various 
cultural, political, and economic changes in Europe, a clear differentiation took place 
regarding the importance of the possession and use of arms in Western European 
states, in contrast to that given by central and eastern ones. While there was a “lowered 
esteem for arms in western Europe, in central and eastern Europe those rulers who 
were inspired by the Enlightenment tried to create a military framework that called for a 
still greater respect for arms” (Corvisier, 1979, p. 20). 
 
This contrast regarding the esteem for arms within the European states is related 
to the upcoming theory of the consolidation of the modern state proposed by Charles 
Tilly. Tilly argued that the process of state-making in western European countries was 
characterized by the accumulation and concentration of political authority and war-
making and policing resources (Tilly, 1992, pp. 27-30). Those resources were embodied 
in strong and large armies that received an exclusive permission to use coercive means 
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granted by a centralized political authority from a given territory. This entrustment 
marked the beginning of the monopoly over the use of violence, or at least the notion of 
it. 
 
This argument is supported by Corvisier, when he affirms that, by the XVIII 
century, in Europe, during the long process of increasing the levels of discipline within 
the armed troops, reducing abuses from the officers, making soldiers more committed, 
and avoiding delays in the provision of all types of supplies, the state began to rise as 
the unit with the authority and power to control the armies. A superior hierarchy slowly 
deprived captains and other proprietary officers from their positions of authority over 
their private regiments. It came to a point in which “the armed forces that were to 
oppose each other during the Wars of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic 
Empire were firmly under the control of the States” (Corvisier, 1979, p. 72). 
 
Weber’s argument regarding the monopoly of the legitimate use of force as the 
central characteristic of the modern state, Mann’s assertion about this monopoly being 
the base of the state’s power, Tilly’s approach towards the process of European state-
making, and Corvisier’s description of the authority of the state to control national 
armies are very valuable contributions to the relation between military forces, their use 
of violence, and the existence of a modern state. However, to some extent, their 
arguments have also been criticized and disputed. For example, Buzan considers that 
the dominant power of the state and its control of the coercive means in society is a 
“theory [that] is close to reality [only] in a large minority of states” (Buzan, 1991, pp. 58-
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59). Likewise, Singer affirms that “the monopoly of the state over violence is the 
exception in world history, rather than the rule” (Singer, 2008, p. 19). Certainly, a 
successful monopoly of the legitimate use of force is a characteristic only of a few states 
that had sufficient authority to claim it. 
 
Not all states were able to exercise the monopoly of violence through their own 
military forces by the end of the XIX century, nor are they able to do so today. Non-state 
provision of military forces has existed since the army of King Shulgi of Ur in the year 
2094 B.C.E., passing by ancient Greek armies, and all the way up to the Carthaginian 
empire to fight the First and Second Punic Wars (Singer, 2008, pp. 19-22). More 
recently, during the Middle Ages, the nobility and the businessmen “produced the 
German Landsknechte, the Swiss Reisläufer, the Italian condottieri, and the English 
mercenaries” (Cockayne, 2006, pp. 465) in order to protect the promising commercial 
system rising in Europe. During this time, the notion of monopoly of force did not exist. 
As time went by, political power began to be centralized, and the concentration of the 
use of coercive means under only one authority was imposed as the western model that 
everyone else had to follow. Yet, today, it is still possible to find active mercenaries 
fighting a wide variety of wars together with corporatized providers of military services 
(Singer, 2008, p. 45). 
 
From the previous review it may be highlighted that after national armed forces 
were institutionalized as the coercive instruments of modern states, they became the 
center of attention of militarization studies, leaving aside other historical non-state 
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actors that have played at times an even major role in the administration of violence. In 
this sense, research on militarization in Latin America has not been an exception: during 
the second half of the past century, scholars have given very little significance to private 
organizations with the legal capacity to use violence. Instead, as the following section 
shows, those regional studies have focused primarily on the impact of the military forces 
on democracy and development. Although this tendency is coherent with contemporary 
militarization studies, its findings may enclose certain limitations: historical evidence and 
current dynamics on the provision of security reveal that private expressions of 
organized violence should not be left out of any thorough analysis of militarization since 
any actor with the capacity of using force may produce an important effect on different 
levels of society and political institutions.  
 
 
2.2.3. Militarization and Development in Latin America 
 
Latin America presents particular characteristics that differentiate it from other 
regions of the world, especially regarding topics such as militarization and democracy. 
The close relationship with the United States and its foreign policy, the early 
decolonization process when compared to other European colonies, and the relatively 
homogenous ethnicity that contrasts with other third world countries in Asia and Africa 
are just some of those distinctive features. This singularity motivated local and foreign 
researchers to elaborate a wide range of scholarly work on the region such as the very 
interesting and complete study written by Miguel Centeno.  
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In his book Blood and Debt, Centeno examines armed conflicts and political 
development in the region throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and tries to 
establish why Latin American states had not evolved in the same way as European 
ones. He affirms that the type of wars fought in the region had not required large armies, 
huge budgets, and long journeys, but instead, had required fewer personnel, less 
budget, and were more localized (Centeno, 2002). In other words, the type of military 
forces raised in Latin America emerged in a different context from the centralized 
military forces that appeared in Europe. However, this differentiation of the Latin 
American militaries was not taken into account in the early scholarly work on 
militarization. 
 
The development of literature on militarization in Latin America began in the 
1950s with the work of Andrezki, Huntington, and Janowitz (Bowman, 2002, p. 20). 
Although they set the classical foundations of scholarship on the topic, they addressed 
militarization in the Third World as a whole, without any clear differentiation by region. 
Until the 1960s, the literature that emerged on Latin American politics followed those 
same classical guidelines. “It was assumed that military involvement in Latin American 
politics would decline as socioeconomic modernization and mobilization occurred, as 
armies became more ‘professional,’ and as the influence of announced United States 
support for democratic regimes made itself felt” (Lowenthal, 1974, p. 109). It was only 
until authors as John Johnson, Edwin Lieuwen, Martin Needler, and Lucian Pye began 
35 
 
to publish their work that the military forces began to be enhanced as a crucial element 
in the development of Latin American countries.  
 
These authors were some of the most visible advocates of the modernization 
school of the 1960s in Latin America. In contrast to the classical scholarly work, this 
school of thought argued that “militarization plays an important role in the development 
process” (Bowman, 2002, p. 183) of states. Edwin Lieuwen affirmed that the military 
forces that gained power in the region after the Second World War had a “decisive 
influence in the promotion of political democracy, economic development, and social 
change” (Lieuwen, 1967, p. 148, own translation).  
 
This influence was extremely relevant since as a result of the Korean War, a 
new wave of militarism returned to the region: in 1947, there were seven governments 
led by military leaders while, in 1954, the military were in power in thirteen out of twenty 
republics. Lieuwen explained this change stating that in a “region of extreme social 
stratification, weak economies, and political apathy, with little respect for constitutional 
and democratic procedures, (…) governments have necessarily rested on the use of 
force” (1967, p. 162). 
 
Lucian Pye supports the idea that militarization contributes to development, but 
it is a limited contribution that needs to be complemented with more representative 
policies (Pye, 1967, p. 95). This slight discrepancy with the modernization theory 
stimulated further research on the topic, which led the way towards the formulation of 
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more detailed studies that focused on the ambiguous relationship between militarization 
and development. The general findings of these studies stress that “in contrast to the 
modernization scholars, observers of Latin America5 claim that militarization is inversely 
related to political development, social spending, citizen well-being and social 
development, democracy, and food consumption” (Bowman, 2002, p. 183). More recent 
studies emphasizing on economic analysis have arrived to similar conclusions and have 
argued that a reduction in military spending would increase a peace dividend that will 
enable more non-military public investments, which, in the end, encourage development 
(Davoodi, et al., 2001, pp. 312-313). 
 
 
2.2.4. Determinants of Militarization and Development 
 
A strong critic of the modernization scholars of the 1960s is Kirk Bowman. He 
insists that the methodology used in those studies, namely the usage of Military 
Participation Ratios (MPR) – or number of soldiers per one thousand inhabitants – as 
the causal variable, had a huge flaw as it considered all military institutions around the 
world as institutions similar enough that could be analyzed with a universal indicator. In 
this sense, he asserts that  
the Latin American military during the Cold War is not comparable to 
other LDC militaries and that the relationship between militarization and 
material development (equity and growth) in Latin America will be 
substantially different than that found by the myriad studies that found a 
positive relationship (Bowman, 2002, p. 186).  
                                                          
5
 These observers include scholars such as Oscar Arias, Barry Ames, Carlos Escudé, and Ruth Sivard. 
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Bowman’s characterization of the Latin American militaries enhanced the need to 
address any issue regarding their study as a unique case. In the same way as Centeno 
argued that the national armies in the region were limited forces because they were 
organized to fight limited wars, Bowman highlights three specific qualities that 
differentiate Latin American military institutions from other institutions around the world: 
first, the region’s armed forces have historically prepared to confront almost exclusively 
internal challenges; second, “the influence of the United States during the Cold War 
[enhanced] the introverted nature of the Latin American military” (Bowman, 2002, p. 
186); and third, Latin American states have not fought many wars among them.  
 
Taking these distinctions into account, Bowman studied the effect of militarization 
on three of the five goals of development defined by Huntington: democracy, economic 
growth, and equity. In his work Militarization, Democracy, and Development, he used 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies to analyze the specific relationships between 
militarization and each of the three goals of development during the Cold War. He 
arrived to conclusions that disputed the 1960s modernization school. His findings stated 
that “militarization more often than not tips power away from the popular classes and 
towards the oligarchy (…) [and] militarization has a substantial negative effect on 
political and material development in Latin America” (Bowman, 2002, p. 245). 
 
Various studies have also concluded that there is a negative relation between 
militarization and democracy or militarization and development, which support 
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Bowman’s work. Karl DeRouen and Uk Heo developed one of the most representative 
ones. They addressed the impact of militarization in Latin American countries from a 
military spending perspective while trying to contribute to the scholarship of the 1960s 
modernization school by examining the impact of military budgets on economic growth. 
After implementing panel estimates and individual longitudinal analysis methods, they 
found “that technological progress in the private sector has contributed to economic 
growth in most of Latin America” (DeRouen & Heo, 2001, p. 488) and that “military 
spending, by contrast, has thwarted growth” (DeRouen & Heo, 2001, p. 496). However, 
they missed to address how did technological progress inside military institutions 
affected the latter and what was the impact of the private sector’s technical 
advancement on the national armed forces: these relations may end up expanding the 
knowledge of how militarization, closely linked to the private sector, may influence 
economic growth and development. 
 
From all the previously mentioned studies, a set of determinants to evaluate 
militarization and development may be identified. For instance, Bowman selected 
democracy, economic growth, and equity to measure development since “they are 
much more easily operationalized than ‘development’” (Bowman, 2002, p. 7). In the 
case of militarization, it was determined by calculating the levels of military spending as 
a percentage of GDP and military participation ratios. For the democracy variable, the 
indicators used include interval measures from sources such as Freedom House, 
Fitzgibbon-Johnson Modified Index, and Polity. Finally, the country’s annual growth rate, 
per capita GDP, and GNP were the values usually used to explain economic growth 
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(Bowman, 2002). In order to conduct the intended analysis of the present study, this 
dissertation used similar determinants to measure militarization, democracy, and 
economic growth that are detailed in chapter three.  
 
 
2.3. The Industry of Private Military and Security Services 
 
Private providers of security and military services have been present in every 
form of human community along history. Pirates, corsairs, mercenaries, and private 
contractors have provided their services to states, kingdoms, empires, and all other 
forms of political organizations in order to fulfill the duties commanded to them by the 
correspondent ruler or authority (Holmqvist, 2005, p. 1; Avant, 2005, p. 1). Even in 
today’s political environment where the modern state is the type of organization that 
prevails – and which traditional theorists characterize as the one that claims, among 
other things, the “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory” (Gerth & Wright, 1946, pp. 77-78) – the tendency to rely on private 
organizations to provide security and military services has increased and has been 
growing exponentially during the last three decades (Singer, 2001, p. 189).  In the 
academic literature, these contemporary private organizations have been referred to as 
private military and security companies.  
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Besides becoming very popular among states, PMSC have also been used by 
various international organizations, private corporations, and even individuals (Singer, 
2001, p. 189; Leander, 2005, p. 606). Their presence in conflict scenarios supporting 
peacebuilding, peacemaking, and humanitarian activities has risen in recent years. 
Although estimates on the total amount of private contractors in the field varies a lot and 
trustworthy information is not always available, several reports show the extent to which 
this industry has expanded. Iraq is a perfect example: while in 2003 one of every ten 
people deployed by the U.S. was an employee of a PMSC (Avant, 2005, p. 1), in 2007 
the U.S. had a total of 160,000 troops and 180,000 private contractors on the ground at 
the same time (Singer, 2008, p. 245). Likewise, an official report of the U.S. 
Accountability Office stated, in 2006, that “60,000 privately contracted personnel were 
working with US forces (alone) in South-west Asia” (Bailes & Holmkvist, 2007, p. 4). 
These types of statistics repeat themselves in other parts of Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America and highlight the importance of this private industry at a worldwide level. 
 
Although PMSC are present in more than 100 countries, and their revenues 
exceed $100 billion U.S. dollars per year (Verkuil, 2007, p. 26), there is not yet a vast 
amount of research and writing on the topic. The war on terrorism, at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century, stimulated an initial discussion of this private industry by 
authors such as Peter Singer, Deborah Avant, and Robert Mandel, but it was especially 
after the killing of 17 civilians in Nisour Square, Bagdad, by members of the PMSC 
Blackwater, in 2007, that these companies became a hot topic for both researchers and 
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the media. The following section illustrates what different writers have argued about the 
origin and evolution of PMSC, and it also exposes the impact that these companies 
have had in various countries where they have operated or still operate. The final 
section will review the literature on the PMSC working in Colombia, the case study of 
the present work, in order to identify the state of the art of the research on the topic, the 
relevance of the case study, and the gaps of the existing research where further 
exploration should be done. 
 
 
2.3.1. The Rise of the PMSC Industry 
 
Although most of the state-authorized military entrepreneurs, as defined by 
Cockayne, ended up being very effective, they were subject to elimination because 
“each of these practices produced unexpected or at least unmanageable problems from 
states” (Thomson, 1994, p. 42). The end of the Crimean War, in 1856, led to the Treaty 
of Paris which, among other things, abolished the practice of privateering at least amid 
the signatory states. From that moment on, states agreed to stop granting letters of 
Marque to private vessels. The international presence of mercantile companies declined 
due to cases of mismanagement and bankruptcy, agreements of merger between them, 
and the annulment of their official charters or licenses (Thomson, 1994, pp. 70-98). 
Mercenarism was a practice that lasted a little bit longer, but, in 1977, the member 
states of the Organization of the African Unity drafted the OAU Convention for the 
Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, and, in 2005, the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of 
42 
 
the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States adopted a CIS Model 
Law “On Counteracting Mercenarism”. These regional initiatives together with the 
elaboration of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 
entry into force of the United Nations International Convention against the Recruitment, 
Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries, in 1989, ended the possibilities of any 
legal use of state-authorized mercenaries.  
 
However, non-authorized military entrepreneurs, such as pirates and other 
expressions of private violence, have prevailed and reappeared. States and other forms 
of authority have had very low levels of control over piracy that makes it virtually 
impossible to eradicate this type of activity. This situation has allowed piracy to prevail 
and even reemerge “both in south-east Asian waters and off the Horn of Africa, where 
barriers to market entry are once again low” (Cockayne, 2006, p. 479). Cockayne also 
affirmed that weak state power, the increasing need for better organized violence, and 
insufficient military and security assistance from the international community have 
triggered the resurfacing of other types of military entrepreneurs (Cockayne, 2006, pp. 
479-480). In this sense, private military and security companies have become the latest 
expression of organized private violence. 
PMSC are the military entrepreneurs that have prevailed and represent the 
essence of today’s industry of private military and security services. Most scholars 
coincide on the fact that the rise of PMSC responded to an increasing trend towards the 
privatization of security that began in the aftermath of the Cold War (Avant, 2005, p. 30; 
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Holmqvist, 2005, p. 1; Richards & Smith, 2007, p. 3; Singer, 2008, p. 49). Peter Singer 
stated that “when the Berlin Wall fell, an entire global order collapsed almost overnight. 
The resultant effect on the supply and demand of military services created a ‘security 
gap’ that the private market rushed to fill” (Singer, 2008, p. 49). Deborah Avant’s 
argument in her book The Market for Force supported Singer’s position. She argued 
that private security benefited itself from the excessive trained personnel that increased 
the supply of workforce and by the higher demand of such experienced workforce 
required by private market forces (Avant, 2005, pp. 30-31).  In other words, the end of 
the Cold War, characterized by a massive downsizing of the defense sectors and a 
reduction in the amount of personnel, translated into smaller armed forces and less 
security-related costs for the state (Shreier & Caparini, 2005, pp. 3-4; Cohn, 2010, pp. 
24; Holmqvist, 2005, p. 2).  
In addition to the supply and demand effect, other factors also encouraged the 
rise of a private military industry. The liberal ideals that spread around the world in the 
second half of the XX century and called for a smaller state apparatus translated into 
what Singer called a “privatization revolution” (Singer, 2008, p. 49). This revolution led 
to the outsourcing of state responsibilities, among them military functions, to private 
providers in a very short period. At the same time, the withdrawal of major powers from 
certain regions of the world and the emergence of new wars in developing countries 
during the 1990’s, motivated the involvement of private security providers in conflict 
zones (Shreier & Caparini, 2005, pp. 3-4; Cohn, 2010, p. 24; Holmqvist, 2005, p. 2; 
Ortiz, 2004, pp. 206-207). Finally, Deborah Avant asserted that the improvements in 
warfare technology and the change in the balance of power among states stimulated 
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even more the private industry: “the turn to PSCs was the obvious, natural, and 
functional response to the material changes technology brought to warfare and the shift 
in the balance of power after the Cold War” (Avant, 2005, pp. 30-31). This argument 
complements the findings of the study on militarization conducted by DeRouen and 
Heo: technological enhancements in warfare do have an impact on the provision of 
private security and also on the levels of militarization in a state. 
    After examining what different scholars have explored regarding the origins of 
the rise of the private industry of military and security services, it may be affirmed that 
there are three main factors that led to the consolidation of PMSC by the end of the XX 
century. First, the downsizing of the defense sector at the end of the Cold War: a 
reduced budget and the need to make the state more cost-efficient encouraged the 
assistance of the private sector to fulfill the tasks that the security sector was not able to 
do efficiently anymore but that were still required. Second, the reduction of military 
personnel: the reduction of the budget of the defense sector together with the tendency 
to discontinue conscripted armies obliged the military institutions to cutback men and 
women that were not indispensable, and when more personnel was required in specific 
or extraordinary circumstances, the private sector became the perfect ally to provide the 
needed human resources. Third, the high salaries offered by the private sector: those 
unemployed men and women, found in the private industry the perfect possibility to get 
back into the security business for which they were trained. At the same time, well 
trained and talented personnel began to be offered better salaries in the private sector. 
This offer gave them an incentive to drop out from public military institutions and to 
enlist with private providers of military and security services. In this sense, national 
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armies were obliged to rely once again on private companies to get a hold of the well 
trained personnel who had vanished from within their ranks. 
 
 
2.3.2. Global Challenges Posed by the Industry of PMSC  
 
Private security agents flourished by the end of the XX century and became 
structured corporations that successfully commercialized the provision of security and 
military services around the world (Singer, 2001, p. 191; Holmqvist, 2005, p. 2). These 
private military and security companies reached countries in every region, very quickly, 
and in a short period, performing activities that used to be carried out by public security 
forces. These tasks range “from tactical combat operations and strategic planning to 
logistical support and technical assistance" (Singer, 2005, p. 120). The services 
provided by PMSC proved to be more efficient and effective than public security 
providers, and in many cases, they offered higher levels of security when compared to 
their public counterparts (Singer, 2001, p. 197; Leander, 2005, p. 609).  
 
As the popularity of PMSC increased, and their activities spread all around the 
world, the difficulties around the use of private providers of security also began to rise. 
Grave scandals involving the activities of PMSC linked to cases of violations of human 
rights and abuse of national laws became a public concern. One of the most publicized 
cases took place in September 2007 in Iraq, more precisely in Nisour Square, a busy 
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public square in Bagdad. Employees of Blackwater USA, at the time a contractor 
offering security services to officials of the US State Department, argued that they were 
responding to previous gunshots and “proceeded to shoot and kill 17 civilians, wounding 
numerous others” (Cotton, et al., 2010, p. 26). Beside this, the employment of 
Colombian demobilized paramilitaries in Honduras, the presence of unauthorized 
private armed groups disguised as PMSC in Afghanistan, and “the alleged involvement 
of two United States-based corporations, CACI and L-3 Services (formerly Titan 
Corporation) in the torture of Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib prison” (General Assembly, 
2010, pp. 5-7), highlighted some of the critical challenges posed by this emergent 
private industry.   
 
The structure of the security sector is perhaps where PMSC have a greater 
impact. The reform or restructuration of the security sector and the professionalization 
of national armed and polices forces have been two of the most often cited motives for 
the use of private providers of military and security services (Krahmann, 2007, pp. 94-
95). Elke Krahmann developed a study where she “examined the challenges posed by 
the involvement of PMCs in military assistance and security sector reform” (Krahmann, 
2007, p. 95) in transitional states. Her study identified that PMSC were hired to assist in 
the reform of security sector programs in transitional states by both donor states and 
recipient states.  
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The analysis of Krahmann’s study showed that PMSC hired by Bosnia, Croatia, 
Sierra Leone, and Angola did not transform into positive experiences due to their weak 
state apparatus and to the difficulty to finance a sustainable long-term assistance in 
order to achieve a successful reform. Regarding the participation of donor states, she 
sustained that there were “inherent disadvantages of private security sector reform 
assistance in comparison with military-to-military exchange and education programmes” 
(Krahmann, 2007, p. 95), namely reduced levels of accountability and control over 
contractors overseas (Krahmann, 2007, pp. 100-105). Although she acknowledged that 
inefficient and ineffective programs also affected the results of the reforms, from her 
results it may be exposed that private companies do not replace the need for a strong 
state apparatus nor necessarily increase the levels of legitimacy of any political or 
military authority.   
 
Another study by Anna Leander analyzed the increasing use of PMSC in failed 
African states in order to strengthen the provision of public security. The answer to the 
main question of her research - “How to move towards greater public security?” 
(Leander, 2005, p. 606) – stressed that although insecure environments may encourage 
the presence of private military companies, “the market for force created by increased 
reliance on PMCs weakens the foundations of public security” (Leander, 2005, p. 606). 
In this case, the main challenge for the consolidation of public security was the demand 
of individual clients with the capacity of hiring private security, a frequent situation 
present in weak African countries. That demand increased the market for force, but it 
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also accentuated social inequality as not all the population had the capacity to hire 
private security. A research by Rita Abrahamsen and Michael Williams regarding PMSC 
in the Nigerian oil industry, arrived to a similar conclusion: “By offering security 
capabilities that would otherwise be absent, global PCS help facilitate the continuation 
of unjust societies where security solutions become the dominant logic and response to 
underlying political questions of distribution and participation” (Abrahamsen & Williams, 
2011, p. 148). 
 
The use of PMSC also challenges human security and Irene Ndung’u evaluated 
that situation using Africa as a case study. She began by acknowledging the absence of 
appropriate regulations to control the activities performed by PMSC in the continent and, 
therefore, the difficulty to make these companies accountable. Ndung’ sustained that 
Africa represented the best possible scenario for the expansion of the industry of private 
violence: meanwhile armed conflicts existed in weak or failed states, PMSC would 
always be required, and since these companies always searched for individual profit, 
the abundance of mineral resources in African states became an additional incentive for 
their active presence in the region. She concluded that although PMSC may not be a 
direct threat to human security, “their activities definitely pose a challenge not just to 
individual human security, but indeed to the security of the state” (Ndung’u, 2011, p. 30) 
particularly without an adequate legal framework to regulate them.  
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The findings of Krahmann, Leander, Abrahamsen and Williams, and Ndung’s 
make it clear that the lack accountability of PMSC is perhaps one of the most crucial 
challenges of the industry. In fact, for some scholars such as Peter Singer, “the 
privatized military industry lies beyond any one state's control” (Singer, 2001, p. 210) 
due to the economic and political impact that such an industry has over the global arena. 
The absence of binding international agreements or conventions6 that deal with the 
authorization, limitation, and conditions of the use of PMSC by states, military 
institutions (Shreier & Caparini, 2005, p. 26), international organizations, or any other 
type of private establishment is evident. The most binding tool stating the commitments, 
responsibilities, and penalties of these private companies is the same contract through 
which they are hired. This situation becomes even more dramatic when the scarce 
international regulation over private security and military companies is contrasted to the 
                                                          
6
 The United Nations Working Group on Mercenaries was assigned by the UN Human Rights Council to elaborate a 
draft Convention on Private Military and Security Companies. This document was formally presented on July of 
2010 (General Assembly, 2010) and is expected to be the first internationally binding document with the capacity 
to regulate PMSC. However, the draft convention is not a binding instrument since its approval by the United 
Nations is still pending. Another recent international initiative to regulate PMSC is the Montreux Document 
promoted in 2008 by the Swiss Government and the International Committee of the Red Cross (Montreux 
Document, 2009, p. 5). A total of 17 countries participated in the elaboration of the final document which has been 
described as “an intergovernmental statement [that] clearly articulates the most pertinent international legal 
obligations with regard to PMSC and debunks the prevailing misconception that private contractors operate in a 
legal vacuum” (Montreux Document, 2009, p. 5). However, it is not a legally binding document: as its full title 
states, it only presents “pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to 
operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict” (Montreux Document, 2009). There is 
one additional international instrument that has tried to fill the legal vacuum regarding PMSC: the International 
Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers promoted by the Swiss government. It is a self-regulatory 
instrument that intends “to set forth a commonly-agreed set of principles for PSCs and to establish a foundation to 
translate those principles into related standards as well as governance and oversight mechanisms” (International 
Code of Conduct, 2010, p. 3). However, it refers only to the provision of security services without taking into 
account the provision of military services, and it still lacks the external body for governance and oversight in order 
to exercise legitimate authority over its signatory PMSC. 
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norms and laws that control and overlook public security organizations with the legal 
capacity to use coercive means. 
 
 
2.3.3. The PMSC Industry in Colombia 
 
National and international academics, politicians, historians, and the military have 
studied extensively the protracted violence in Colombia, but the issue of the 
privatization of military and security services within the armed confrontation has not yet 
been properly analyzed. Philip Mauceri elaborated in 2001 one of the studies that began 
to introduce the idea of a process of privatization of security and defense in Colombia. 
Mauceri intended to compare the insurgent violence that was taking place in Colombia 
and in Peru, and, as part of his analysis, he argued that the Colombian experience 
could be catalogued as a process of “abdication and privatization” (Mauceri, 2001, p. 
54). Although he did not refer directly to the presence of PMSC in Colombia, he showed 
how state actors and regional elites, affected by the activities of guerrilla groups, 
supported and promoted the conformation of private self-defense organizations. He 
stated that the initiative to privatize the provision of security in certain regions of the 
country, led to the consolidation of paramilitary groups which were also strengthened by 
the support received from the powerful Colombian drug cartels (Mauceri, 2001, pp. 54-
55). 
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It was, in fact, this illegal business of drug trafficking that opened the possibility 
for PMSC to enter Colombian territory. Since the 1970s, the United States had great 
interest in stopping the trafficking of illegal drugs from Colombia and from the Andean 
region in general. These efforts led to the establishment of Plan Colombia in 1999, a 
cooperation agreement between Colombia and the United States. “To support Plan 
Colombia, [U.S.] Congress approved a $1.3 billion aid package to the country in 2000, 
$400 million of which was allotted for helicopters, military training programs, and 
additional assistance to the Colombian Army counter-narcotics brigades” (McCallion, 
2005, p. 320). The original agreement allowed military and civilian personnel from the 
United States to be stationed in Colombia in order to support and assist all activities 
against drug trafficking. The maximum amount of personnel permitted to be in Colombia, 
according to the initial conditions of the agreement, included 400 troops and 400 
civilians. The majority of this civilian component corresponded to private contractors. 
 
Sergio Gómez paid close attention to the situation of these civilian contractors 
and, in 2003 exposed valuable information from an official report of the State 
Department requested by the Congress of the United States regarding their activities in 
Colombia. During the year 2002, a total of 17 private military and security companies 
were present in Colombia developing activities that ranged from “establishing radars 
and training pilots to monitoring the dense Colombian jungle” (Gómez, 2003). From the 
official report, he concluded that these PMSC received almost 50% of the total budget 
of 2002 assigned to Plan Colombia, that some companies had been allocated more 
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than one different contract, and that most of the activities and services provided would 
require a long time in order to be assimilated and passed on to Colombian authorities, 
an objective that had been stated in the general agreement.  
 
The PMSC listed in the official report of the State Department and disclosed by 
Gómez were Lockheed-Martin, with eight contracts; Airinc, Inc. and Integrated 
AeroSystems, Inc. with three contracts each; DynCorp Aerospace Technologies, Inc. 
and  ACS Defense with two each; and DynCorp Aerospace Operations, Ltda., TRW, 
Cambridge Communications, Virginia Electronic Systems, Inc. (VES), Air Park Sales 
and Service, Inc. (APSS), ARINC Engineering Services, LLC, Northrop Grumman 
California Microwave Systems, Alion, LLC, Rendon Group, INS, Science Applications 
International Corp. (SAIC), and ManTech with one contract each (Gómez, 2003). 
 
The foreign assistance provided by the United States to Colombia, which at some 
point was intended specifically to strengthen the fight against illegal drug trafficking, 
suffered a significant modification. Alleged ties between the drug cartels and the 
emergent paramilitary groups, as well as the immersion of insurgent groups in the illegal 
drug business, made it necessary to join efforts in order to confront drug trafficking and 
insurgent violence at the same time.  
The war on drugs in Latin America now encompasses the war on 
terrorism as well. Both wars have become intertwined elements that 
comprise ‘narcoterrorism’. (…) As civilian contractors work to reduce 
coca cultivation in the Andean Region, they also battle guerilla groups in 
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war-like surroundings alongside the Colombian Army. What was once 
only a war on drugs has become full-fledged warfare with American 
civilian contractors in the middle of a combat zone (McCallion, 2005, pp. 
322-326).  
The new activities that had to be assigned to civilian contractors reinforced the 
increasing presence of PMSC in Colombia. 
 
Matthias Boysen and Claudie Balié, on separate studies, agreed that the use of 
PMSC became additional instruments of U.S. foreign policy in Colombia. Boysen’s 
study tried to establish whether the use of PMSC facilitated an effective and 
democratically accountable type of foreign policy. In his analysis, he used Avant’s 
classification of PMSC and categorized those that worked in Colombia, at least until 
2003, as “unarmed operational support on the battlefield” and “unarmed military advice 
and training” companies, arguing that “PMFs [Private Military Firms] in Colombia do not 
provide war-fighting capabilities, but rather operational support and consulting services” 
(Boysen, 2007, p. 59).  
 
Boysen identified that companies such as Dyncorp, hired to provide unarmed 
operational support, also got to perform activities that could have put them in direct 
combat situations: aerial spraying and search-and-rescue missions. He concluded that 
a continuous use of PMSC did not fulfill the aim of strengthening national armed and 
police forces since contractors completed their instructions without necessarily 
developing abilities and capabilities of national personnel (Boysen, 2007, pp. 38-57). 
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Finally, Boysen also highlighted that PMSC hired foreign personnel in order to avoid the 
legal cap of civilian contractors agreed by the governments of the United States and 
Colombia, and that although the U.S. Congress tried to keep close attention over the 
activities of contractors in Colombia, an adequate control and accountability over them 
proved to be very difficult to attain. 
 
The costs and benefits of using PMSC as instruments of foreign policy in 
Colombia were also addressed by Mónica Cortés. She analyzed the disadvantages and 
risks of using private contractors taking into account their impact on the state’s 
legitimacy and sovereignty and on the violation of human rights due to the legal vacuum 
in which these companies operate. Contrary to Boysen, Cortes believed that civilian 
contractors do play a more direct role in the Colombian conflict, and she argued that 
delegating the monopoly of the use of force to non-state actors breaks the paradigm of 
the nation-state, where the legitimate use of force is an exclusive function of the state 
that should not be delegated (Cortés, 2008). Although her study became more of a 
descriptive work of the private providers of military and security services active in 
Colombia and the environment of impunity in which they operate, her approach towards 
the state’s monopoly of the use of force showed the importance of deepening the 
discussion on that issue. The discussion seems even more relevant as it may result 
contradictory that the United States assistance to Colombia, which was intended to 
strengthen national military and police forces, aimed at confronting insurgent groups 
directly with foreign PMSC. 
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Another in depth study of PMSC within the Plan Colombia was elaborated by the 
Colectivo de Abogados José Alvear Restrepo, a Colombian human rights NGO, very 
critical of the national government. Like Mónica Cortés, the Colectivo de Abogados 
argued that these companies have played an active and direct role in the Colombian 
conflict due to their "unlimited power of information, coordination, and intelligence" and 
that there is a high level of impunity regarding the crimes and illegal activities that the 
personnel of these companies have committed, creating "grave and harmful effects on 
the Colombian democracy" (Colectivo de Abogados, 2008, p. 9). After analyzing the 
2006 report of the U.S. Congress regarding the activities of PMSC in Colombia, the 
Colectivo de Abogados was able to deduce that most of the contracts signed by the U.S. 
Department of State with private contractors were elaborated to allow an ongoing 
presence of these companies within the Colombian armed conflict (Colectivo de 
Abogados, 2008, p. 8-9). This conclusion supports the criticism expressed by other 
scholars regarding the inadequate measures taken by the United States to strengthen 
Colombian national military and police forces. 
 
The use of PMSC in Colombia has also attracted the attention of scholars that 
alleged that the foreign assistance of the United States has intensified the conflict in the 
Andean country. Vauters and Smith tried to answer the question concerning whether 
the inclusion of counter-terrorism operations within the foreign assistance policy may 
have escalated the level of violence in Colombia. The results of their study concluded 
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that evidently, the presence of PMSC did generate an escalation of violence in the 
country. This escalation responded to  five critical situations: first, air spraying over coca 
plantations could generate an armed reaction from insurgent groups; second, PMSC 
always seek individual interests, and these may not necessarily be the same as the 
those of the state; third, clear distinctions between members of PMSC and U.S. officials 
may not always become evident, making all of them  possible targets of illegal armed 
groups; fourth, lack of control and oversight by the U.S. Congress over the activities of 
PMSC may diminish their accountability and prevent their punishment when 
appropriate; and fifth, the fact of being foreign companies puts PMSC on a unfavorable 
position regarding characteristics of the Colombian conflict compared to all other actors 
involved in it (Vauters & Smith, 2006, p. 176). 
 
Most of the existing literature on providers of private military and security services 
in Colombia has focused on the presence of foreign PMSC. However, there is a growing 
domestic industry of private security services that has remained in the shadows of the 
academic community. The only references regarding this prosperous industry are 
included in a few regional studies on the security sector in Latin America. One of them, 
coordinated by Lucía Dammert, only highlighted that the national police in Colombia 
was not authorized to perform any activity related to private security, and that the 
domestic private security industry was supervised by a civilian authority instead of a 
governmental one (Dammert, 2007, p. 85). The studied ended up being more a 
descriptive one than a research exercise.  
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Another academic investigation on the topic was conducted by Patricia Arias, 
who trying to analyze the dilemmas posed by the scarce regulatory framework on 
private security in Latin America, was able to suggest an approximate number of 
personnel employed by the private security industry in Colombia in 2007. Her work was 
incorporated into a broader project published by Small Arms Survey, which identified 
that in Colombia, the number of PSC personnel exceeded amply the total number of 
police officers (Florquin, 2007, p. 104-112). These studies provide interesting 
information regarding the magnitude of the domestic private security industry, but they 
do not offer any indication concerning the impact of the industry on the national 
economy or on the country’s political environment. 
 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
 
The first part of this chapter reviewed the existing literature on militarization in 
Latin America. From an academic point of view, militarization is a concept that could be 
defined in a narrow or in a wide sense, depending on whether it concentrates on military 
forces exclusively, or whether it includes all organizations and expressions of organized 
violence that use coercive means to attain social objectives. The review highlighted that 
after the modern state structured a centralized military force and once it began to claim 
the monopoly over the use of violence, research on militarization restricted itself to the 
narrow sense of the concept. However, other private expressions of organized violence 
prevailed and since they were not formal elements of national armies, they were not 
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included in any academic study. Therefore, with the current evolution of PMSC, 
scholarly work on militarization should expand its scope of study and incorporate this 
private industry of private military and security services into every thorough analysis 
hereafter conducted. 
 
Militarization in Latin America after the Second World War could be divided into 
two separate groups. The studies of the modernization school appeared first, and most 
of them alleged that military forces encouraged modernization and development. The 
second wave of academic research contradicted those findings and argued that military 
spending and militarization in general had a negative effect on democracy, equity, and 
economic growth. The latter group strongly criticized the modernization school since in 
their studies they used Military Participation Ratios as the causal variable on a universal 
basis and overlooked that militaries from different regions were substantially different 
from each other, especially those military institutions raised in Latin America. Proof of 
the uniqueness of the Latin American military forces confirmed the analytical mistake 
committed by modernization researchers and strengthened the results of authors of the 
second wave such as Kirk Bowman. 
 
The second part of the chapter focused on literature regarding PMSC. It 
emphasized that militarization has been inversely related to the rise of the private 
industry of military and security services: PMSC arose in a demilitarization context. 
Those arguments concentrate on three main factors. The first one is related to the 
downsizing of the defense sector after the Cold War, mainly a reduction in budget and 
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administrative tasks. The second one refers to a decrease in the amount of military 
personnel within the military and police forces of the majority of states around the world. 
The third one concerns the high salaries offered by the private sector in contrast to the 
low wages that characterized the public security sector.  In this way, demilitarization 
increased the supply of trained workforce which became easily absorbed by a growing 
demand of private actors immersed in the private military business.  
  
Due to the rapid evolution of the industry of PMSC, the security sector had to 
face certain unexpected challenges for which it was not prepared. The reviewed 
literature demonstrated that the industry is not properly regulated, its responsibility over 
violations of human rights is unclear, it may increase social inequality, and excessive 
reliance on it may weaken the provision of public security. However, foreign PMSC were 
introduced in Colombia to strengthen the fight against illegal drug trafficking and to 
collaborate on counter-insurgent operations – and by the way, became additional 
instruments of U.S. foreign policy in the country. Likewise, a domestic industry of private 
security companies emerged and developed so quickly that in less than two decades 
the number of employees of the industry exceeded the total number of police personnel 
in the country.   
 
The reviewed literature presented a complete state of the art of militarization in 
Latin America and PMSC in Colombia. At the same time, it exposed the academically 
intriguing situation that this dissertation analyses and also revealed certain gaps that 
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have not been properly addressed by existing scholarly work. On the one hand, it was 
argued that PMSC emerged in a demilitarization context, but in Colombia, foreign and 
domestic private security companies developed in a militarization environment. In this 
sense, the fact that a private security industry emerged in the country while the state 
strengthened its national armed forces suggests that other factors different from 
militarization or demilitarization motivated its growth. Perhaps the internal security 
challenges that have affected the country for decades have triggered an increasing 
demand for security that the national armed forces have not been able to fulfill by 
themselves; according to the reviewed literature, this is true at least for the presence of 
foreign PMSC in Colombia. 
 
On the other hand, while contemporary literature affirmed that militarization in 
Latin America had a negative effect on development, the levels of democracy in 
Colombia have remained stable and the country has shown positive indicators of 
economic growth, despite of the militarization environment of the last two decades. This 
situation proves that militarization does not necessarily harm democracy and economic 
growth. Furthermore since the domestic private security industry emerged at the same 
time as the country strengthened its national armed forces, it may be possible that the 
presence of private security providers fulfilled security demands that promoted a stable 
political and economic atmosphere and mitigated the negative effects indicated by 
regional militarization studies.  
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3 Research Design 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
This dissertation examines the effect of the privatization of security on the 
relationship between militarization, democracy, and economic growth in Colombia. The 
impact of militarization in Latin American countries has been widely studied by different 
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scholars, but until now none of those studies has taken into account the influence that 
the current process of the privatization of security may have. This research tries to fill 
that gap through a thorough analysis of the private security industry in Colombia, a 
country where the provision of private security services has increased notoriously in the 
past two decades.  
 
This chapter describes the overall design and the methods used in carrying out 
the study. The following section explains the context in which the research was 
conducted and describes in detail the research questions and hypotheses that guide the 
dissertation. Then, the perspective and type of research, and the instruments used to 
collect data are specified. Afterwards, the dependent and independent variables are 
identified detailing how they were defined and measured.  Finally, a summary of the 
methodology will point out the key features of the research design.     
 
 
3.2. The Research Context  
 
The study took place in Colombia, a country with a particularly complicated 
internal situation characterized by the presence of insurgent armed groups, illegal 
paramilitary groups, and a very lucrative and well developed illegal business of drug 
trafficking. The constant struggle of the Colombian government to counter the country’s 
internal security challenges has been supported by the United States for decades. The 
support began in 1962 when the national government launched Plan Lazo, the first 
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formal counterinsurgency program in the country with a direct assistance from the 
United States. From that moment on, the North American country continued to influence 
the implementation of other counterinsurgency strategies and policies in Colombia. The 
bilateral diplomatic relationship also led to the formation of Plan Colombia in 1999. This 
plan entailed a cooperation agreement between Colombia and the United States that 
allowed military and civilian personnel from the United States to be stationed in 
Colombia in order to support and assist all activities against drug trafficking. The 
general situation has become even more complex as the war against the traffic of illegal 
drugs and the execution of counterinsurgent operations have merged and transformed 
into a joint war against terrorism.  
 
The period of study of the research is limited to the years between 1990 and 
2010. The year 1990 was a very significant year in the recent history of Colombia as the 
former guerrilla group M-19 signed a peace agreement with the government and a 
National Constituent Assembly was elected in order to elaborate the National 
Constitution of 1991, currently in force. Besides, the beginning of that decade witnessed 
the emergence of the domestic industry of private security companies which led in 1994 
to the creation of the Superintendency of Surveillance and Private Security 7 , the 
national authority in charge of controlling and supervising domestic private security 
companies. In contrast, the year 2010 marked the end of the 8-year Democratic 
                                                          
7
 “The Superintendency of Surveillance and Private Security is a national and technical body which is 
administratively and financially autonomous and is part of the Ministry of National Defense. It is the 
Superintendency’s responsibility to monitor and regulate surveillance and private security services throughout 
Colombia” (Superintendency, 2013). 
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Security Policy of President Alvaro Uribe. This security policy, among other things, 
achieved a peace agreement with paramilitary groups, promoted a militarization process 
to counter the expansion of insurgent groups, reaffirmed the diplomatic relations with 
the United States especially in the war against terrorism, and stimulated a more direct 
participation of civilians and private organizations in the public struggle against national 
security threats. 
 
 
3.3. Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
The existing literature on PMSC agrees on the fact that the demilitarization 
process that took place after the end of the Cold War was one of the main causes for 
the consolidation of a corporatized industry of private military and security providers 
around the world. The excess of trained personnel and the emergence of new wars 
increased the supply and demand for PMSC, a perfect combination for a profitable 
business. However, the presence of these private companies in Colombia responded to 
a different set of dynamics characterized by the following three elements. First, the 
country did not face a demilitarization process that could have otherwise increased the 
amount of unemployed military-trained workforce. The internal security challenges 
present in Colombia obliged the government to strengthen its security and defense 
policies in order to counter insurgent groups and drug trafficking.  
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Second, instead of following a demilitarization path, the country went through a 
militarization process that intensified after 2002. In 1998, the government and the FARC 
initiated a new round of peace negotiations that came to an end on February of 2002 
due to violations of the initial agreements by the insurgent group. The failed negotiations 
left the armed confrontation as the only way out of the conflict which encouraged the 
government to strengthen the country’s military and police forces. Finally, not only 
foreign but also domestic PMSC settled successfully in Colombia in the absence of a 
demilitarization process. In the 1990s these private companies began to play a 
significant role in the provision of military and security services, and their active 
presence in the country continues taking place today. 
 
The evolution of the internal situation in Colombia contrasts with the widespread 
academic “proposition that large militaries undermine democracy, equity, and economic 
growth” (Bowman, 2002, p. 4) in Latin America. However, the increasing level of 
militarization and the expansion of the private security industry in the last decades in 
Colombia are undeniable, as are the country’s relatively positive democracy ratings, 
political stability, and economic growth. Therefore, under the framework of the current 
literature on militarization and PMSC, the country’s internal context, characterized by 
the rise of a private security industry within a militarization process and the apparent 
positive effect of militarization on democracy and economic growth, results intellectually 
puzzling. It is precisely this puzzling situation the one that motivates the formulation of 
the research questions that the present research aims to answer: 
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Research Question No. 1: Despite the fact that PMSC emerged in the context of 
demilitarization after the end of the Cold War, why has the domestic private security 
industry developed in an environment marked by greater militarization in Colombia 
during the last two decades? 
 
Research Question No. 2: While existing literature on militarization concludes 
that large militaries and high defense budgets are negatively associated with 
development (in terms of levels of democracy and economic growth) in Latin America, 
why does the militarization process in Colombia seem to have had a positive effect on 
democracy and economic growth? 
 
The demilitarization trend after the Cold War was not as palpable in Colombia as 
it might have been perceived in other countries of the world. On the contrary, the 
demand for more and better security services increased and the national government 
was obliged to strengthen the country’s military and security institutions. This reinforced 
the militarization process in Colombia instead of reducing the levels of military spending 
and trained workforce. However, the dynamics of the internal armed conflict and the 
period of violence that took place in the country after 1990 made all governmental 
efforts insufficient: the national armed forces were not able to satisfy the entire demand 
for security. The gap between supply and demand for security became then an 
attractive opportunity for the formalization of the private sector that began to offer 
security services that were rapidly and widely accepted by the society. This situation 
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provides enough elements to suggest two hypotheses regarding the first research 
question of the dissertation:  
 
Hypothesis No. 1: The rise of the domestic private security industry in Colombia 
is not triggered by the country’s militarization or demilitarization context; other factors 
motivate its growth. 
 
Hypothesis No. 2: The domestic private security industry and the national armed 
forces provide complementary services to fulfill the increasing demand for security in a 
country affected by a protracted internal armed conflict. 
 
Consequently, while the demand for security in Colombia is not satisfied by the 
national armed forces, the private security industry has the possibility to develop and 
expand. Hence, a larger supply of security services becomes accessible to individuals 
and private organizations, improving in this way the country’s security environment as 
well. This constant availability of an alternative provider of security services may take 
away some of the state’s burden to create stable scenarios that encourage 
development, and enable the proposition of two additional hypotheses in relation to the 
second research question of the dissertation: 
 
Hypothesis No. 3: The presence of a domestic private security industry mitigates 
the negative effects of militarization on democracy and economic growth. 
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Hypothesis No. 4: The domestic private security industry fulfills security demands 
that promote a stable political and economic environment.  
 
 
3.4. Type of Study and Research Methods 
 
This is a policy-oriented study. Its main objective is to assess the existing theory 
regarding the relationship between militarization, democracy, and economic growth, 
paying special attention to the role played by the process of privatization of security that 
took place in Colombia. To adequately address the research questions described above, 
the dissertation embodies both quantitative and qualitative perspectives. The type of 
design of the study is a case study research of Colombia: it is a single-case study that 
entails diachronic and synchronic analysis. In other words, militarization and 
privatization of security are analyzed combining temporal – two decades – and spatial – 
Colombia – components (Gerring, 2007, pp. 28-31).  
 
In order to do conduct the qualitative analysis of the study, the techniques used 
to collect data were semi-structured interviews with individuals related to the private 
security sector, and analysis of official documents and reports. The interviews were 
conducted with members of the Second Commission of the Colombian Congress who 
are in charge of discussing issues related to national security and defense, academic 
experts in the field of militarization and private security, and officials of the 
Superintendency of Surveillance and Private Security – the national authority in charge 
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of supervising and controlling the domestic private security companies that operate in 
the country.  
 
Most interviews were conducted in person, although in one case the interview 
had to be done over the phone due to time limitations of the interviewee. Semi-
structured interviews were preferred over structured and unstructured ones because the 
controversial themes of the research could lead towards ambiguous and unclear 
information. Therefore, in order to address the main research questions and avoid 
useless data, rather specific questions had to be asked to leave just enough space to 
gather relevant unanticipated information. The topics brought up during the interviews 
derived primarily from the previous literature review and were enhanced as additional 
explanation was required to understand entirely the answers of the interviews. 
 
The quantitative analysis of the study includes two measures of association 
between different variables such as linear correlation coefficients and regression 
coefficients. The first technique is the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient 
that is represented by the letter r and is used to indicate the degree or strength of linear 
relationship between two variables. The value of the resulting r can range from -1 to 1, 
where -1 reveals a total negative relationship, 1 a total positive relationship, and 0 no 
correlation at all.  
 
The second technique is the multiple regression analysis. It evaluates the 
magnitude of the variation in a dependent variable for every change in each of the 
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independent variables included in the analysis (Acock, 2008, p. 180). This technique 
enables the possibility to test one independent variable at a time while controlling for 
other independent variables or elements – called control variables – that may also have 
an impact on the dependent variable (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 66). For the various 
analyses, this study uses the usual significance parameters of 1%, 5%, and 10% to 
establish the statistical significance of the independent variables in the regression 
models: depending on the p-value8 obtained in each test, the independent variable may 
be catalogued as significant – if under the significance parameter – or not significant – if 
over the significance parameter.  
 
To carry out the quantitative analysis, data has been collected mostly from 
secondary sources. The majority of the various indicators used were obtained from the 
World Bank datasets, the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset, the Observatory 
on Citizen Security database of the Organization of American States, the World 
Governance Indicators of the World Bank, and official reports of the Superintendency of 
Surveillance and Private Security. 
  
 
3.5. Concerned Variables 
 
                                                          
8
 The p-value is a probability that “nicely summarizes the strength or weakness of the empirical evidence against 
the null hypothesis” (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 129). In other words, a small p-value, usually under 0.1 (or 10%), 
determines that the statistical result is significant for the test that was conducted. Its value is between zero and 
one. 
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The study assesses the relationship between militarization, democracy, and 
economic growth in Colombia, and examines the impact that the privatization of security 
has on those relationships. In this sense, the elements that materialize the processes of 
militarization and privatization of security in Colombia are considered the independent 
variables of the study while the level of democracy and economic growth are treated as 
the dependent variables. 
 
 
3.5.1. Militarization 
 
The traditional definition of militarization is related to the growth, expansion, 
enlargement, and size of the armed forces of a state. Most scholarly works 
operationalize militarization according to military participation ratios – the total amount 
of military and police personnel per 1.000, 10.000, or 100.000 inhabitants – and military 
spending. However, taking into account the dynamics and evolution of armed conflicts 
in the past decades, a more modern and contemporary meaning has been proposed. 
This new proposal states that the doctrine behind militarization should “refer both to the 
military as a formal, state institution and to various non-state forms, expressions and 
instruments of organized violence” (Cock, 2005, p. 791). Although the narrow and 
traditional definition of militarization is used in the initial quantitative analysis of the 
present study, the wider conceptualization of militarization opens the possibility to 
embrace public and private expressions of organized violence under only one term; this 
conceptualization might become relevant during the presentation of the findings of this 
72 
 
research. In this sense, the units of measurement of the narrow notion of militarization 
in this study are M1: Military Participation Rates - the total number of military and police 
personnel per 1000 inhabitants -, and M2: military expenditure as a percentage of GDP.  
 
 
3.5.2. Privatization of Security 
 
Two broad types of companies have been part of the legal and legitimate 9 
process of privatization of security in Colombia: foreign and domestic PMSC. Data on 
foreign PMSC that operate in Colombia is not accessible on a regular basis. The level of 
secrecy regarding the type and total value of the contracts assigned to those companies 
is very high. Likewise, information on the employees of foreign PMSC and the detailed 
activities they perform is extremely difficult to obtain. It is also practically impossible to 
have access to officials of these companies in order to carry out interviews. In contrast, 
data on the domestic industry of private security companies is more at hand, especially 
since the moment in which the Superintendency of Surveillance and Private Security 
has tried to centralize as much information of the sector as it can. Given that the data on 
foreign PMSC is not available, the one on domestic PMSC may well represent the 
impact of the whole process of privatization of security in the country. Therefore, for the 
purpose of this study, the unit of measurement of the privatization of security is P1: 
                                                          
9
 Various types of illegal providers of security have existed throughout the history of the country. However, for the 
purpose of this thesis, only the legal ones are taken into account in the qualitative and quantitative analyses.  
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Private Military Participation Rates - the total personnel of domestic private security 
companies per 1000 inhabitants. 
 
 
3.5.3. Democracy 
 
The conceptualization and measurement of democracy has been a very complex 
exercise for scholars in different disciplines, especially regarding studies on 
comparative politics and international relations. There has not been a universal 
consensus on the precise definition of the term or on the accurate indicators that may 
determine it. This situation has generated a wide variety of studies each with a different 
measurement or evaluation approach. In this context, Gerardo Munck and Jay Verkuilen 
presented, in 2002, a very detailed analysis of the most frequently used data sets on 
democracy. They compared the ACLP Index, the Arat Index, the Bollen Index, 
Coppedge & Reinicke Polyarchy, Freedom House, Gasiorowski Political Regime 
Change, the Hadenius Index, Polity IV, and the Vanhanen Index (Munck & Verkuilen, 
2002, p. 10). Although Munck and Verkuilen concluded that “no single index offers a 
satisfactory response to all three challenges of conceptualization, measurement, and 
aggregation” (2002, p. 28) of democracy, Freedom House and Polity IV are the most 
commonly used ones. However, for the present dissertation, those two ratings were not 
used because the ratings given to Colombia for the period between 1990 and 2010 
present very little variation for consecutive years, a condition that reduces the 
explanatory capacity of the independent variables.  
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After a careful review of the existing measurements of democracy that provide 
ratings for the entire period of study of the research, the most suitable index for the 
dissertation turned out to be the Empowerment Rights Index, an indicator of the 
Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset. The Empowerment Rights Index “is an 
additive index constructed from the Foreign Movement, Domestic Movement, Freedom 
of Speech, Freedom of Assembly & Association, Workers’ Rights, Electoral Self-
Determination, and Freedom of Religion indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government 
respect for these seven rights) to 14 (full government respect for these seven rights)” 
(Cingranelli-Richards, 2010, p. 4). Since this dissertation is limited to a single-case 
study, this additive index proved to be more appropriate than others, such as Freedom 
House, that rate countries based on a comparative evaluation and may be more useful 
in cross-country studies. Besides, the ratings of the Empowerment Rights Index present 
a larger variation between consecutive years compared to other indexes such as 
Freedom House and Polity IV. As a result, the unit of measure of democracy is D1: 
Empowerment Rights Index. 
 
 
3.5.4. Economic Growth 
 
Economic growth has been identified by Huntington as one of the goals of 
development together with democracy, stability, equity, and autonomy (Bowman, 2002, 
p. 6). As such, there is an extensive scholarly work on the different elements and 
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determinants that may have an impact on it. The levels of security and insecurity have 
been crucial factors that have had a direct effect on economic growth, and since 
militarization, military spending, and the privatization of security are also directly related 
to security, then economic growth represents a key variable to take into account in this 
study. The unit of measurement of economic growth in this study is E1: percentage of 
annual growth of per capita GDP since it has been one of the most repeatedly used 
ones in various academic works. 
 
 
3.5.5. Relationships among variables 
 
After identifying the units of measurement of the different variables of the study, it 
is important to clarify how these variables interact. The independent operationalized 
variables are Military Participation Rates (MPR); Military Expenditure (MilExp); and 
Private Military Participation Rates (PrivateMPR); Similarly, the dependent 
operationalized variables are D1: Empowerment Rights Index and E1: percentage of 
annual growth of per capita GDP.  
 
Consequently with Hypothesis No. 2, the study intends to determine that while 
MPR increases due to the government’s militarization initiative, it is very likely that 
PrivateMPR also shows a positive growing tendency. There might be a correlation 
between both independent variables that indicates their connection to the country’s 
internal security threats. It is relevant to stress that correlation does not imply causality 
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between the variables. As Hypothesis No. 1 states, the strengthening of MPR and 
MilExp do not cause an increase in the levels of PrivateMPR: what motivates the growth 
of PrivateMPR are other factors related to the country’s internal security threats and the 
resulting increasing demand for security. 
 
Regarding Hypotheses No. 3 and No. 4, the study expects to identify that 
PrivateMPR is a relevant variable in the Colombian context and that an increase in MPR 
and MilExp due to the intensification of the internal armed conflict in the country after 
1990 does not have a negative effect on democracy (D1) and economic growth (E1). 
Furthermore, the possible correlation between MPR and PrivateMPR would suggest 
that an increase in both of them may, on the contrary, enhance the resulting outcome in 
democracy (D1) and economic growth (E1). In other words, the strengthening of 
PrivateMPR mitigates the negative effects of militarization on democracy (D1) and 
economic growth (E1) argued by existing literature. 
 
 
 
3.6. Summary of the Methodology 
 
To summarize the previous explanation, this study uses both qualitative and 
quantitative perspectives and gives priority to the qualitative analysis. In the first place, it 
examines the relationship between militarization and the privatization of security in 
Colombia, and then, it analyzes the impact that those processes have had on 
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democracy and economic growth in the country. The independent variables of the study 
are militarization and privatization of security, and the dependent ones are democracy 
and economic growth: for each one of them, specific units of measurement are 
identified. The type of the study is a case study research of private security and 
militarization in Colombia which includes correlation and regression analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Militarization and Privatization of Security in Colombia 1990-2010 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Following the Cuban revolution, armed rebel groups aiming for radical social 
change began to rise up across the American continent. This was particularly true in 
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Colombia. Over the years, most of the smaller groups operating in Colombia have 
disappeared – either because they merged with other groups, or because they 
negotiated their demobilization with the government. However, there are still two active 
guerrilla groups in the country: the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 
(FARC) and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN). In the beginning of the 1990s, 
these insurgent groups took over a great share of the illegal business that had been 
consolidated a decade before by the drug cartels. The income from these business 
activities, supplemented by funds procured from kidnappings and extortion, has 
strengthened the groups’ financial structures. 
 
Despite the enormous efforts of the national government to eradicate the 
production and trafficking of illegal drugs in Colombia, even with the assistance and 
close cooperation of the United States, the results of the implemented policies have not 
unfolded as expected. Chapter 1 has already provided a brief summary of the evolution 
of illegal drugs in the country, as well as a description of the early strategies adopted by 
the Colombian government to confront the problem up until the end of the 1980s. By 
that point, the government had already created a set of national regulations to counter 
the trade of narcotics, authorized a special anti-narcotic unit within the national police to 
combat the production of marijuana and the processing of coca leaves, and trained an 
elite force to capture the leaders of the main drug cartels. Although the majority of the 
drug kingpins of the day were either killed or captured and extradited to the United 
States, anti-narcotic policies proved to be insufficient to entirely eradicate the illegal 
drug business. 
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The sustained manifestation of these internal security challenges – insurgency 
and illegal narcotics – has encouraged a greater show of strength on the part of the 
Colombian government and an intensification of its policies. Particularly, a great 
emphasis has been placed on military activities. This chapter elaborates on the 
evolution of national strategies to counter insurgent groups and drug trafficking, and 
relates the consequent militarization process with the consolidation of the private 
security company industry. It is intellectually puzzling that the private security sector in 
Colombia developed in tandem with greater militarization, since existing theories affirm 
an opposite trend. Therefore, the present chapter aims to explain this phenomenon by 
answering the following research question: despite the fact that PMSCs emerged in the 
context of demilitarization after the end of the Cold War, why has the domestic private 
security industry developed in an environment marked by greater militarization in 
Colombia during the last two decades? 
 
The following section in this chapter gives an overview of the counterinsurgency 
operations in Colombia, highlighting the intensified militarization trend during the 2000s. 
The next section describes Plan Colombia, the major cooperation agreement between 
Colombia and the United States to strengthen the war against illegal drugs. It was 
through this plan that PMSCs began to expand their presence in the country. The 
subsequent section examines the factors that led to the emergence of the domestic 
private security industry and traces the development of the industry in the last two 
decades. A further section presents a correlation analysis between the variables that 
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determine both militarization and the privatization of security. The final section 
summarizes the findings drawn by the chapter and offers concluding remarks. 
 
 
4.2. Counterinsurgency in Colombia until 1990 
 
The counterinsurgency operations implemented by the Colombian national 
armed forces have reflected three different attitudes towards the insurgency: at first, 
there was a period marked by total confrontation with the rebel groups; next came a 
phase of absolute ignorance and unawareness of the problem; and finally, a scheme of 
disqualification and underestimation took place (Rangel, 2001, pp. 353-354). The initial 
strategy that began in the 1960s focused on consolidating professional, armed counter-
guerrilla groups and refining civil-military programs aimed at isolating the guerrillas from 
the civilian population. On one hand, the civil-military programs included the use of 
psychological initiatives that tried to improve the image of the armed forces among the 
general population (Vargas, 2002, pp. 262-263) – an image ruined years before by the 
regretful actions carried out against civilians during the violent disputes between the two 
major political parties in the period known as “La Violencia.” On the other hand, within 
the armed forces, several counter-guerrilla groups were formed as part of a national 
program known as “Plan Lazo.”  
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Plan Lazo was approved in 1962 and became the first formal counterinsurgency 
plan elaborated by the Colombian government with assistance from the United States10. 
This assistance began in 1959 when  
A US Special Survey Team, jointly composed of civilian and military personnel, 
was fielded by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), under State Department 
guidance and with Department of Defense (DOD) participation, to review the 
internal security situation in Colombia and to make recommendations towards 
solution of the violence problem (Rempe, 1999, p. 24).  
 
At the beginning of 1962, another Special Survey Team commanded by General 
William P. Yarborough arrived in Colombia. Based on the unit’s experiences of guerilla 
warfare in Indochina, it recommended the formation of specialized teams prepared to 
fight an irregular confrontation, as well as, “the organization of 'indigenous irregulars' as 
a fundamental component of the Colombian counterinsurgency strategy” (Tate, 2001, p. 
164). 
 
                                                          
10
 The first formal agreement between the United States and Colombia regarding military or security issues was the 
“Military Assistance Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Colombia”, signed at 
Bogota on April 17, 1952. Later on, both countries continued to strengthen their bilateral support to protect 
national security through the signature of the following documents: the Agreement between the Government of 
the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Colombia concerning an Army Mission, a 
Naval Mission, and an Air Force Mission of the United States of America Armed Forces in the Republic of Colombia, 
signed at Bogota on October 7, 1974; the Annex to the General Agreement for Economic, Technical, and Related 
Assistance between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of 
Colombia, signed at Bogotá on August 30, 2004; the Memorandum of Understanding for a Strategic Security 
Relationship to Promote Cooperation between the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic 
of Colombia, signed at Bogota on March 14, 2007; the Agreement between the Government of the United States 
of America and the Republic of Colombia to Suppress Illicit Traffic by Sea, signed at Bogotá on February 20, 1997; 
the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Republic of Colombia 
Concerning the Program for the Suppression of Illicit Aerial Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 
signed at Bogotá on December 20, 2007; and the Supplemental Agreement for the Cooperation and Technical 
Assistance in Defense and Security Between the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of 
Colombia, signed at Bogotá on October 30, 2009. 
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Plan Lazo promoted both direct confrontation with the insurgent groups and an 
anticommunist campaign to delegitimize their revolutionary ideals. Accordingly, the total 
number of recruits increased significantly: the military forces went from 23,000 men in 
1961 to 37,000 in 1965 (Rangel, 2001, p. 357). However, the counterinsurgency 
operations executed during this period proved to be ineffective in that the guerrilla 
movements were not completely annihilated. Although the Plan LAZO was designed by 
the national government and enjoyed the complete support of the military forces, certain 
powerful elites and politicians did not participate as enthusiastically as they perhaps 
could have. “Many people in the nation complained that Plan Lazo was a useless waste 
of their money, 183 million pesos to be exact, and noted that many innocent civilians as 
well as communist guerrillas had been killed” (Henderson, 1985, p. 223). Those elites 
and politicians disapproved the killings of innocent civilians; their condemnation and 
rejection of Plan Lazo motivated its termination 1965. 
 
The end of Plan Lazo concluded the phase of total confrontation and ushered in 
a new phase characterized by attitudes of ignorance and unawareness. In this phase, 
the first Defense and Security Decree and the first Law of National Defense were issued, 
but they were not properly put into practice. The Colombian institutions and the national 
armed forces gave a higher priority to the potential threat of an armed conflict with 
Venezuela and diverted all the attention that had been previously given to the 
insurgency in previous years (Rangel, 2001, p. 359). The relative inoperativeness of the 
insurgent groups during this period also contributed to the more hands-off approach of 
the government. It was only until the end of the 1970s that the second generation of 
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insurgencies began to appear and only until the 1980s that the first-generation 
insurgencies started to increase their number of recruits and to expand throughout the 
national territory.  
 
The third phase of the counterinsurgency followed as the state had to confront 
stronger and more frequent guerrilla movements, and it has lasted until the present day. 
After 1982, the state once again gave priority to addressing the insurgency as a critical 
defense and security threat and tried to put into practice the legal instruments that had 
been issued years before, but which had not been adequately implemented. For 
example, the Law of National Defense, also known as Law 48 of 1968 11 , which 
authorized the formation of armed groups composed of civilians outside of the national 
armed forces, began to be widely used as a counterinsurgency tool during this phase. 
Counterinsurgency strategies sought to eliminate nascent insurgent movements among 
the general population and to design plans to defeat more organized rebel groups on 
the battlefield.  
 
As was already explained in Chapter 1, under the legal framework established by 
Law 48 of 1968, collective associations of armed self-defense groups such as 
ACDEGAM began to appear during the 1980s. The formation of these groups was also 
encouraged officially by the commander of the national military in order to involve more 
directly the civilian population in the response against insurgent activities (Romero, 
                                                          
11
 Among other things, Law 48 of 1968 authorized civilians to conform armed groups autonomous from the 
national armed forces, as part of the country’s counterinsurgent strategies. This law represented the legal basis for 
the emergence of self-defense organizations in Colombia. 
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2006, p. 360). These paramilitary groups became informal but successful 
counterinsurgency instruments, financed mainly by big landowners and wealthy 
peasants, most of which were already involved in the illegal business of drug trafficking 
and were therefore important targets for insurgent groups. Paramilitary groups 
continued to evolve and joined forces under a broader national organization called the 
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC)12.    
 
Although paramilitary groups consisted of armed civilians with no official 
institutional ties with the national armed forces – and were not created by a direct 
dispensation from the national government – their role in counterinsurgency operations 
was widely accepted. An evident example of this situation was the presence of an 
Israeli in Colombia whose purpose was to train private ACDEGAM forces to fight 
guerrilla groups. Yair Klein13, a retired coronel of the Israeli military, arrived in Colombia 
in 1988 and met with the major of Puerto Boyacá, an official of ACDEGAM, a retired 
                                                          
12
 Paramilitary groups were widely accepted in Latin America as counterinsurgent mechanisms. Besides the AUC in 
Colombia, other similar groups were the Patrullas Armadas Civiles (PAC) in Guatemala, the Patrullas Cantonales in 
El Salvador, and the Rondas Campesinas in Perú. Even though all of them shared similar goals, the AUC had certain 
distinctive characteristics that motivated their illegal status. Contrary to paramilitary groups in Guatemala, El 
Salvador, and Perú, once the Law 48 of 1968 was repealed, the AUC lost the legal mandate that approved its 
existence. In addition, while all other paramilitary groups were financed by their own governments, the AUC 
obtained its financial resources from drug trafficking and other illegal activities (Pizarro, 2004, pp. 114-116).  
13
 In the beginning of 1988, an association of banana producers from Urabá, a region located in the Northwest part 
of Colombia near Panamá, contacted Yair Klein to train them in order to fight the guerrilla groups that were 
present in the area and were affecting their local economy.  Isaac Shoshani, representative in Colombia for TAAS, a 
state-owned Israeli security company, facilitated the contact. Klein alleges that during his first visit to Colombia to 
meet the director of the association of banana producers he also met in Bogotá with the supreme commander of 
the Colombian national armed forces. However, he does not recall the name of the commander. Despite this initial 
contact, Klein could not work in Colombia at that time because the guerrilla took control of the area and dissolved 
the association of banana producers. A couple of months later, Klein was contacted once again by ACDEGAM, 
another civilian association, for a similar purpose (Behar & Ardila, 2012, pp. 36-40).  
85 
 
member of the Colombian armed forces, and with other officials of the national 
Administrative Security Department (DAS): everyone wanted to use Mr. Klein’s 
expertise. National authorities knew that he was coming to train civilian groups, and yet 
there was no public impediment that prevented him from fulfilling the task for which he 
had being hired (Behar & Ardila, 2012, pp. 43-58).  
 
However, the use of paramilitary groups as important elements in the unofficial 
fight against insurgent groups lasted until 1989, year in which Law 48 of 1968 was 
repealed and those associations of armed civilians became another illegal armed 
faction within the internal armed conflict. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the military 
capacity of the paramilitary groups got out of hand. Tortured and mutilated individuals 
began to appear in what was known as “Health Brigades”: social cleansing where 
anyone related to the guerrillas became a military target. By 1983, various massacres 
had already taken place in peasant villages informally accused of supporting guerrilla 
groups. Every now and then corpses appeared with a sign that said “Dead Communist” 
(Revista Semana, 1989). These sorts of activities were the reasons that obliged the 
national government to repeal the law that authorized the existence of paramilitary 
groups and similar armed groups of organized civilians. Nevertheless, the existence of 
informal – and illegal – providers of security and private justice never ceased to exist 
and even gained importance as their ties with drug trafficking strengthened (C.Echandía, 
personal communication, November 15, 2012). 
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Besides this, the national state also designed other official and institutional 
instruments to confront insurgent groups. In 1985, the government created the Fuerza 
Elite Antiguerrillera, a special counterinsurgency group composed of professional 
soldiers to fight rebel groups. Another measure adopted in that same year legally 
authorized the recruitment of individuals who voluntarily wanted to become part of the 
national armed forces – a measure which strengthened the existing, institutionalized 
military conscription system (Leal, 2006, p. 517). This initiative aimed at increasing the 
total number of personnel within the ranks of the armed forces. Likewise, mobile military 
brigades were formed in 1990 in order to support the activities of the Fuerza Elite 
Antiguerrillera, making use of the increasing number of recruits. These newly appointed 
military groups were not only a response to fight insurgents, but also to confront 
paramilitary groups after 1989.  
 
 
 
 
 
4.3. Counterinsurgency and Militarization after 1990 
 
Beginning at the end of the 1980s, in addition to active armed confrontation, the 
national government included the option of peace negotiations as another 
counterinsurgency strategy. Consequently, rebel groups were granted a political status 
that gave them the possibility of initiating peace negotiations as another way out of the 
87 
 
internal conflict. In 1984, 1985, and 1990, various peace agreements were signed 
between the Colombian government and the rebel group M-19. Other similar 
agreements were formalized with the EPL in 1991, the Comando Ernesto Rojas in 1992, 
and in 1994 with the CRS, the Quintín Lame, and a small dissident group of the still-
active ELN.  
 
Despite these important demobilizations, counterinsurgency operations continued 
to be implemented in the country to fight the remaining guerrilla groups – FARC and 
ELN – and paramilitary units. It should be highlighted that although the paramilitaries 
officially became illegal in 1989, they continued to consider themselves 
counterinsurgency units and persisted in their aim of confronting insurgencies all around 
Colombia. They even maintained close contact with some members of the national 
armed forces, and in many cases, it has been alleged that the military and the police 
worked together with paramilitary groups. “Despite being officially banned, a significant 
number of military personnel maintained their relationship with these [paramilitary] 
groups into the 21st century" (Richani, 2006, p. 407). These revelations became public 
many years after and most of the members of the armed forces accused of 
collaborating with paramilitary groups have already been prosecuted and sent to jail or 
are still facing judicial proceedings.   
 
Throughout the first half of the 1990s, the guerrillas intensified their fight against 
the government, generating a quick response from the affected regional authorities. In 
1995, the local authority of the Antioquia Department, with the support of landowners, 
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tried to implement a joint strategy with the regional commander of the military to 
militarize the region and create so-called Community Associations Convivir (Romero 
2006: 371). These Convivir14 were armed civilians, similar to the former paramilitary 
groups that were legal before the abolition of Law 48 of 1968, but supported by newly 
issued legislation. Although this new initiative of arming civilians proved to have a great 
potential in counterinsurgency operations, the law that legalized them was once again 
considered unconstitutional in 1997. 
 
The end of the 1990s renewed the possibility of initiating peace talks with the 
FARC and the ELN. In what was perhaps another mistake on the part of the national 
government, the peace agreement with the FARC was given higher priority. In order to 
begin negotiations, the FARC demanded a specific neutral territory without the 
presence of armed forces. Therefore, the national government issued Law 418 of 1997, 
per which a total of 42 thousand square kilometers15 had to be demilitarized in order for 
FARC members to settle down, concentrate their forces, and prepare to negotiate. This 
situation stopped the increasing tendency to strengthen the national armed forces: 
Graph 4.3.1 pictures that between 1998 and 2000, the total personnel of the Colombian 
military and police forces slightly decreased. Unfortunately, the peace talks were 
unsuccessful, and during the three years in which the FARC were granted a 
                                                          
14
 The legal creation of the Convivir was based on the Law 62 of 1993, the Decree 356 of 1994, and the Ministerial 
Resolution 368 of 1995. At first sight, the Convivir followed all the legal parameters necessary to provide security 
services. Later on, powerful landowners and cattle breeders began to take advantage of them and finance them to 
fulfill their own security needs. In this way, the distinction between the Convivir and the paramilitaries 
disappeared (Cubides, 2005, pp. 194-195). 
15
 A region as large as Switzerland. 
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demilitarized zone, the main outcome was that the FARC were able to regroup and 
strengthen their forces. This situation nearly removed any future possibility of 
negotiations with the insurgent groups and built almost unanimous public support for 
confronting rebel groups mainly with military-oriented strategies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 4.3.1 Increase of Colombian National Armed Forces 1998-2009 
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Source: Graph elaborated by the author with data obtained from Logros y Retos de la Política de 
Seguridad Democrática. Ministerio de Defensa Nacional de Colombia. 2006: 9 and Logros de la Política 
de la Seguridad y Defensa. Seguridad para la Prosperidad. Ministerio de Defensa de Colombia. 2010: 77.  
 
In 2002, a new government was formed with the straightforward objective of 
strengthening the nation’s military power to confront insurgent and paramilitary groups. 
Military and police personnel began to increase considerably in that year, together with 
the total budget assigned to national defense. Graph 4.3.1 shows that, following a slight 
drop in the total number of military and police in 2000, after 2002 the tendency was 
totally the opposite: from 1998 until 2009, the combined national armed forces 
increased 70%. Likewise, Graph 4.3.2 shows the constant increase of public 
expenditures on national defense as a percentage of GDP. The specific military and 
police personnel spending, as a percentage of GDP, is indicated, too. Both statistics 
demonstrate the high importance that the national government gave to the defense 
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sector in order to counter the country’s security challenges. A clear tendency towards 
strengthening the military and the police forces is evident.  
 
Graph 4.3.2 Colombian Public Expense on National Defense 1990-2010 
(as a percentage of 1994-based GDP) 
 
Source: Graph elaborated by the author with data obtained from Logros y Retos de la Política de 
Seguridad Democrática. Ministerio de Defensa Nacional de Colombia. 2006: 79 and Logros de la Política 
de la Seguridad y Defensa. Seguridad para la Prosperidad. Ministerio de Defensa de Colombia. 2010: 80.  
 
After 2002, the national government demonstrated a clear determination to 
confront the guerilla forces operating in the country and to defeat paramilitary groups as 
well. Besides the regular military operations against illegal armed groups, the 
government approached AUC leaders and designed a peace agreement in 2003. This 
agreement involved the collective disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration by 
2006 of all paramilitary groups operating in Colombia. The progression of 
demobilizations is shown in Graph 4.3.3. A total of 31,671 former paramilitaries 
92 
 
demobilized and entered the reintegration program designed by the national 
government as an additional incentive to promote their disarmament. 
 
Graph 4.3.3 Collective Demobilizations in Colombia 2002-2009 
 
Source: Graph elaborated by the author with data obtained from Official report on the 
progress in the DDR process in Colombia. High Commission for Reintegration. 2009. 
The data includes demobilizations registered until February 28, 2009. 
 
The legal framework elaborated to implement the peace agreement with the AUC 
also left open the possibility for members of insurgent groups to demobilize and 
reintegrate into civilian life. Thus, the government encouraged individual demobilizations 
of guerrilla groups as another counterinsurgency strategy in order to weaken rebel 
groups even further. The results proved to be very satisfactory. As per Graph 4.3.4, a 
total of 18,414 individuals demobilized from insurgent groups between 2002 and 2009, 
most of them affiliated to the FARC. 
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Graph 4.3.4 Individual Demobilizations in Colombia 2002-2009 
 
Source: Graph elaborated by the author with data obtained from Official report on the 
progress in the DDR process in Colombia. High Commission for Reintegration. 2009. 
The data includes demobilizations registered until February 28, 2009. 
 
It is interesting to compare the demobilization graphs with those documenting the 
increase in armed forces personnel in Colombia. The collective demobilizations of 
paramilitary groups, together with the individual demobilizations of illegal armed groups 
between 2002 and 2009, add up to a total of 50,085 people. However, despite the 
significant reduction in the number of insurgents and rebels throughout the country, the 
total number of armed forces continued to increase over the same period. Furthermore, 
increases in both personnel and public defense spending were intensified specifically 
during the same years in which the demobilization process was taking place. This 
finding would seem to indicate the government’s harsher approach towards the 
remaining insurgent groups in Colombian territory.  
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Besides increasing the number of armed forces personnel and encouraging the 
demobilization of insurgents, the government continued its attempts to involve civilians 
in counterinsurgency operations after 2002. Despite the negative results experienced 
after arming paramilitaries in the 1970s and 1980s, the use of noncombatants as 
strategic instruments in the fight against rebels persisted. In this sense, during the first 
decade of the 2000s, the national government created a network of informants 
composed primarily by civilians in rural areas who ended up carrying out military 
intelligence tasks. The intelligence gathered through these recruited individuals became 
a very important input for the design of armed interventions by the military and the 
police in the territories controlled by insurgents. 
 
At the same time as individuals were recruited for the network of informants, the 
government also promoted training peasant soldiers in rural areas. These peasants 
received weapons and military training for three months in order to support the national 
armed forces side-by-side in combat operations that took place near their regions of 
origin (Olarte, 2008, p. 36). Graph 4.3.5 shows the evolution of the recruitment of 
peasant soldiers between 2003, the year in which the program began, and 2009. Both 
the network of informants and the peasant soldiers became compelling civilian 
alternatives used by the government to complement its counterinsurgency offensive, 
following the decades-old guidelines and recommendations of U.S. advisors embodied 
in Law 48 of 1968. 
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Graph 4.3.5 Peasant Soldiers in Colombia 2003-2009 
 
Source: Graph elaborated by the author with data obtained from Logros de la Política de la 
Seguridad y Defensa. Seguridad para la Prosperidad. Ministerio de Defensa de Colombia, 2010: 78. 
 
By the end of the first decade of the twenty first century, the counterinsurgency 
strategies of the national government seemed to have obtained positive results. The 
militarization process that was intensified in 2002, which included the involvement of 
private civilians in counterinsurgency operations, coupled with the incentives that 
motivated individual and collective demobilizations of illegal armed groups, 
strengthened the national armed forces and weakened the insurgent groups. 
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that foreign support, especially from the 
United States, also played an important role in the fight against rebel groups in 
Colombia. 
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4.4. Plan Colombia and PMSCs 
 
The illegal business of drug trafficking has been the other main security 
challenge, together with insurgent movements, in the past decades in Colombia. Unlike 
national counterinsurgency operations, the strategies to fight this illegal business have 
witnessed more direct and evident international involvement, especially from the United 
States. “Since the early 1970s16, the United States has supported Colombia’s efforts to 
reduce drug trafficking activities and stem the flow of illegal drugs, principally cocaine 
and heroin, entering the United States” (United States Government Accountability Office, 
2004, p. 1). This assistance became even stronger once the country became the main 
producer of illegal drugs in the region. Graph 4.4.1 traces the development of leading 
South American drug producing countries and shows an impressive increase in cocaine 
production in Colombian territory after 1995. As a result, in 1999 the governments of 
Colombia and the United States designed a national program called Plan for Peace, 
Prosperity, and the Strengthening of the State, better known as Plan Colombia, to 
                                                          
16
 Colombia and the United States signed on October 7, 1974, the “Agreement between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Colombia concerning an Army Mission, a Naval 
Mission, and an Air Force Mission of the United States of America Armed Forces in the Republic of Colombia”. 
Although there is no Status of Force Agreement signed between Colombia and the United States, the 1974 
agreement marked the beginning of immunity privileges for military and civilian personnel from the United States. 
“In accordance with Articles 5 and 11 of the 1974 Military Missions Agreement, Colombia shall grant United States 
personnel and their dependents the privileges, exemptions, and immunities accorded to the administrative and 
technical staff of diplomatic mission under the Vienna Convention” (Supplemental Agreement, 2009, p. 7). In this 
case, United States personnel refers to “the United States Armed Forces military personnel and civilian personnel 
who are in Colombia to carry out activities within the framework of this Agreement (Supplemental Agreement, 
2009, p. 3). 
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formalize this foreign assistance and elaborate more specific counternarcotic policies in 
the country. 
 
Graph 4.4.1 Cocaine Production in the Andean Region  
(in metric tons) 
 
Source: Graph elaborated by the author with data obtained from Marcella, G., (2010). 
Plan Colombia: The Strategic and Operational Imperatives. United States: Strategic 
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, p. 3. 
 
Plan Colombia was initially a 5-year program with the central objective of 
supporting counternarcotic maneuvers – mainly air spraying illegal crops, alternative 
development projects, and interdiction operations. The total budget of the plan was 7.5 
billion U.S. dollars, out of which Colombia would contribute $4 billion, the United States 
would provide $1.3 billion, and the remaining $2.2 billion would be financed by other 
foreign countries (Marcella, 2001, p. 10). However, donors from Europe did not support 
the plan, and so the United States ended up being the main foreign contributor. Graph 
4.4.2 traces the United States’ foreign assistance to Colombia from 1996 until 2010. 
98 
 
The figures show an appreciable increase in the economic support given by the United 
States to Colombia in 2000, after the approval of Plan Colombia. 
 
Graph 4.4.2 Total Grant Military and Police Aid from the United States to 
Colombia 1996-2010  
(in million USD) 
 
Source: Graph elaborated by the author with data obtained from Just the Facts, a project of the 
Latin America Working Group Education Fund in cooperation with the Center for International 
Policy and the Washington Office on Latin America, which includes information from the 
Department of State, the Department of Defense, and fiscal year reports. 
 
Graph 4.4.2 also shows the continued aid given to Colombia even after the initial 
implementation of Plan Colombia. It is possible to note that the foreign assistance 
remained relatively constant after 2003, and that in the following years, the levels of 
assistance provided were greater than the amounts granted before the implementation 
of Plan Colombia. This situation reveals that the United States’ policy in Colombia 
followed a long-term strategy and was not limited only to what was stipulated in the 
1999 bilateral plan. 
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In order to fulfill the aim of Plan Colombia, besides economic support, the United 
States also provided government officials, advisory teams, and training for the 
Colombian military and police. The presence of these foreign officials in Colombia was 
initially limited to a maximum of 400 members of the United States armed forces and 
400 civilian personnel. However, in 2004, these limits were increased, allowing a 
maximum of 800 members of the armed forces and 600 civilians to operate in 
Colombian territory. It was through this civilian component that private contractors were 
able to work in Colombia, assisting the activities of Colombian armed forces and United 
States personnel.  
 
A “Report on Certain Counternarcotics Activities in Colombia,” issued by the 
Department of State of the United States during the fiscal year 2002, affirmed that by 
that time there were already over 15 PMSCs operating in the country (United States 
Department of State 2003). In 2007, a similar report stated that the total number of 
PMSCs had risen to around 25 PMSCs in total (Perret 2009: 66). The main contractors 
and the total worth of all contracts for the fiscal year 2006, as reported by the 
Department of State and the Defense Department to the Congress of the United States, 
are listed in Table 4.4.1. 
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Table 4.4.1 PMSCs in Colombia - Contracts for the 2006 Fiscal Year 
(In U.S. Dollars) 
 
Contractor Amount (USD) 
1 DynCorp International, LLC  $      164.260.877  
2 Lockheed-Martin Group  $        70.154.557  
3 ARlNC, Inc.  $        29.184.000  
4 OPTEC  $          9.409.664  
5 King Aerospace  $          9.036.310  
6 ITT  $          6.533.502  
7 Oakley Networks  $          5.000.000  
8 MANTECH  $          4.704.955  
9 
Northrop Grumman Information Technology 
International, Inc. 
 $          3.330.863  
10 Telford Aviation  $          2.783.000  
11 PAE Government Services  $          2.540.000  
12 Olgoonik  $          2.425.739  
13 OMNITEMPUS  $          1.000.000  
14 CACI, Inc.  $             555.230  
15 Tate Incorporated  $             420.603  
16 
Construction, Consulting, & Engineering 
eCCE) 
 $             300.000  
17 Chenega Federal Systems  $             200.000  
18 
U.S. Naval Mission Bogota Riverine Plans 
Officer 
 $             200.000  
19 
Science Applications International 
Corporation 
 $                78.879  
 
    
 
TOTAL  $      312.118.173  
Source: Table elaborated by the author with data obtained from the Department of State 
(2007). Report on Certain Counternarcotics Activities in Colombia. Department of State of the 
United States, pp. 3-30. 
 
As Table 4.4.1 shows, the two main contractors carrying out activities in 
Colombia during the year 2006 were DynCorp International and Lockheed-Martin Group. 
Dyncorp International was working for the Department of State and its assigned 
activities were the “provision of pilots, maintenance technicians, and logistic support to 
the Colombian Army Counter-Drug Brigades and to the CNP [Colombian National 
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Police] aerial eradication program” (Department of State, 2007, p. 3). The central 
argument for the presence of DynCorp in Colombia at the time was that “neither the 
COLAR [Colombian Army] nor the CNP [Colombian National Police] ha[d] the technical, 
personnel, or financial resources to adequately maintain and support the aircraft in this 
program” (Department of State, 2007, p. 3). Hence, one of the additional responsibilities 
of DynCorp was to train the Colombian armed forces to carry out the required aircraft 
maintenance tasks.  
 
While Dyncorp had one big contract, the report showed that Lockheed-Martin 
Group had twelve different contracts, both with the Department of State and the 
Defense Department. The biggest one of them involved the “provision of maintenance 
and logistics support personnel, aviation facilities and facility maintenance support to 
assist the Colombian National Police (CNP) in the maintenance and support of the CNP 
Air Service fleet, including procurement of spare parts and repair parts for the CNP 
fleet” (Department of State, 2007, p. 2). The rationale for enlisting the services of the 
Lockheed-Martin Group echoed that used in the case of DynCorp International.  
 
The remaining activities performed by the other PMSCs included assistance and 
training for Colombian armed forces in surveillance operations and the delivery of 
specific equipment. For each contract, there was a risk assessment, and most of the 
assessments ranged between low and medium risk, evidencing the scant involvement 
of PMSC personnel in field operations. However, the activities implemented by DynCorp 
International were considered as having a significant risk due to the air spraying of 
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illegal crops in rural areas. “Following an increase from the previous year in 2005, the 
number of ground-fire bullet impacts decreased by 45 percent during 2006, indicating 
that the measures which had been taken in conjunction with the COLAR and the CNP 
helped to control and mitigate these risks” (Department of State, 2007, p. 3). 
 
The activities of the military and civilian personnel of the United States were 
intended to strengthen Colombian capabilities in the war against the cultivation and 
production of illegal drugs under the framework of Plan Colombia. However, the 
dynamics of the insurgency violence in the country, and the abundant benefits that 
these rebel groups obtained from drug trafficking to fund their armed struggle, made it 
very difficult to differentiate counternarcotic from counterinsurgency operations. Policies 
and strategies to confront both security challenges began to overlap, as did the areas of 
direct assistance provided by the United States.  
 
In 2003, the Colombian government designed Plan Patriota, a program to 
complement and support its large-scale offensive and existing operations against 
insurgent groups. This plan targeted the known locations of insurgents in the southern 
part of the country, the same region where most of the illegal drugs were cultivated. 
However, the national armed forces required additional assistance to perform the set 
task. Specifically, “more U.S. personnel was needed in order to satisfy demands for 
training and planning assistance because of the broadened engagement of the 
Colombian military” (Boysen, 2007, p. 43) in that region. International assistance 
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provided by the United States continued to be crucial for the implementation of national 
security-related policies along the lines of Plan Patriota throughout the decade.  
 
This sustained assistance, confirmed by the presence of PMSCs in Colombian 
territory, reached a total of US$216,907,812 for the 2009 fiscal year (Department of 
State, 2010), down from US$95,210,361 in the 2006 fiscal year, but still a very 
significant figure in economic and political terms. It is equally relevant to highlight that 
the overlap between counterinsurgency and counternarcotic operations took place even 
among the tasks assigned to PMSCs in Colombia. In the Report to Congress on 
counternarcotic activities performed by PMSCs in Colombia for the 2009 fiscal year, the 
detailed activities for which PMSCs were hired embraced “multiple echelon counter-
narcoterrorism public communications training and capacity building in support of Plan 
Colombia” (Department of State, 2010, p. 9).  
 
 
4.5. The Domestic Private Security Industry 
 
Security services provided by private groups or organizations have existed in 
Colombia since Law 48 of 1968 entered into force. This law enabled civilians to arm 
themselves and assist the national armed forces in its counterinsurgency operations 
throughout the country. As has already been explained in Chapter 1, the private armies 
that developed under this legal framework evolved into the widespread paramilitary 
groups that confronted insurgents during the 1980s. However, the legal status of these 
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paramilitaries changed in 1989 when Law 48 of 1968 was repealed. From that moment 
on, paramilitary groups were considered illegal and also faced confrontations with the 
national armed forces. Although illegal, certain ties continued to exist between the 
paramilitaries and members of the military and the police due to the former’s important 
and informal role in counterinsurgency operations.  
 
The dynamics of the internal armed conflict and the intensification of violent acts 
in the main cities perpetrated by insurgent groups, drug cartels, and paramilitary groups 
also increased the demand for additional security in urban areas. Guerrilla and 
paramilitaries had always tried to gain control of towns and cities, but since the mid-
1980s, throughout the 1990s, and especially after 2002, the urbanization of the internal 
armed conflict became more apparent and generated a higher sense of insecurity also 
among the populations of major urban centers. Illegal armed groups and drug cartels 
intensified the levels of violence in certain influential cities in Colombia in order to 
exercise pressure on politicians and decision makers. 
 
An essential instrument that facilitated the process of the urbanization of the 
conflict was the use of hired assassins known as sicarios. Drug cartels were perhaps 
the first illegal organized groups that took advantage of the availability of sicarios, 
especially in the cities of Medellín and Cali, the headquarters of the main cartels in the 
1980s. The existence of these hired killers became well known all around the country 
after one of them murdered Rodrigo Lara, Minister of Justice, in 1984. By the end of the 
1980s, Pablo Escobar, leader of the Medellín drug cartel, had already recruited over 
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300 sicarios to execute activities such as kidnappings, terrorist acts, and 
assassinations: at the time, he paid them 3,500 USD for a murdered policeman and 
8,800 USD for a dead civilian of political relevance. Although the number of homicides 
decreased after Escobar was killed, the general perception of insecurity remained very 
high due to the continuous and increasing number of car thefts, shoplifting, and 
robberies to financial institutions (Montoya,  2009, pp. 62-63). 
 
In 2002 the Colombian Presidential Office for Human Rights and International 
Humanitarian Law analyzed the evolution of the intensity of the armed conflict in 20 
major cities across the country. The study included actions of sabotage, armed 
confrontations, ambush situations, harassment, assaults on various institutions, land 
piracy, murders recognized by guerrillas and paramilitaries, and kidnappings, among 
others, and the results are expressed in Graph 4.5.1 (Observatorio de Derechos, 2002, 
p. 4). The graph shows an evident escalation of the armed conflict in urban areas 
especially in 1991 and 1992. These peaks respond to a critical political phase in 
Colombia between 1989 and 1991, during which time presidential elections were about 
to take place, extradition policies for drug trafficking charges were discussed in the 
National Congress, and a new constitution was crafted. This situation encouraged illegal 
armed groups to increase the use of violence in the cities: various presidential 
candidates, politicians, and judges were murdered.  
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Graph 4.5.1 Intensity of the Armed Conflict in the Major Cities of Colombia 1990-
2002 
 
Source: Graph elaborated by the author with data obtained from Observatorio de 
Derechos Humanos. (2002). Resumen Sobre el Conflicto Armado en las Ciudades, p. 3. 
 
As the acts of violence augmented during the 1990s, insecurity and fear spread 
throughout the society and the demand for security services rose. However, the public 
security forces did not have the capacity to cover that demand, especially with the 
intensification of counterinsurgent and counternarcotic operations in the country and the 
need to confront paramilitary groups considered illegal after 1989. Under these 
circumstances, a remote way out began to insinuate itself: private companies with 
certain expertise in security services offered the possibility of hiring armored vehicles to 
transport money and valuable goods throughout the city. If certain goods needed to be 
secured and the public security forces were not enough guarantee for the safety of 
those goods, people and commercial companies that could afford it preferred to hire 
those private security providers in order to have additional protection. This marked the 
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beginning of the history of the private security as an industry in Colombia (Dammert, 
2008, 17). 
 
Although the transport of valuable goods might be the first instance of an industry 
composed of properly registered firms, other legal private security services were also 
present in the cities years before in a very informal and rudimentary condition. In 
residential neighborhoods, it was very common to see a person, called celador, 
wandering around one or two streets in a block, with a wooden baton in his hand. This 
celador received a very small income from each of the houses that he guarded or kept 
an eye on, and this would be his daily or weekly income. The relationship between the 
celador and the police was almost non-existent, but the celador tried to resemble the 
attitude and the outfit of the police: he wore a jacket and a cap very similar to those 
ones used by policemen (L. Onzaga, personal communication, November 15, 2012). 
This security service was not too expensive for the households that used it, but it was 
not present in all neighborhoods and in all social classes. 
 
The increasing demand for security in the cities asked for a more formal type of 
protection. In this way, the services offered by the celadores began to be replaced by 
firms that could provide a more organized security. Together with the increasing 
demand and following the flow of the market, private companies started to offer the 
required services that the police were not able to provide. The demand was of such a 
magnitude and the companies offering private security services were so many in 
number, that in 1993 the government created a national institution called the 
108 
 
Superintendency of Surveillance and Private Security to control and supervise the 
provision of private security services. The market for these services had developed and 
diversified to such extent, that the Superintendency could already categorize the 
business into the following subsectors: advisors, cooperative surveillance companies, 
security departments, armored services, armed surveillance companies, and unarmed 
surveillance companies, among others. 
 
One of the named responsibilities of the Superintendency is to collate as much 
information about the industry as possible, but according to Ximena Tamayo, current 
advisor to the director of the institution, it has been very difficult to gather complete and 
accurate data for the whole sector (X. Tamayo, personal communication, October 19, 
2012). Nevertheless, even with the information available, it is still possible to appreciate 
the development of the private security market in Colombia. Graph 4.5.2 shows the 
growth trend.  
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Graph 4.5.2 Number of Private Security Companies in Colombia 1994-2010 
 
 
Source: Graph elaborated by the author with data obtained from Superintendency of Surveillance and 
Private Security. (2007). La Seguridad Privada en Colombia. Visión 20/20, pp.18-23. 
 
The total number of registered private security companies operating in the 
country increased significantly after 1996, and after 1998, the total number of 
companies has not dropped below 3,000. Graph 4.5.2 also differentiates between two 
main types of private security services: security companies that offer armed services 
and security departments created within other commercial companies. These security 
departments were formed as commercial companies preferred to provide their own 
security themselves – instead of hiring third parties. However, these security 
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departments still need to register before the Superintendency in order to obtain a 
license to operate and to legally use firearms when required. It is interesting to see that, 
while the number of security departments peaked in 2003 and then began a decreasing 
trend, private security companies offering armed services have maintained a fairly 
constant presence throughout the past two decades. This behavior could be interpreted 
as a reduction of the perception of insecurity among commercial companies. 
 
Although the total number of private security companies has varied in the last 
decades – and although after 2006 their numbers have dropped off, according to Graph 
4.5.2 – the total income of the private security sector has only increased in recent years. 
Graph 4.5.3 shows the tremendous income rise enjoyed by the industry: 175% in 6 
years, going from 1.8 billion pesos in 2005 to 4.9 billion in 2011. The significance of 
these figures is better understood in Graph 4.5.4, where the total income of the industry 
is represented as a percentage of the national GDP. The industry alone accounts for a 
little bit less than 1% of the national GDP, placing it as the country’s second most 
important industry with the highest growing economic rates.  
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Graph 4.5.3 Income of the Private Security Industry in Colombia 2005-2011  
(In billions of Colombian pesos) 
 
 
Source: Graph elaborated by the author with data obtained from Indicadores Financieros 2011. 
Superintendency of Surveillance and Private Security. 2011: 6. 
 
 
Graph 4.5.4 Income of the Private Security Industry in Colombia as a Percentage 
of GDP 2005-2011  
 
Source: Graph elaborated by the author with data obtained from Indicadores Financieros 
2011. Superintendency of Surveillance and Private Security. 2011: 6. 
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In the private security industry, the type of service that generates the highest 
revenues is the provision of armed security. This branch of the industry represents 
almost 75% of the total income of the sector, a fact that highlights that the most 
demanded private security service is armed security. Graph 4.5.5 presents a detailed 
comparison of the main security services provided by the industry, excepting security 
departments. 
 
Graph 4.5.5 Income of the Private Security Industry by Type of Service in 
Colombia 2007-2011 
 
 
Source: Graph elaborated by the author with data obtained from Indicadores Financieros 2011. 
Superintendency of Surveillance and Private Security. 2011: 5. 
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After describing the evolution of the private security services industry in Colombia, 
it is necessary to differentiate this type of private security from the kind of private 
security provided by paramilitaries, armed community associations, foreign PMSCs, the 
network of informants, and peasant soldiers. The domestic private security industry 
does not get directly involved in counterinsurgency or counternarcotic operations, but all 
the other aforementioned types of private security do, since it is their inherent 
responsibility. Perhaps with the exception of some private security companies – that 
due to their operating location have been encouraged to belong to the network of 
informants – all the other companies have not been directly used to fight rebel groups or 
drug traffickers. The current director of the Superintendency explained this difference in 
a clear way. He stated that registered private security companies have played a 
preventive role, while all the other expressions of security providers involved in the 
armed conflict have played a more reactive role in Colombia (C. Krüger, personal 
communication, November 7, 2012). However, it should also be noted that the presence 
of a legal industry of private security companies does not prevent or deter the existence 
and operation of other informal providers of private security services, many times 
related to the drug business17. 
 
 
                                                          
17
 Some scholars argue that to some extent, informal providers of security have helped to reduce the levels of 
kidnappings in certain regions of the Colombia, most of the time in places where illegal drugs are produced or 
transported. This increase in the perception of security may not be attributed to the legal private security industry, 
but should be taken into account in studies regarding the provision of security in the country (C. Echandía, 
personal communication, November 15, 2012). However, it is practically impossible to measure the impact of 
those informal providers of security really have. 
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4.6. Relationship Between the Private Security Industry and the National Armed 
Forces 
 
The existence of a consolidated private security industry, in a country where the 
most demanded service is armed security, cannot be left aside in any broader analysis 
of security, especially within the context of the internal armed conflict in Colombia. The 
rise of the private security industry has definitely strengthened the provision of public 
security and defense. The urbanization of the armed conflict expanded the field of 
action of counterinsurgency operations, and therefore a larger public security force base 
was required.  However, the presence of private security companies hired by the 
government and by the private sector allowed members of the public defense forces to 
concentrate more on the counterinsurgency and less on other security issues that could 
be fulfilled by private operators. It is important to clarify that the private companies hired 
by the government were not assigned counterinsurgent or counternarcotic activities: 
they were instructed to provide surveillance only to public buildings and public assets. 
This is one of the reasons that may explain why the government is considered one of 
the best clients of the private security industry (C. Krüger, personal communication, 
November 7, 2012). 
 
This clear relation between the private security industry and the national armed 
forces is stronger that might appear at a first glance. The dynamics of the internal 
armed conflict and the increasing demand for security in the cities shows that there is a 
circumstantial or contextual relationship between both providers of security.  In order to 
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verify that relationship, a correlation analysis between the military participation ratios of 
the public armed forces (MPR) and the military participation ratios of the private security 
industry (PrivateMPR) would indicate the extent to which the public provider of security 
is related to the private one.  
 
A correlation analysis is a measure of association frequently used in academic 
research to indicate the degree, strength, and direction of a relationship between two 
specific variables. The technique used in this case is the Pearson product-moment 
correlation analysis and the two analyzed variables are MPR and PrivateMPR. The 
result of the Pearson correlation is denoted by the coefficient r, which may have a value 
between -1 and 1. A negative coefficient stands for a negative correlation – meaning 
that as one variable increases, the other one decreases –, a positive coefficient 
indicates a positive correlation – meaning that as one variable increases, so does the 
other one –, and a value of 0 means that there is no correlation at all. The closer the 
value of r is to -1 or 1 determines the strength of the relationship between the variables: 
a strong negative correlation would be close to -1 while a strong positive correlation 
would be close to 1. 
 
The result of the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient between MPR 
and PrivateMPR in Colombia from 2000 until 200718  is 
r=0.9372, 
                                                          
18
 The only reliable data that exists of the private security industry is the number of employees in the industry in 
Colombia from 2000 until 2007. 
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or in other words, the test shows that there is a very strong linear relationship 
between both variables. The correlation analysis also includes a p-value, a measure 
that evaluates “the strength or weakness of the empirical evidence against the null 
hypothesis” (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 129): a small p-value usually under 0.1 or 1% 
indicates that the statistical result of the test is significant. The p-value for the Pearson 
correlation between MPR and PrivateMPR is 
p-value=0.0006, 
which means that the Pearson coefficient is in fact significant. Although the 
sample size of the test is rather small and therefore the results should be analyzed with 
caution, it can be affirmed that there is a strong and significant relation between MPR 
and PrivateMPR. A visual representation of that relationship is shown in Graph 4.6.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
117 
 
Graph 4.6.1. Relationship Between MPR and PrivateMPR 
(N=8; r=0.9372; p=0.0006) 
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The scatter plot exposed in Graph 4.6.1 shows that there are no significant 
outliers among the data points: all the data follows a similar pattern. Outliers may affect 
the strength of the result of the Pearson correlation coefficient, but the graph proves that 
this was not the case. 
 
 
4.7. Conclusion 
 
The militarization process in Colombia, understood in its narrow sense, is clearly 
observable in the last two decades. The process intensified after 2002 when the public 
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security personnel and the total public defense expenditures increased consistently. 
This was reinforced by the extended presence of foreign PMSCs that trained the 
national armed forces and supported their offensive actions against rebel groups. The 
process was further complemented by the creation of a network of informants and 
divisions of peasant soldiers as a means of boosting the numbers of the national armed 
forces and involving the civilian population largely in the fight against insurgents and 
drug traffickers.  
 
Along with the increasing number of military and police personnel, an industry of 
private security companies sprang up during the 1990s. From 1994, when these 
companies were obliged to register for the first time before the Superintendency of 
Surveillance and Private Security, until 2002, the year in which the number of private 
security providers reached its peak, the total number of companies increased by almost 
400%. Although the number of companies did not continue to increase at the same rate 
in the following years, the industry itself continued to grow in terms of total income.  
 
The parallel growth of the public defense forces and the private security industry 
in Colombia contradicts the existing theory that explains the global rise of private 
providers of military and security services after the end of the Cold War (as described in 
Chapter 2). Instead of following a demilitarization process in the 1990s, the country 
ramped up public defense spending and encouraged the recruitment of more police and 
military personnel. Furthermore, the domestic private security industry rose in the 
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absence of a demilitarization process, challenging the accepted reasons and 
explanations for the emergence of PMSCs. 
 
Due to the protracted internal armed conflict, the Colombian government did not 
intend to reduce the size of the national armed forces; instead, policies were oriented 
towards strengthening public defense. In the beginning of the 1990s, the government 
could not afford to scale back its counterinsurgency efforts at the precise moment when 
the paramilitary groups were declared illegal and became another target of the national 
armed forces. Likewise, after the unsuccessful peace process undertaken with the 
FARC between 1999 and 2001, the possibility of a negotiated solution to the conflict 
faded away and the only apparent viable solution was a strong and straightforward 
military offensive against guerrilla groups.  
 
The supply and demand effect that Singer and Avant have presented in their 
works as one of the main reasons for the rise of PMSCs did take place in Colombia – 
but with some variations. The increase in the supply of security services did not 
correspond to cutbacks in the defense sector that generated jobless former military and 
police personnel, but instead to a higher demand for security generated by the 
expansion of rebel groups’ field of action. The urbanization of the armed conflict also 
triggered a higher demand of security. This process of conflict urbanization increased 
the demand for security in major cities – a demand that could not be met by public 
defense forces, despite their growing numbers. Therefore, the private security 
companies became a perfect solution: they could provide the required security services, 
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enabling the police and military to concentrate on fighting insurgents and drug traffickers. 
In other words, “and referring to negotiation techniques, it was a win-win type of 
relationship” (C. Krüger, personal communication, November 7, 2012).  
 
One of the most interesting characteristics of the domestic industry of private 
security that highlights its political and economic relevance and calls for a widening of 
the academic concept of militarization is the correlation between MPR and PrivateMPR. 
A Pearson correlation analysis showed that the private security industry presents a 
strong and significant relationship with the national armed forces: as the number of 
national armed forces increases, so does the number of private security forces. In other 
words, although the ongoing militarization process did not trigger the rise of the private 
security industry in the country, an increase in the number of military and police forces 
would always go along with an increase in the number of private security agents. 
 
Finally, although not directly involved in counterinsurgency or counternarcotic 
operations, private security companies proved to be useful as instruments of military 
intelligence. Together with local villagers in rural areas, certain private security 
companies were encouraged to become part of the network of informants created by 
the government in 2003. Moreover, their role in the provision of preventive security 
contrasted perfectly with the reactive task of the public defense forces; the increase in 
the number of military and police personnel was adequately complemented by the 
presence of a domestic private security industry. 
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It has been made clear that private security companies are not part of the 
Colombian national armed forces and therefore are not taken into account in any 
analysis of militarization of the country according to the narrow definition of the concept. 
However, it is clear that these companies play indeed an important role in the 
militarization process. Jacklin Cock argues that the doctrine behind militarization should 
“refer both to the military as a formal, state institution and to various non-state forms, 
expressions and instruments of organized violence” (Cock 2005: 791). Therefore, since 
private security companies complement the security services provided by the military 
and police, indirectly support counterinsurgency and counternarcotic operations, and 
the main service they provide is armed security (as seen on Graph 4.5.5), these 
companies should be definitely included as part of the wider notion of militarization.  
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5. The Impact of Militarization and the Privatization of Security on Democracy 
and Economic Growth 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The state, the military, and the economic situation in Latin America have been 
widely studied for decades. In the 1960s, scholars of the so-called modernization school 
affirmed that militarization was crucial for the development and modernization of Latin 
American nations. Their understanding of militarization referred exclusively to the scale 
and preparedness of states’ national armed forces, and they argued that these armed 
forces were the only ones capable of promoting democracy, economic development, 
and social change. Since these modernization scholars characterized Latin America as 
a “region of extreme social stratification, weak economies, and political apathy, with little 
respect for constitutional and democratic procedures” (Lieuwen, 1967, p. 162), they 
believed that national governments necessarily had to rely on the use of force to remain 
in power.  
 
Later on, another school of thought criticized the assertions of the modernization 
scholars, arguing that their theoretical assumptions and research methodologies were 
inappropriate. Kirk Bowman was one of these critical researchers. His perception of the 
role of the military with regard to democracy and development was diametrically 
opposed to that of the modernization school. His research proved that “militarization is 
inversely related to political development, social spending, citizen well-being and social 
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development, democracy, and food consumption” (Bowman, 2002, p. 183). This 
negative effect of militarization on democracy and development became widely 
accepted among Latin American researchers and has been the leading theory in most 
studies on the subject in the decades since.  
 
However, the current situation in Colombia seems to challenge Bowman’s theory. 
The country has strengthened its national armed forces while democracy ratings have 
remained stable, and the tendency towards economic growth continues to increase; in 
sum, there does not seem to be a negative effect of militarization on democracy and 
development as Bowman suggested. This discrepancy between the existing theory on 
the effects of militarization and the reality in Colombia will be addressed in this chapter. 
In order to do so, this chapter aims to answer the following research question: while 
existing literature on militarization in Latin America concludes that large militaries and 
high defense budgets are negatively associated with development (in terms of levels of 
democracy and economic growth), why does the militarization process in Colombia 
seem to have had a positive effect on democracy and economic growth? 
 
The Colombian case study provides the possibility to broaden the scope of 
current research on militarization and expand the findings obtained in previous works. 
The increasing trend towards the privatization of security forces, represented by the 
presence of private military and security companies throughout the country, is a variable 
that has been absent in the studies elaborated by modernization scholars and their 
subsequent critics. The inclusion of this new variable will very likely bring new insights 
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about the relationships between a wider notion of militarization, democracy, and 
economic growth. In this sense, and as a complement to the previously stated research 
question, this chapter tries to assess the role played by the domestic private security 
industry19 in the particular militarization process in Colombia.  
 
This chapter begins by presenting the main argument of the dissertation that 
relates the privatization of security to economic growth and democracy based on 
qualitative and contextual evidence. In the following section, a thorough quantitative 
analysis is conducted in order to support the main argument with statistical evidence. 
The next section describes the risks entailed by the privatization of security in the 
country. Finally, the last section includes a summary of the chapter and concluding 
remarks. 
 
 
5.2. Impact of the Privatization of Security on Democracy and Economic Growth 
 
The militarization process that took place in Colombia near the end of the 20th 
century was the evident reaction towards the dynamics of the country’s protracted 
internal armed conflict. As was explained in earlier chapters, the merger of the main 
security threats that affected the country – namely, insurgent movements and illegal 
                                                          
19
 As it is explained in Chapter 3, the analysis of the privatization of security in Colombia is limited to the domestic 
private security industry. While the presence of foreign PMSC in the country is evident and its relevance is detailed 
in Chapter 4, access to data and personnel from those companies is very restricted and almost impossible to obtain. 
Therefore, the focus of the upcoming qualitative and quantitative analysis focuses only on domestic private 
security companies. 
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drug trafficking – took place during the 1990s and obliged the government to adjust its 
defense and security policies accordingly. The increase in the defense budget and a 
larger number of personnel of the armed forces were among the adopted measures. 
Likewise, a legal, strong, and lucrative domestic private security industry appeared in 
the country during that same period offering a wide variety of security services to 
individuals, corporations, and even state institutions.  
 
With this in mind, it proves interesting to recall once again Kirk Bowman’s claims 
regarding the impact of militarization. He hypothesized that militarization affects 
negatively democracy and economic growth and argued that “where the armed forces 
are focused on internal threats, militarization has serious opportunity costs and 
undercuts two pillars of state capacity: economic resources and organizational 
resources/priorities” (Bowman, 2002, p. 245). Although his findings are very well 
supported by extensive quantitative research and case studies analyses, there are four 
reasons that challenge those findings in Colombia and provide a possible explanation 
why militarization, understood in its wider sense, does not exert a negative effect on 
democratization and economic development in the country.  
 
These reasons are directly related to the process of the privatization of security. 
In the various existing analyses of the impact of militarization on democracy and 
development carried out by scholars of the modernization school and also by their 
succeeding critics such as Bowman, Arias, and Hadenius, among others, private 
providers of military and security services were not included as additional variables. 
126 
 
However, the presence of these domestic private security companies does importantly 
affect the consequences of increasing the defense budget and armed forces personnel 
due to the positive and significant correlation established in the previous chapter 
between private security and militarization. Hence, the role played by the privatization of 
security in the process of militarization in the country is very relevant.  
 
The insertion of the privatization of security variable in the analysis of the impact 
of militarization on democracy and economic growth provides at least four new 
elements capable of explaining why the current theory does not appear to completely 
extend to the Colombian case. First of all, the service provided by private security 
agents complemented the service that had been traditionally provided by national 
security forces. Second, private security providers helped reduce the risks posed by the 
urbanization of the conflict in Colombia during the 1990s, a situation that otherwise 
would have created more political and social instability. Third, the private security 
industry enabled national and foreign companies to continue performing and expand 
their commercial activities throughout the country, increasing their sense of security in 
the middle of the internal conflict. Finally, the privatization of security created a 
significant number of quality jobs that had a positive impact on the nation’s 
unemployment rate. 
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5.2.1. Complementarity of Private and Public Security Provision 
 
In the words of Colombian Congressman Carlos E. Barriga, the high levels of 
violence, crime rates, and the general feeling of insecurity, together with the strong 
perception of the ineffectiveness of the security forces in Colombia in the last years, 
generated an increasing demand for private security (Barriga, 2012, p. 23). Although 
this growing demand was evident, as has been shown in the previous chapter, it would 
be wrong to believe that private security in Colombia has tried to replace the 
constitutional functions assigned to the military and police forces; on the contrary, the 
activities carried out by the former have complemented the functions of the latter.  
 
For Christian Krüger, the current director of the Superintendency for Private 
Security and Surveillance in Colombia, there is a huge difference between the services 
provided by private security companies and national security forces. While the main 
purpose of the latter is to react against any security threat, the central objective of the 
former is to prevent a possible threat from happening. For example, a private security 
guard would not get involved in any type of riot taking place near the building that he 
has been assigned to protect because it is not part of his jurisdiction. His jurisdiction 
entails only the property assigned to him, and he is expressly prohibited from 
intervening in the riot if beyond his jurisdiction. However, using the same example, if the 
same security guard considers that the safety of the property he is guarding is 
compromised due to the ongoing riot, he should alert the authorities so that they can 
intervene. Only in an extreme case, in which there might be a threat against his life or 
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the life of a third party, may the security guard react in self-defense (C. Krüger, personal 
communication, November 7, 2012).   
 
The different approaches that may exist between public and private agents 
towards security threats have been highlighted in the previous example. However, this 
distinction has not always existed as such. The current Political Constitution of 
Colombia issued in 1991 established that, upon the manifestation of any threat against 
national sovereignty, territorial independence and integrity, constitutional order, the 
exercise of public rights and liberties, or the peaceful coexistence of its citizens, it would 
be a matter for the national armed forces to handle (Political Constitution of Colombia, 
1991, pp. 163-164). It is clear that the duty resides with the national armed forces to 
counter any threat to national defense and security; there is no indication of any role 
assigned to private providers of security. Yet, as Congressman Barriga asserted, the 
demand for more and better security was not being adequately fulfilled by the public 
forces, especially during the 1990s. Therefore, the rise of a domestic private security 
industry controlled and supervised by the national government through the 
Superintendency for Private Security and Surveillance became the perfect solution.  
 
The categorization of preventive and reactive actions against security threats 
turned out to be a practical solution to legitimize the role of private security companies 
without breaking the existing national law. In this way, the reactive character assigned 
to the national armed forces was perfectly complemented by the preventive role 
assigned to private security companies. Their complementarity helped to fulfill the 
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increasing demand for security and also enabled the national armed forces to focus 
more on reacting in the case of real and potential threats – a very relevant task in a 
country facing an internal armed conflict. This complementarity has become so natural 
for some sectors within the government and Colombian society that in many unofficial 
statistics regarding security issues, the personnel of domestic private security 
companies is counted as part of the total national security force, which once consisted 
only of military and police forces (W. Vargas, personal communication, December 13, 
2012). 
 
It is important to note that despite this complementarity, the privatization of 
security does not eliminate the opportunity costs that, according to Kirk Bowman, the 
militarization process entails. The public security providers are the only ones that have 
the mandate to react upon security threats and given the Colombian context, they have 
always had to focus on the country’s internal security challenges. This has not changed 
due to the presence of the domestic private security industry because, as it was 
explained before, its intention has not been to replace the constitutional functions 
assigned to the public force. Therefore, the existence of domestic private security 
companies has not liberated economic and organizational resources of the state that 
could otherwise strengthen state capacity and development efforts. In fact, the 
privatization of security has actually prevented the increase of those opportunity costs 
that would have otherwise worsened the negative impacts of militarization in Colombia. 
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An appropriate complementarity between reactive and preventive actions, or 
between the provision of public and private security, should result in the consolidation of 
an environment where the rules that organize the society and the norms that protect 
property rights, among others, are highly respected. In other words, there should be a 
strong correlation between the provision of security and the level of the rule of law. In 
Colombia, the measures of the level of “rule of law” between 1996 and 2010 can be 
obtained from the World Governance Indicators (WGI)20 of the World Bank; the ratings 
for the country’s rule of law are shown in Graph 5.2.1.  
 
Graph 5.2.1 WGI Rule of Law Indicator for Colombia 1990-2010 
 
Source: Graph elaborated by the author with data obtained from the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators in: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1682130 
(Accessed February 1, 2013) 
 
                                                          
20
 The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) proposed by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi 
in a policy research working paper of the World Bank, gather information since 1996 and consist of six indicators 
that “are based on several hundred variables obtained from 31 different data sources, capturing governance 
perceptions as reported by survey respondents, non-governmental organizations, commercial business 
information providers, and public sector organizations worldwide” (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi 2010: 2). 
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As it was done in Chapter 4, the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient 
evaluates the degree, strength, and direction of the relationship between two variables, 
in this case the privatization of security and the rule of law. The result of the analysis is 
a coefficient r that may receive a value between -1 and 1: the closer the value is to -1 
indicates a strong negative correlation between the variables while the closer to 1 
indicates a strong positive correlation.  The quantitative analysis also includes a p-value, 
which is a value between 0 and 1 that determines how significant the result of the test 
is: a significant p-value is usually under 0.1. Using Military Participation Ratios of the 
private security industry (PrivateMPR) and the measurement of the rule of law in 
Colombia from the WGI between 2000 and 200721, it results that there is a robust and 
significant correlation between both elements evidenced by a Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient of 
r = 0.9711, and a 
p-value = 0.0012. 
This statistical evidence suggests that there is a close relationship between the 
private security industry and the rule of law, which in turn may suggest that there may 
be a casual mechanism between the privatization of security and democracy and 
economic growth. 
 
 
 
                                                          
21
 The only reliable data that exists of the private security industry is the number of employees in the industry in 
Colombia from 2000 until 2007. 
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5.2.2. Private Security and the Urbanization of the Conflict 
 
Until the 1990s, armed conflict in Colombia had taken place mainly in rural areas. 
The activities of illegal armed groups and individuals involved in the drug trafficking 
business rarely reached the main cities of the country. However, the Colombian 
Presidential Program for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law developed 
a study that analyzed the intensity of the conflict in the ten largest cities in the last two 
decades, and the findings showed geographic variation to the conflict’s development. 
The results of that study are shown in Graph 4.5.1. The graph shows that, throughout 
the 1990s, urban conflict events accounted for an overwhelming majority of the total. 
 
Various scholars have agreed that after 2002, the escalation of conflict-related 
actions in the cities was definitely bringing the conflict to a new, urban stage. Illegal 
armed groups started using rural combatants in very specific violent acts in the cities in 
order to magnify these acts’ psychological and political impact at a very low cost 
(Rangel, 2003, pp. 16-17). Examples of this shift include the kidnapping of twelve 
members of a local parliament in Cali, an ambush against a presidential candidate that 
left three dead in Barranquilla (Libreros, 2002), a car-bomb inside a social club in 
Bogotá that left 36 dead, and a house-bomb that left 16 dead in Neiva (Leal, 2004, pp. 
90-91). 
 
The total number of private security companies, already shown in Chapter 4 in 
Graph 4.5.2, exploded in the 1990s in response to the increasing violence occurring in 
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the main cities of the country. The national armed forces were not able to address this 
situation because “although no one ignores their patriotic and selfless attitude and no 
one forgets their great efforts and sacrifices (…), they were never trained to confront the 
challenge of an urban war” (Libreros, 2002, own translation). The private security 
industry, acting as part of the private sector, understood the immense possibilities of the 
new market niche created by the growing sense of insecurity in the cities and exploited 
this. This situation, together with the dynamics and demands of the market, evolved to a 
point where the private security industry actually had to specialize the services it 
provides in a wide variety of subsectors (C. Krüger, personal communication, November 
7, 2012).  
 
The increased sense of insecurity in the cities after 2002 contrasted with the 
alleged lack of commitment from urban centers until that moment (Echandía, 2006: 17). 
Since the internal armed conflict had traditionally taken place mainly in rural areas, 
urban sectors had not been directly affected by the negative consequences of the 
confrontation. Therefore, the rising insecurity about the evolution of the armed conflict – 
together with the astonishment awoken by the conflict-related events occurring in urban 
hubs – created an increasing demand for security that called for immediate attention. 
The impossibility for the national armed forces to adequately provide the demanded 
services would have likely generated unrest or political instability if it had not been for 
the private security industry.  
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If this were true, there should be a strong correlation between the provision of 
private security and the level political stability in Colombia. Another one of the WGI 
measures the level of “political stability” in various countries, and the ratings for 
Colombia between 1996 and 2010 are shown in Graph 5.2.2.  
 
 Graph 5.2.2 WGI Political Stability Indicator for Colombia 1990-2010 
 
Source: Graph elaborated by the author with data obtained from the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators in: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1682130 
(Accessed February 1, 2013) 
 
Using the data for PrivateMPR and the WGI indicator for Political Stability, it 
results that there is a robust and significant correlation between both elements 
evidenced by a Pearson’s correlation coefficient of  
r = 0.7577, and a 
p-value = 0.0809. 
This statistical evidence suggests that there is close relationship between the 
private security industry and the political stability in Colombia, which in turn suggests 
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that there may be a casual mechanism between the privatization of security and 
democracy and economic growth in the country. 
 
 
5.2.3. The Private Security Industry and the Private Sector 
 
The urbanization of the conflict that intensified during the 1990s, besides 
increasing the perception of insecurity among Colombian civilians, also raised the 
potential risks for new national and foreign investments. This translated into a growing 
fear among local and international investors and entrepreneurs who began to 
reconsider their priorities amid the security environment in Colombia. It was clear that if 
the capacity of the national armed forces was not sufficient to fulfill the country’s 
counterinsurgency and counternarcotic demands, those forces would not be in a 
position to offer the additional security services required by the private sector. 
 
The private security industry became once again the most viable option to 
overcome the country’s growing security needs. The services provided by these private 
companies were able to mitigate the perceived threats to the security of current and 
future investments in the national economy. In other words, the possibility of hiring a 
private security company restored the entrepreneurs’ trust and confidence that had 
been lost or weakened due to the increasing conflict-related violence. This more trustful 
environment motivated the appearance of new constructions, buildings, and malls, each 
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one of them guarded by private security companies (L. Murgueitio, personal 
communication, November 19, 2012). This situation is better depicted in Graph 5.2.3.  
 
Graph 5.2.3 Is Security the Main Problem for Colombian Entrepreneurs? 
 
Source: Graph elaborated by the author with data obtained from Proexport and the 
ANDI. 
 
Graph 5.2.3 shows the results of one of the questions of a survey conducted by 
the National Business Association of Colombia22 to its permanent members regarding 
what respondents considered as the main problems or obstacles hindering the 
economic performance of their companies. In 2001, 14% of the survey respondents 
believed that security was their companies’ main problem, but that percentage lowered 
drastically after 2002. From that moment, and until the end of 2010, the percentage of 
survey respondents that identified security as their main concern was not over 2%.  
 
                                                          
22
 In Spanish: Asociación Nacional de Industriales (ANDI) 
137 
 
This reaction on the part of Colombian entrepreneurs is perhaps partly owing to 
the militarization process encouraged by the national government, but appears more 
significantly tied to the availability of private security services. A more secure setting 
encouraged the entry of foreign companies and foreign investment. In other words, the 
growing presence of foreign companies and foreign capital generated even a greater 
demand for security services (C. Krüger, personal communication, November 7, 2012). 
This demand was again fulfilled by the private security industry, and the result is 
evidenced in the rise of the total number of providers in the sector.  
 
These private security providers may be divided into two broad groups: private 
security companies and security departments. Graph 4.5.2 in Chapter 4 shows the 
magnitude of the whole industry and discriminates between gun-bearing private security 
companies and security departments. The reason for isolating only those companies 
that use guns is owing to the fact that they are the large majority within that category. 
The security departments23 are attached to firms, corporations, and multinationals, but 
they need to be registered in order to receive the proper authorization from the 
Superintendency for Private Security and Surveillance to provide security services. It is 
not a coincidence that the incredible rise in the number of security departments during 
the 1990s and early 2000s took place at the same time as national and international 
businesses in the private sector increased their demand for security.  
                                                          
23
 Security departments are allowed to be armed just like regular private security companies. The main difference 
is that security departments may only provide security services to the company or corporation they belong to; they 
are not allowed to offer security services to individuals or entities unrelated to the company or corporation they 
are part of (Decree Number 356 of 1994). 
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Private security companies and the security departments that supplied the 
services required by the private sector enjoyed a mutually beneficial relationship. This 
relationship improved the security environment in the national economy and drew in 
even more national and international investors. More investors translated into higher 
demand for security services, which in turn encouraged the appearance of more private 
security companies and security departments. This situation reveals the strong link that 
exists between the economic growth of the private security sector and the country’s 
economic growth (D. Velásquez, personal communication, November 14, 2012, own 
translation). 
 
A study conducted in Colombia in 2011 regarding the oil extraction business and 
the internal armed conflict, highlighted the impact of companies’ demand for security in 
this sector. One of the findings of the study stated that private security companies “have 
[had] an impact in the regions where oil companies operate and are [have been] 
perceived by the community and other interest groups as inherent to the presence of 
international oil companies” (Posso, 2011, 33, own translation). The private security 
industry has become essential for this economic activity – even more so, as the 
extraction of mining resources has turned out to be the most important industry in 
Colombia in recent years.   
 
If indeed the private security industry has generated a more secure and more 
appropriate environment for the development and strengthening of the private 
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commercial sector and the country’s economy in general, there should be a strong 
correlation between the provision of private security and the levels of FDI, among other 
things. Using the data for PrivateMPR and FDI, it results that there is a robust and 
significant correlation between both elements evidenced by a Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient of 
r = 0.6932, and a 
p-value = 0.0566. 
This statistical evidence suggests that there is a close relationship between the 
private security industry and FDI in Colombia, which in turn suggests that there may be 
a casual mechanism between the privatization of security and democracy and economic 
growth in the country. 
 
 
5.2.4. High Employment in the Private Security Industry 
 
The most flourishing industries in successful economies tend to increase the 
overall demand for labor. This has also been the case of the private security industry in 
Colombia. The industry posted a total income revenue of $1.8 billion Colombian pesos 
in 2005, which rose to $4.9 billion in 2011, an increase of 172% in 6 years. In the last 
few years, the total income of the industry has been very close to 1% of the nation’s real 
GDP, as shown in Graph 4.5.4, an outstanding percentage that ranks it as the second-
most important productive sector in the country’s economy. The private security sector 
stands just behind the mining sector and outperforms other traditional industries, such 
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as flower-growing and banana plantations (L. Murgueitio, personal communication, 
November 19, 2012). 
 
The extraordinary economic performance of the industry, strongly related to the 
security demands in urban and rural areas, has generated a great number of new jobs 
in the last years. In 2007, the total number of employees working for private security 
companies amounted to almost half of the public defense forces. Furthermore, in that 
year, the total number of private agents was already larger than the number of police 
personnel, according to data from the Colombian Ministry of Defense: Graph 5.2.4 
presents that comparison. 
 
Graph 5.2.4 Personnel of Private Security Companies Compared to 
Personnel of the Police Force in Colombia in 2007 
 
 
 
Source: Graph elaborated by the author with data obtained from Small Arms Survey for “Private 
Agents” (Florquin, 2011) and the Colombian Ministry of Defense for “Public Force”, “Police 
Personnel,” and “Military Personnel” (Ministerio de Defensa de Colombia, 2010, p. 77). 
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In 2007, the approximate number of employees working for private security 
companies was 190,000. Information from the World Bank data sets established that, 
for that same year, the total labor force in the country was 19,826,779, meaning that the 
private security industry provided almost 1% of the total jobs in Colombia. The only 
industry capable of generating a larger number of jobs was the construction sector, 
which is naturally more work-intensive (Barriga, 2012, p. 26). 
 
The private security industry has not only generated new jobs: it has offered 
quality jobs. On one side, it has offered employment to a very specific segment of 
society that would otherwise find it very difficult to get a job (J. Martínez, personal 
communication, October 16, 2012). Usually, the retirement benefits and allowances 
given to retired personnel from the national security forces has not been enough to 
cover the living expenses of their households, and they have been forced to find other 
sources of income. However, finding a job has not been easy for individuals with skills 
and abilities pertaining to security and defense activities. Therefore, the appearance of 
the private security industry has been very important since it demands especially this 
type of personnel (C. Navas, personal communication, October 23, 2012).  
 
On the other side, the private security sector is obliged to offer jobs that fulfill all 
the social security requirements prescribed by law. All the registered companies in the 
sector must hire personnel using full employment contracts. These types of contracts 
involve the need to establish a formal professional relationship between employer and 
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employee, according to which the employee is afforded corresponding social benefits 
while employed. (L. Murgueitio, personal communication, November 19, 2012). This 
legal requirement tries to prevent the expansion of informal jobs that tend to have a 
negative impact on the national economy.  
 
In order to expect another plausible interconnection between the privatization of 
security and democracy and economic growth, a strong correlation between the 
provision of private security and the levels of employment – or a strong inverse 
correlation between private security and unemployment – should be found.  Using the 
data for PrivateMPR and Unemployement measurements from the World Bank data 
sets, it results that there is a robust and significant inverse correlation between both 
elements evidenced by a Pearson’s correlation coefficient of 
r= -0.7233, and a 
p-value = 0.0426. 
This statistical evidence suggests that there is indeed a close relationship 
between the private security industry and employment in Colombia, which in turn 
suggests that there may be a casual mechanism between the privatization of security 
and democracy and economic growth in the country. 
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5.3. Effect of the Broader Concept of Militarization on Democracy and 
Economic Growth: A Quantitative Analysis 
 
Among the existing quantitative analysis of the impact of militarization in Latin 
American countries, the one conducted by Kirk Bowman is among the most 
representative ones in academic literature. Bowman ruled out the generalized 
conclusions of previous large-N quantitative studies that concluded that militarization 
had a positive effect on democracy and economic growth. In order to support his work 
and especially to explain why his findings differed from those of other quantitative 
studies, Bowman claimed that  
“Many large-N quantitative scholars have made a serious mistake by 
treating all LDC militaries as the same variable. I contend that the Latin 
American military during the Cold War is not comparable to other LDC 
militaries and that the relationship between militarization and material 
development (equity and growth) in Latin America will be substantially 
different than that found by the myriad studies that found a positive 
relationship” (Bowman 2002:186). 
 
Other scholars have also come to conclude that the evolution of militaries in Latin 
America is significantly different from other regions (Centeno, 2002) and have 
supported further criticism of the generalization of the results of the large-N studies. 
Likewise, they have strengthened the theory that large militaries have a negative impact 
on democracy and development. However, Bowman’s findings regarding the 
relationship between militarization, democracy, and economic growth do not seem to 
entirely map onto the situation in Colombia: when Bowman’s statistical model is tailored 
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to analyze the situation in Colombia between 1990 and 2010, there is an evident 
discrepancy among the expected results. 
 
Bowman’s quantitative analysis included a pooled cross-section time series data 
for 18 countries. He operationalized militarization as the percentage of national GDP 
spent on defense –MilExp- and the number of soldiers per thousand inhabitants -MPR- 
(Bowman, 2002, pp. 19-20), following the traditional definition of militarization and 
ignoring the privatization of security as another relevant element of the process of 
militarization in Latin American countries. His study contained two different regression 
analyses in order to determine, separately, the impact of militarization on economic 
growth and the impact of militarization on democracy. 
 
In his first analysis regarding the effect of militarization on economic growth, he 
regressed real per capita GDP growth rates (PC GDP) against military participation 
ratios (MPR) and military spending (MilExp). In this regression he used as control 
variables the following elements: Democracy (number of years with free elections 
between 1963 and 1988), Instability (Instability measure according to Barro-Lee dataset 
on floppy), Primary Education (percentage of total population with primary education), 
Secondary Education (percentage of total population with secondary education), 
Government Consumption (ratio of real government consumption expenditure to real 
GDP), and Investment (mean percentage of GDP investment) (Bowman, 2002, p. 205). 
In his second analysis regarding the effect of militarization on democracy, Bowman 
regressed democracy scores against MPR and MilExp. In his model, the dependent 
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variable was Democracy (per Freedom House scores) and his control variables were: 
Literacy (adult literacy with one-year lag in three equations and average literacy 
between 1972 and 1985 in other three equations), and PCGDP (natural log of per capita 
GDP with one-year lag and average log of PCGDP between 1972 and 1985) (Bowman, 
2002, p. 66). 
 
It is difficult and risky to try to tailor a pooled cross-section multi-country time 
series model into a single-case time series one without cross-section. However, the 
single-country model elaborated for Colombia based on Bowman’s design proved to be 
successful: while the results did not contradict his previous research, they did produce 
new, interesting insights regarding the impact of militarization in Colombia.  Those new 
findings support with significant statistical evidence the positive effect that the private 
security has on the militarization process and consequently on economic growth and 
democracy in the country. 
 
In the tailored model, real per capita GDP growth rates are regressed against 
MPR and MilExp using the following as control variables: Democracy (according to the 
Empowerment Rights Index), Primary Education (percentage of total primary completion 
rate between 1990 and 2010), Government Consumption (general government final 
consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP between 1990 and 2010), and FDI 
(foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP between 1990 and 2010). The 
Empowerment Rights Index is used as a more suitable measurement of democracy 
since the ratings for Colombia assigned by Freedom House and Polity – the most cited 
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ones in academic works – present very little variation for consecutive years, reducing in 
that way the explanatory capacity of independent variables. On the contrary, the ratings 
of the Empowerment Rights Index do present a larger variation. Besides, since this 
dissertation is limited to a single-case study, this additive index is more appropriate than 
others, such as Freedom House, that rate countries based on a comparative evaluation 
and may be more useful in cross-country studies. Furthermore, due to data availability, 
Secondary Education could not be included in the model and FDI is used instead of 
Investment. 
 
In the second regression analysis of the Colombian model, the variable for 
democracy, Empowerment Rights Index, is regressed against MPR and MilExp. Once 
again, compared to Bowman’s original model, an alternative measurement of 
democracy is used to avoid the problem generated by little variation in the dependent 
variable. The control variables used in the model include: Primary Education 
(percentage of total primary completion rate between 1990 and 2010), PCGDP 
(percentage of annual growth of per capita GDP between 1990 and 2010), Life 
Expectancy (number of years of life expectancy between 1990 and 2010), 
Unemployment (total unemployment as a percentage of labor force between 1990 and 
2010), and Population (total population between 1990 and 2010). In this case, Literacy 
is not used as a control variable due to lack of available data; instead it is replaced with 
Primary Education which is somewhat related. Likewise, the log of per capita GDP is 
not used since unlogged per capita GDP gives a better explanation in single-case study 
analysis. Finally, Unemployment and Population are also as additional control variables 
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since these variables may also help explain the variation in the measurement of 
democracy. 
 
In order to avoid autocorrelation in the dependent variables of the regression 
models, a Dickey-Fuller test for unit root was conducted. A unit root test is required to 
validate the results obtained when using a variable in a regression analysis: if there is a 
unit root – or, in other words, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected –, it is very 
probable that the findings of the regression show a significant effect of one variable on 
another one even if those variables are completely unrelated. The tests of the 
dependent variables of the regression models for Colombia stated that while the 
variable for economic growth did not contain a unit root, the null hypothesis for 
democracy could not be rejected and it had to be detrended24 so that it could be reliably 
used in the regression analysis.  
 
A summary of the results of the regression analyses is presented in Tables 5.4.1 
and 5.4.2. The multiple regression analysis is a technique that identifies the combined 
effect of various independent variables on the dependent one – determined by the 
coefficient of determination or R-squared of the regression – and at the same time, 
shows how each independent variable may explain the variation of the dependent 
variable while controlling for the remaining independent variables – this is determined 
by the regression coefficient of each independent variable. The difference between 
                                                          
24
 Detrending is a mathematical operation that removes "the trend from a time series" (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 793). 
A trend in a time series may affect or distort the relationships among the variables in a specific model. 
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those two parameters is crucial. On the one hand, the R2 of the regression shows “the 
proportion of the sample variation in the dependent variable explained by the 
independent variables [combined]” (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 102). This coefficient of 
determination may have a value between 0 and 1, and may be expressed as a 
percentage by multiplying R2 times 100.  
 
On the other hand, regression coefficients measure how much the dependent 
variable changes when there is a one-unit increase in an independent variable 
(Wooldridge, 2002, p. 803) while all other independent variables are controlled or hold 
constant. Since the purpose of the regression analysis of the Colombian model is to 
identify the impact of two specific independent variables, namely MPR and MilExp, on 
the dependent variables, in the presence of various control variables, the regression 
coefficients for MPR and MilExp are more relevant than any other of the parameters 
resulting from the analysis.  
 
As both tables show, the regression coefficients for MPR and MilExp expose the 
important impact that these variables have on democracy and economic growth, while 
controlling for other independent variables. According to Table 5.4.1, holding all other 
independent variables fixed, an increase in one unit of MPR generates an increase of 
1.77% in the real per capita GDP and an increase of 1% in MilExp causes a decrease of 
2.79% in the real per capita GDP. Likewise, according to Table 5.4.2, an increase in 
one unit of MPR generates an increase of 1.67 units of the country’s New 
Empowerment Rights Index and an increase of 1% in MilExp results in the reduction of 
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2.89 units of the democracy indicator given to the country by the New Empowerment 
Rights Index. Besides, the corresponding p-values for each regression coefficient of 
MPR and MilExp show that these variables have indeed a significant effect on the 
dependent variables: the p-values fall within 10% of significance and in some cases 
even within 5% of significance.  
 
In Tables 5.4.1 and 5.4.2, the negative signs of the regression coefficients for 
MilExp indicate that military expenditure has a negative effect on economic growth and 
democracy, a trend that goes along Bowman’s work. However, the regression 
coefficients for MPR in each table have a positive sign that reveals a positive effect of 
military participation ratios on economic growth and democracy. These regression 
coefficients for MPR in the Colombian model contrast with Bowman’s findings: in 
Colombia, MPR does not have a negative impact on economic growth and democracy.  
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Table 5.4.1: Real Per Capita GDP regressed against MPR and Mil Exp 
Dependent Var
Indep. Variable R1 R2 R3 R4
Intercept (Coefficient) -4,34000 11,63613 14,50358 26,16315
(Coefficient) 2,26839 0,92209 1,09642 -0,5138449**
p value 0,16500 0,62800 0,50700 0,09800
(Coefficient) 0,07419 -0,15324 -0,15152 -0,19424
p value 0,13100 0,42200 0,36000 0,12300
(Coefficient) -0,713098*** -0,5987994** -0,4270707* -0,2725616*
p value 0,00300 0,01600 0,05300 0,05800
(Coefficient) 0,788487* 0,63217 0,53725 0,33223
p value 0,06600 0,14500 0,15400 0,26260
(Coefficient) 1,37352 1,737569* 1,768685**
p value 0,22500 0,08800 0,03300
(Coefficient) -2,64197** -2,786084**
p value 0,02600 0,01300
R2 0,50500 0,55270 0,68950 0,73790
Adj. R2 0,38130 0,40360 0,55650 0,62560
No. of Obs. 21 21 21 21
F (4,16)(5,15)(6,14) 4,08 3,71 5,18 6,57
Prob>F 0,0182 0,022 0,0053 0,0018
Root MSE 1,9533 1,9177 1,6538 1,5193
Independent Variables
Democracy
Primary Education
Gov. Consumption
FDI Foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP, 1990-2010
MPR
Mil Exp
Dependent Variable
Real Per Capita GDP
Mil Exp
In R1, R2, and R3: Average Freedom House Ratings for Civil  Liberties and Political 
Rights, 1990-2010. In R4: New Empowerment Rights Index
Percentage of total primary completion rate, 1990-2010
General government final consumption expenditure as percentage of GDP, 1990-2010
MPR
Democracy
Primary Education
Real Per Capita GDP regressed against Military Participation Rates and Total Military Expenditure
(Control Variables: Democracy, Primary Education, Government consumption, and FDI)
PC GDP
*** p < 0,01 , ** p < 0,05 , * p < 0,1
Military Participation Rate (Armed Forces personnel per 1000 inhabitants), 1990-2010
Military expenditure  as a percetange of GDP), 1990-2010
Percentage of annual growth of per capita GDP, 1990-2010
Gov. Consumption
FDI
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Table 5.4.2: Empowerment Rights Index regressed against MPR and Mil Exp 
Dep. Variable
Ind. Variables
Intercept (Coefficient) 2,2024 7,9032 19,2977
(Coefficient) -0,0112 -0,0717 -0,1379
(T-ratio) 0,9410 0,6980 0,4020
(Coefficient) 0,0755 0,0573 -0,2926
(T-ratio) 0,7760 0,8340 0,3050
(Coefficient) 0,0748 0,0900 0,0892
(T-ratio) 0,7500 0,7090 0,6700
(Coefficient) -5.42e-08 -1.51e-07 -2.13e-07
(T-ratio) 0,9080 0,7670 0,6300
(Coefficient) 0,5674 1,67286*
p value 0,5550 0,0970
(Coefficient) -2,889116**
p value 0,0330
R2 0,029700 0,054400 0,343000
Adj. R2 -0,229100 -0,283300 0,039800
No. of Obs. 20 20 20
F (6,13)(7,12)(8,11) 0,11 0,16 1,13
Prob>F 0,9754 0,9728 0,3975
Root MSE 1,7985 1,8377 1,5896
Independent Variables
Primary Education
Real PC GDP
Unemployment Total unemployment as a percentaje of labor force, 1990-2010
Population Total population, 1990-2010
MPR
Mil Exp
Dependent Variable
New Empowerment 
Rights Index (Source: 
http://www.humanrigh
tsdata.org)
Democracy scores regressed against Military Participation Rates and Total Military Expenditure
(Control Variables: Primary Education, Real PC GDP, Life Expectancy, Unemployment, Population)
New Empowerment Rights Index
Primary Education
PC GDP
Unemployment
Population
MPR
Percentage of total primary completion rate, 1990-2010
Percentage of annual growth of real per capita GDP, 1990-2010
Military Participation Rate (Armed Forces personnel per 1000 inhabitants), 1990-2010
Military expenditure  as a percetange of GDP), 1990-2010
Additive index constructed from the Foreign Movement, Domestic Movement, Freedom 
of Speech, Freedom of Assembly & Association, Workers ' Rights , Electora l  Sel f-
Determination, and Freedom of Rel igion indicators . It ranges  from 0 (no government 
respect for these seven rights ) to 14 (ful l  government respect for these seven rights ).
Mil Exp
*** p < 0,01 , ** p < 0,05 , * p < 0,1
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The positive impact of MPR on democracy and economic growth is enhanced by 
the fact that the coefficient of determination of each regression analysis shows that an 
important percentage of the change in the dependent variable may be explained by the 
independent variables included in the regression model. According to the results in 
Tables 5.4.1 and 5.4.2, 73.8% of the variation in economic growth is explained by the 
independent variables of the model and 34.3% of the variation in democracy indicators 
is explained by the independent variables of the model25. These findings clearly indicate 
that something in the Colombian context alters the expected impact of militarization – 
specifically MPR – on democracy and economic growth anticipated by previous works 
of scholars such as Bowman. 
 
 The qualitative analysis previously conducted and the robust, significant, and 
positive correlation that exists between MPR and PrivateMPR that was explained and 
tested in Chapter 4, offer a very possible and viable explanation to justify the results of 
these regression analyses. Since the positive impact of MPR is correlated to a positive 
increase in PrivateMPR, and the private security industry has grown considerably during 
the past two decades fulfilling security demands that the public force was unable to 
provide, it is reasonable to argue that a positive increase of PrivateMPR also generates 
a positive effect on economic growth and democracy. Unfortunately, it was not possible 
                                                          
25
 Another parameter of analysis provided by this test is the adjusted R
2
. It determines how good does the fit of the 
model is given that its value decreases as additional independent variables are included in the model - and 
increases if those additional independent variables increase the explanatory capacity of the model (Wooldridge, 
2002, p. 791). For the purpose of this analysis, the regression coefficients of MPR and MilExp are more important 
than evaluating whether the control variables may or may not improve the fit of the model, because the latter are 
not directly relevant to the current research. 
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to include PrivateMPR as another variable in the regression analysis because there are 
not enough observations for the entire period of study, but the previous analysis reveals 
that the presence of a private security industry is able to mitigate the negative impact of 
militarization on democracy and economic growth argued by various contemporary 
scholars. 
 
It is important to highlight that the same is not true for the MilExp variable: the 
statistical evidence from the Colombian case study shows that it has indeed a negative 
impact on democracy and economic growth. Among the various reasons that explain 
this effect, the extensive literature on militarization affirms that the use of public funds 
for military-related issues goes in detriment of other social and economic needs that 
would otherwise encourage and strengthen development. However this argument is 
debatable: as the qualitative analysis in this chapter shows, the strengthening of the 
private security industry actually improves certain social, economic, and political 
requirements in the society. As the private security industry grows, the rule of law in the 
country increases, the political environment gains stability, the tendency to invest in the 
economy rises, and more formal jobs are offered. Besides, since a high percentage of 
the income received by the private security industry comes from individuals and private 
companies not necessarily related with the government, the costs of these private 
providers of security does not become an entire and direct burden of the national 
government. Unfortunately, there is not enough data yet to quantitatively prove this 
argument, but the logic behind it is reasonable. 
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5.4. The Risks of Privatizing Security  
 
Although the previous analysis shows that the privatization of security might 
mitigate the negative impact of militarization on democracy and economic growth, it 
does not mean that privatizing security is the perfect solution for insecure environments, 
democratic instability, or low rates of economic growth. In fact, the privatization process 
entails certain risks and dangers that in other parts of the world and in different periods 
have generated political unrest and economic breakdowns. However, it seems that 
under the current circumstances, those challenges have been adequately – and even 
unintentionally – addressed in Colombia, at least momentarily.  
 
Three main risks may be identified as the major challenges posed by the 
domestic private security industry in the country: the national armed forces may become 
dependent on the private security companies; the privatization of security threatens the 
state’s monopoly over the use of force; and the current regulations for the private 
security sector are out of date. These risks have not been too harmful yet – either 
because they have been insignificant in practice or because adequate control measures 
have been taken in response. Therefore, it is important to identify them and keep close 
track of their evolution. 
 
The complementarity of the national armed forces and the private security 
companies can easily result in a relation of dependency. One of the reasons for the rise 
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of the private security industry was the impossibility for national military and security 
services to attend to the increasing demand for security in the country. Once the private 
industry supplied services meeting the demand, the national armed forces could 
concentrate on other security threats and rely on the private actors to continue fulfilling 
those other security needs. This situation became evident in at least one of the sectors 
of Bogotá, the capital city of Colombia. A university26 in the center of the city hired a 
private security company to protect its students from ordinary crime and other security 
threats during their transit from the bus station to the campus. The total area of control 
covered between 20 to 25 blocks. Although this private company was hired to protect 
the students going to the university, the whole population present in that same area of 
control gained the same security benefits. After more than five years marked by the 
constant presence of the private security company, the police office that had jurisdiction 
in the center of the city was not concerned about sending officers to the 20 blocks 
between the university and the bus station because the private security company 
effectively covered the zone. Although this was possibly true, it is still a duty of the 
police to exercise control over their entire jurisdiction (W. Vargas, personal 
communication, December 13, 2012). Not fulfilling its constitutional mandate was a 
consequence of its perhaps unintended dependence on private security companies. 
 
The predominance of private providers of military and security services has 
raised alarms regarding their threat towards the state’s monopoly over the use of force. 
The academic and political debate on this issue is very complex and is open for further 
                                                          
26
 The interviewee requested to avoid mentioning the name of the university.  
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analysis. However, the current legislation in Colombia allows its citizens to possess and 
carry certain types of weapons, subject to prior approval by national authorities. 
Likewise, legally registered private security companies are also allowed to carry and 
use certain types of weapons under the same type of permitting process. It should be 
noted that under no circumstance may an individual or private company carry weapons 
categorized for use exclusively by the military and police forces.  
 
The reasoning behind this argument is that, although individuals and private 
companies have the capacity to carry weapons, the state continues to have final control 
over the use of force in its territory since it is the only one with the authority to extend 
such rights to third parties. There are three official entities that approve any petition to 
possess and carry a weapon and exercise control and oversight over those 
permissions: the Office for Control and Commercialization of Weapons, the National 
Military Industry, and the Ministry of Defense (L. Onzaga, personal communication, 
November 15, 2012). This high level of control and oversight minimizes any threat 
posed by the private security companies to the state’s monopoly over the use of force in 
Colombia.  
 
The current regulation for the private security sector has been in existence since 
1994, when Decree 356 was issued. More recently, several adjustments and 
amendments have been incorporated into the Decree, trying to adapt the regulatory 
framework to the evolution of the sector. However, since the industry has developed 
very quickly, and the security environment of the country is not the same as it was in the 
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1990s, there is still an urgent need to modify the regulatory framework governing private 
security companies (L. Onzaga, personal communication, November 15, 2012). In the 
last year, two different proposals were submitted to the Second Commission of the 
Colombian Senate in charge of matters related to security and defense. Both proposals 
agreed on the need for a new regulatory framework, but they completely disagreed on 
certain issues that made both of them incompatible (K. Perez, personal communication, 
October 16, 2012). Although these differences precluded the possibility of updating the 
current regulation, it is important to highlight that the government and the legislative 
branch are aware of the need to reform the regulations concerning the private security 
industry in order to maintain the same control and oversight that has enabled that 
industry to serve the country’s democratic stability and economic growth. 
 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
 
The existing theory regarding the impact of militarization on democracy and 
economic growth in Latin America, which counters the argument of the modernization 
school, states that “militarization is inversely related to political development, social 
spending, citizen well-being and social development, democracy, and food 
consumption” (Bowman, 2002, 183). However, data on militarization, democracy, and 
economic growth in Colombia shows that the country challenges the accepted theory. In 
order to address this puzzling situation, this chapter has tried to explain why the 
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militarization process in Colombia appears to have had a positive effect on democracy 
and economic growth.  
 
The privatization of security that took place between 1990 and 2010 – the same 
period in which militarization intensified in the country – proves a likely answer to the 
stated question. In order to test this assertion, the first part of the chapter focused on 
establishing a strong argument relating the private security industry with the evolution of 
democracy and economic growth ratings on the basis of qualitative and contextual 
analysis. The second part of the chapter presented a quantitative analysis to support 
that argument with statistical evidence. The overall analysis broadened the scope of 
existing research on the concept of militarization and echoed the proposal for a wider 
theoretical notion of militarization put forward by Jacklyn Cock. 
 
The qualitative analysis conducted in the study reveals that the inclusion of the 
privatization of security variable as part of the wider notion of militarization provides at 
least four elements that help explain the positive impact of militarization on democracy 
and economic growth in Colombia: first, the complementarity of the services security 
services provided by the national armed forces and the private security companies; 
second, the reduction of additional security threats posed by the urbanization of the 
internal armed conflict in the 1990s by private security providers; third, the provision of 
more secure environments for national and foreign companies (and their investments) 
due to the presence of private security; and fourth, the creation of additional jobs in the 
private security sector that helped to reduce the national unemployment rate. 
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The single-country regression model tailored to the Colombian context 
complemented those findings. The results of the regression analysis proved that in fact, 
an increase in MPR generates a robust and positive change in economic growth, and a 
positive, although not so robust change in the levels of democracy. This outcome, 
together with the strong, positive, and significant correlation between MPR and 
PrivateMPR demonstrated in Chapter 4, suggest that the strengthening of PrivateMPR 
directly supports the country’s militarization process while motivating a positive impact 
on democracy and economic growth.  
 
The regression analysis also shows that military expenditure in Colombia 
presents a strong, negative, and significant effect on democracy and economic growth. 
However, the close link between the private security industry and the militarization 
process in the country and the benefits that this industry offers to individuals, private 
commercial companies, and other non-governmental organizations, mitigates the 
negative impact of militarization on democracy and economic. Very probably, the 
inclusion of the privatization of security variable in the regression analysis would have 
generated a different set of findings, but the lack of available data prevented that from 
happening. Yet, it has been made clear that a larger amount of security providers 
created a safer environment for national and foreign private investment and private 
businesses had the possibility to hire private security companies or constitute security 
departments that, along with the national armed forces, protected them from any 
security threats. Furthermore, as the personnel of the national armed forces increased 
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and the private security industry raised its hiring rates, the employment levels improved 
and the national economy received another boost. 
 
Although the analysis conducted in this chapter put forward that the privatization 
of security mitigates the negative effects of militarization, it would be very risky and 
dangerous to believe that private security is the ultimate solution to have stable political 
regimes and successful economies. Luckily for Colombia, the threats posed by the 
private security industry have been adequately handled until now, but when the internal 
security challenges vary or the demand for security declines, those risks might flourish 
and get out of hand. 
 
The findings of this research have established that the nature of the militarization 
process in Colombia is, in fact, not incompatible with improvements in the indicators of 
democracy and economic growth. However, it is important to emphasize that the 
militarization process should not be considered the only reason behind the behavior of 
democracy and economic growth in the country: other elements aside from militarization 
that may also have some degree of influence.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
This dissertation examines the private security industry that arose in Colombia at 
the end of the twentieth century and studies the role it played in the country’s 
militarization process that took place between 1990 and 2010. The research analyzes in 
detail the relationships among militarization, democracy, and economic growth based 
on the general theoretical literature on the subject. This literature, led by the work of Kirk 
Bowman, argues that large militaries and increasing military expenditures have a 
significant negative impact on political and economic development. However, this study 
shows that the privatization of security in the country has complemented the tasks 
traditionally assigned to the national armed forces and at the same time has mitigated 
the negative effects of militarization on democracy and economic growth.  
 
 
6.1. Summary of the Findings 
 
The introductory chapter of the dissertation describes the security threats that 
make Colombia a particularly interesting case. The combination of insurgent groups, 
illegal paramilitary armies, and drug trafficking have increased the levels of insecurity in 
the country for years and have turned on the alerts of neighboring countries, as well as, 
of the United States. The involvement of the latter in the internal security policies of 
Colombia has existed for decades, but it was only until the end of the past century that 
the assistance provided by the United States promoted the incorporation of foreign 
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PMSC as additional tools to strengthen the national armed forces and to support the 
counterinsurgent and counternarcotic operations in the country. At the same time, a 
domestic industry of private security companies arose and strengthened in this way the 
process of privatization of security in Colombia. 
 
The presence of these foreign PMSC, the emergence of a domestic private 
security industry, the evident ongoing militarization process, and the evolution of the 
levels of democracy and economic growth in the last two decades in the country 
comprise an intriguing situation around which this research is conducted. As it is 
reviewed in the second chapter, current literature on militarization and on the 
privatization of security affirms that an increasing militarization process has a negative 
effect on indicators of development and that the rise of a globalized industry of private 
military and security services occurred while states stimulated the implementation of 
demilitarization policies. Therefore, it results intellectually puzzling that the militarization 
process in Colombia did not prevent the appearance of a domestic industry of private 
security services, the advent of economic growth, nor the consolidation of a stable 
democratic environment. 
 
This academic puzzle is translated in chapter three into the research questions 
that the dissertation tries to answer: 
1. Why has the domestic private security industry developed in a context 
characterized by greater militarization in Colombia during the last two 
decades?  
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2. Why does the militarization process in Colombia seem to have had a positive 
effect on democracy and economic growth? 
 
The findings of the research are presented in the fourth and fifth chapters, each 
one addressing research question No. 1 and No. 2, respectively. Chapter four focuses 
on the relationship between militarization and the privatization of security in Colombia. 
The evident militarization process that began in 1990 and was intensified in 2002 is 
demonstrated by the increasing numbers of the personnel of the public force and the 
total public expenditure on national defense. This militarization initiative revealed a 
notorious influence of the United States’ foreign policy: the use of civilians and private 
providers of security in counternarcotic and counterinsurgent operations. Under this 
framework, foreign PMSC were hired to train and support the national armed forces, 
and a network of informants and divisions of peasant soldiers were created to 
strengthen even more the military and the police. The evidence gathered also shows 
that over the same period, a domestic private security industry formalized during the 
1990s, the income of the private security sector maintained a growing trend throughout 
the 2000s, and by 2007 the total number of private security agents was higher than the 
total number of police forces. 
 
Although the militarization process and the emergence of the domestic private 
security industry materialized almost at the same time, the factors that originated them 
are different. On the one hand, the risks posed by the internal security threats and the 
failed attempts to find peaceful solutions to the internal armed conflict promoted the idea 
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that the only viable way to end the violent struggle relied on the implementation of 
strong and straight forward military policies. On the other hand, the urbanization of the 
armed conflict, the increasing demand for security in the cities, and the formalization of 
private surveillance services created the perfect environment for the consolidation of a 
profitable industry of private security companies. These facts prove right the first 
hypothesis of the dissertation: other factors different from the ongoing militarization 
process triggered the appearance and development of the domestic private security 
industry in Colombia.  
 
Additionally, the study has found that since the national armed forces did not 
have the capacity to adequately fulfill the population’s demand for security, private 
security companies could take advantage of a promising market niche; one that would 
also end up benefitting the public force. Private security companies could provide the 
demanded security services enabling the police and the military to concentrate on 
fighting insurgents and drug traffickers in different regions of the country. This ratifies 
the second hypothesis of the research: domestic PMSC complement perfectly the 
security functions assigned to the national armed forces within the internal armed 
conflict in Colombia.  
 
Unlike previous studies on militarization, this research takes into account the 
privatization of security as an additional variable capable of explaining to a certain 
extent the effect that militarization has on democracy and economic growth. As a first 
step in the process, chapter four reveals that there is a strong, robust, and significant 
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correlation between militarization and the privatization of security in Colombia. This 
correlation indicates that the strengthening of militarization policies would be 
accompanied by an increase in the number of private security forces. Therefore, if the 
former has a direct impact on democracy and economic growth according to the 
reviewed literature, it would be reasonable to try to identify what are the effects of the 
latter. In this sense, the findings of chapter five confirm the third hypothesis of the study 
by showing that the presence of a domestic private security industry indeed mitigates 
the negative effects of militarization on democracy and economic growth through four 
clearly identified reasons.  
 
First, the security services provided by the national armed forces and the private 
security companies complement each other perfectly. While the national armed forces 
react to security threats, private security companies have a more preventive role, 
encompassing in this way the whole spectrum of security needs of the population. This 
complementarity should not be assimilated with a reduction in the opportunity costs that 
a militarization process entails since the domestic private security industry does not 
intend to replace the public force in its task to counter the country’s internal security 
challenges. On the contrary, this privatization of security prevents the increase of those 
opportunity costs as the state does not have to raise even more the budget and 
organizational resources to fulfill an increasing additional demand for security.  
 
Second, private providers of security help to reduce the increasing security 
threats posed by the process of urbanization of the conflict in the country during the 
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1990s. National armed forces were prepared to fight illegal armed groups in rural areas, 
but the urbanization of the conflict took them by surprise. When the internal armed 
conflict arrived at the main cities, the political and social elite that had not been affected 
previously by the conflict required immediate protection, but the national armed forces 
were not capable of fulfilling those needs. Therefore, without private security providers, 
the increasing security threats in urban areas might have resulted in higher political 
unrest and instability, reaffirming in this sense the fourth hypothesis of the dissertation. 
 
Third, the protracted internal armed conflict and its inherent insecurity made the 
country a very risky destination for economic investment. However, the sense of 
security provided by the private security industry and the services it offered to national 
and foreign investors helped them overcome that risk. The possibility of acquiring 
security departments within businesses and corporations made them less dependable 
on the national armed forces. Fourth, as the private security sector expanded and its 
profits continued to increase, the constantly required work force created additional jobs 
that helped to reduce the national unemployment rate. More employment translated into 
better living conditions for 1% more of the country’s population. 
 
The results of the regression analysis conducted in Chapter 5 support the 
previously stated findings. The regression coefficients for MPR revealed that in 
Colombia, an increase in the number of national armed forces has a positive and robust 
effect on economic growth and democracy, although the effect on the latter is not as 
robust as on the former. With this in mind and given the strong correlation between 
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MPR and PrivateMPR evidenced in Chapter 4, an increase in the personnel of the 
domestic private security industry may also end up having a positive impact on 
democracy and economic growth. In this way, it may be argued that the inclusion of the 
privatization of security variable in militarization studies is indeed relevant and 
significant.  
 
 
6.2. Discussion 
 
The main findings of this dissertation are the result of analyzing a specific case 
study, but they do not need to be limited to this specific scenario. As it was stated in the 
introductory chapter, due to the particular characteristics of the Colombian internal 
security situation, it may be difficult to generalize the final results of the research. 
However, several features and dynamics present in the study could make some of 
those findings generalizable to a certain extent. This means that the positive impact that 
PMSC have shown in Colombia may be applicable to other similar contexts. 
 
For example, in a country with an internal armed conflict where the national 
armed forces are present but are not enough, PMSC may also have a positive impact. 
PMSC cannot substitute or completely replace national armed forces because the 
essence of military and police forces is closely linked to the society that they protect and 
the state that they defend and these are not natural characteristics of private providers 
of military and security services. PMSC constitute a mechanism to strengthen the 
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general provision of security together with the national armed forces. This was what 
happened in Colombia and what may happen elsewhere: PMSC complemented the 
activities of the military and the police; they never intended to displace them. 
 
Likewise, in a country with an internal armed conflict where there are potential 
economic opportunities but the security situation prevents them from being exploited, 
PMSC may also have a positive impact. The sole presence of PMSC does not improve 
national economic indicators. Private security companies are a means for private 
investors to return to the country and enhance the economy using their own capital. For 
this to happen there should be economic opportunities that encourage risky investments. 
PMSC improve the security environment for businesses and corporations offering 
security services that they can control and even incorporate to the organization as 
security departments. This dynamic took place in Colombia and may also happen 
elsewhere. 
 
The dissertation provides three major theoretical contributions. The first one is to 
test the existing theory on militarization in Latin America. The research used the 
Colombian case study to expand the results of previous studies and offer a satisfactory 
explanation of why the militarization process in Colombia has a positive relation with 
democracy and economic growth. However, it must be highlighted that the findings of 
the current research do not distort the theoretical model proposed by Latin American 
researchers such as Bowman.  
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The second one challenges the existing theory regarding the rise and evolution of 
the industry of PMSC and brings new insights for further studies. Various scholars 
argued that one of the principal reasons that enabled the emergence of a globalized 
industry of private military and security services was the demilitarization process that 
occurred after the end of the Cold War. However, Colombia developed a domestic 
private security industry in the middle of a strong militarization process, a situation that 
contradicted those scholars. In this sense, it may be argued that the evolution of the 
globalized industry of PMSC differs to a great extent from the evolution of the domestic 
industry of PMSC, and as such, further research on the privatization of security should 
always require a differential approach regarding the type of companies that are the 
object of study. Furthermore, the findings of this dissertation may inspire the evaluation 
of the pertinence or not of encouraging the formation of domestic industries of PMSC in 
countries affected by internal violence. 
 
The third one is to support previous initiatives to expand the academic concept of 
militarization. Some years ago, a revision of the definition of militarization was proposed 
by Jacklyn Cock. She argued that the concept should refer “both to the military as a 
formal, state institution and to various non-state forms, expressions and instruments of 
organized violence” (Cock, 2005, p. 791). The findings of this research have shown that 
PMSC have the capability of building a relationship of complementarity with military 
forces. Without entering into the analysis of the positive and negative aspects of this 
relation, the important issue is that today PMSC may be the most relevant among 
current non-state expressions of organized violence. Since they are active in most 
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countries around the world and they end up having close contact with military and police 
forces, any research on militarization should include them.  
 
Finally, this dissertation offers interesting elements that open the possibility to 
conduct further research on the impact of the privatization of security on different levels. 
Researchers should continue gathering information on the domestic private security 
industry in Colombia to make a more robust assessment of the evolution and the effects 
of the industry in the country. Future works could also analyze the use of PMSC in 
counterinsurgent maneuvers and peace keeping operations: would it be possible to 
affirm that PMSC are becoming a legal and effective way to get civilians more involved 
in armed conflicts as part of counterinsurgent policies?   
 
Another controversial topic that calls for further debate is the role of PMSC in the 
evolution of the concept of the modern state. According to several scholars, before the 
modern state claimed the monopoly over the use of coercive means and national 
armies were institutionalized, various private expressions of military and security 
services were in charge of providing protection to individuals and territories. With this in 
mind, does the consolidation of a globalized industry of PMSC suggests that the 
evolution of the modern state is going in a direction where its claim over the monopoly 
of the use of force is once again lost? Will the current notion of the modern state 
continue to be the modern state? 
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STATA Results of Regression Analysis 
 
 
1. Real Per Capita GDP regressed against Military Participation Rates and Total 
Military Expenditure 
(Control Variables: Democracy, Primary Education, Government consumption, and 
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2. Democracy Scores regressed against Military Participation Rates and Total 
Military Expenditure 
(Control Variables: Primary Education, PC GDP, GDP Growth, Life Expectancy, 
Unemployment, Population) 
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